

JUNE 1950

The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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Summaries and Comments

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ARTICLES

THE SUBJECTIVE AND THE OBJECTIVE *

RUDOLF ALLERS

WHEN HUSSERL addressed to the philosophical world his now famous admonition "back to the things themselves," what he had then in mind were not the things with which we deal in daily intercourse. Quite to the contrary, he set out to "bracket" the whole realm of existence, of concreteness, of becoming. Phenomenology, as he then understood it, did not, as he said in a note in his *Ideas*, "tell any stories." Did he consider the *epoché* as only a methodological device and did he intend from the very beginning to find the way back to the world of concreteness? If so, he did not furnish any information. In any case, we know today that in his subsequent reflections, the problem of the concrete world, the *Lebenswelt* as he called it, assumed increasing importance.

The influence that the meditations of Husserl's later years may have had on the younger generation is, as yet, difficult to assess. And it is, in fact, not important whether this question can or cannot be answered. Husserl, obviously, was not less sensitive to the problems arising from the intellectual and cultural situation as it developed around 1920, than were those who have emphatically made the *Lebenswelt* the primary object of their inquiries and the starting point for the reconstruction of philosophy.¹

Many of the idioms which characterize recent philosophies refer to this world of ordinary experience. Being-in-a-world,

* Read, with some omissions, as the Presidential Address at the tenth meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, Brooklyn College, March 20, 1959.

¹ On the existence of such parallel but largely independent developments, cf. H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society* (New York, 1958). It is also noteworthy that many of the ideas and terms that are used today so generally have been anticipated by Ortega y Gasset. Thus, in his *Meditaciones del Quijote* (Madrid, 1914), he fully recognizes the constitutive role of the situation—*circumstancia*—for the man's being. For further parallels, cf. J. Ferrater Mora, *Ortega y Gasset* (New Haven, 1957), pp. 46 ff.

being-with, situation, *engagement*, commitment, and other such formulae all point in the same direction.

The statement: "to-be-in-a-world is constitutive for the Being of the human being," is not to be understood as establishing a relationship between two independent entities. I-being-in-my-world, on one hand, and my-world-including-me, on the other, are two indissoluble sides of one and the same "state of affairs." This, however, is true of "my" world, not of "the world." "The world" is what is referred to by ordinary language; it is this which enables each one of us to come to some "understanding," to agree or disagree, to co-operate, and so on. By virtue of certain idiosyncrasies each "private" world differs from each other, and the degree of difference determines what we call normalcy. People who live in an "abnormal world" are themselves abnormal. Normalcy consists precisely in that the several private worlds overlap so far as to render possible generally intelligible formulations. The "common world of people who are awake"—the words are those of Heraclitus—is intersubjective and insofar independent of the single human being.

In other words, it is not as if this being-in-a-world were something added to my being, as if there were a human being which then would—or perhaps would not—enter into a relation with the world. This, in fact, is the original meaning of the designation of man as an *animal sociale*. For this name does not indicate a capacity on the part of man of which he might or might not avail himself. It refers rather to an essential or fundamental trait which is not less constitutive and characteristic of man as is his being an *animal rationale*, or a biped, or able to speak. If it was necessary that being-with, *Mitsein*, had to be pointed out explicitly, it was because the original understanding, Aristotle's, had been lost in consequence of certain developments in post-Cartesian philosophy, developments which, in truth, were not implied in Descartes' conception.

If it is said that "all men awake live in one and the same common world" and that they are aware of this fact by means of ordinary language, the objection arises that there are many ordinary languages and, therefore, not one, but many common worlds. Much emphasis has been placed, in recent times, on the

great differences obtaining among the several languages and, consequently, the corresponding world-pictures. But the same writers who stress these differences so much and pretend that no one living in one universe of discourse can truly understand what a member of another such universe means, explain to us carefully what the differences are; that is, they tell us, after all, what the allegedly incomprehensible utterances mean. They are so much concerned with the differences that they pay little attention to the fact of the many things the most divergent languages have in common. And they have much in common because they all deal with one and the same common world.

This common world is where each of us lives, that with which he deals, the origin of all questions, and the place where our endeavors to answer the questions must prove themselves to be reliable, or, at least, tenable for the present. It is the world of the ordinary man not less than that of the scientist when he returns from his calculations and experiments to his daily existence.

But even so, this world is not spread out before us in perfect clarity. It has to be uncovered, for it is overlaid by the manifold theoretical explanations which science has furnished in the course of centuries and which have become part also of the world-picture of average people.² And this applies not only to the world of advanced, especially Western, civilization. It is equally true of the so-called primitive civilizations. If these are poorer in implements and lack scientific knowledge, their worlds are not less overlaid by institutions and interpretations.³

If then we take the call "back to the things themselves" in its widest sense, as referring not only to ideal but to concrete things as well, we are faced by the task of working out an encompassing phenomenology of the ordinary world, for we cannot hope otherwise to arrive at an ontology of the *Lebenswelt*, of which Husserl speaks as of a *desideratum*. To comply with this task it is not only necessary that one free oneself of all admixtures, scientific, meta-

² Husserl refers repeatedly to this circumstance. Cf. also L. Landgrebe in his Introduction to Husserl's *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Hamburg, 1948), pp. 38 ff.

³ Cf. E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, trans. R. Manheim (New Haven, 1955), II, 71 ff.

physical, mythological, or what else, but also that one behave as what Husserl calls a "disinterested observer."⁴

This, however, implies that we are not allowed to credit any datum which we may discover with particular importance. That we are inclined to consider certain data or aspects as more important and tend to choose them as a center, so to speak, for mapping out the ordinary world, has to be taken just as one more datum among others. It is not less one such datum among others that we look "naturally" at those sides of the world as more important that concern us immediately. In other words: from the stand-point of phenomenology or of the "disinterested observer" the preference accorded to "existence" or the individual person is a premature decision which is not *a priori* justified but requires justification.

I submit that the neglect of the task just outlined is the reason, or one of the reasons, why contemporary philosophy has contributed astonishingly little to the phenomenology of the ordinary world. It seems, if one may say so, that in the formula "Being-in-a-world" they are concerned only with the "Being," and they either take the world for granted or view it as something secondary. Or one might speak of a subjectivistic prejudice, understandable as a reaction against the depersonalizing conceptions that prevailed previously, but nonetheless a prejudice.

The position of the "disinterested observer," however, can never be realized. Not because it is impossible to disregard or bracket all one's prejudices and preferences, but because the position is self-contradictory. For disinterestedness itself would also have to be considered as one datum among others; that is, it would, so to speak, require a disinterestedness of a second degree, and this would repeat itself *ad infinitum*.

Hence, it seems that a choice is inevitable. But must choosing mean the adoption of only one viewpoint? Is it not conceivable that one might take account simultaneously of two—or even if it were necessary, of more—viewpoints? That is to say, is it not possible for one to give due consideration to the approach recognized by the "existentialists" and, at the same time, consider

⁴ *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaft und die transzendentale Phänomenologie* (Haag, 1945), pp. 160, 183.

all that which is not existential? Or, what amounts to the same, that equal attention be paid to the person or the *Dasein* or the existent, on the one hand, and the world wherein he is, on the other?

Such a two-pronged approach is, I believe, not only possible, but, in truth, indispensable. The subject (ego, person, *Dasein*, existent) continually transcends himself; where to? His being is "ecstatic" (*ek-sistens*);⁵ but this, too, implies a regions so to speak, into which this ecstasy reaches. And it is not left to the arbitrary decision of the subject in what direction he transcends himself. For he is not surrounded by a void but precisely by a world which has a structure of its own.

To the urge, if one may say so, of self-transcendence corresponds, as its indispensable correlative, the "opportunity" supplied by the transcendent world which extends a "solicitation" to the subject, which "invites" him to respond by "inserting" himself, in an indeed peculiar manner, into the world that is. Without such an invitation, challenge, or solicitation on the part of the world self-transcendence cannot happen.⁶ There must be a "whereto," a direction, for this movement by which man apparently passes beyond the boundaries of his being. Emphasis has to be placed on "apparently." For, in fact, there is no such passing beyond. One is easily misled by certain phrases: a man may say that he was completely lost in the contemplation of a painting, or that he forgot himself altogether while absorbed by some activity or

⁵ H. Plessner, *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1928), speaks of "excentricity," a notion not unrelated to that of self-transcendence. It is, however, not feasible that all the ideas be discussed which somehow converge towards that of being-in-a-world.

It may be noted, however, in passing that the idea of "being-with" as constitutive of man's being holds a prominent place in the thought of Marx and also of L. Feuerbach. "A perfectly isolated individual would disappear undistinguishably in the chaos of nature." (*Das Wesen des Christentums* [Leipzig, 1841].) Both are, of course, dependent on Hegel.

⁶ Self-transcendence and ekstasis, too, depend on choice, and the choice is between anticipated situations which are to be realized. Hence, it is the picture of a possible world which determines the direction of transcendence. The absolute indeterminacy and unlimited freedom of the "project" in the philosophy of J. P. Sartre is purely fictitious.

impression.⁷ But these phrases are, as closer examination will show, only metaphors. What actually goes on is of a much more complicated nature. Some philosophers contend that with the recognition of man's being-in-a-world and of his self-transcendence the gap between subject and object, a heritage of idealism, has finally been closed. This statement I hold to be false or even meaningless; it results from an insufficient clarification of the term "object."

It is not for this study to survey critically the several meanings and to do away with the many equivocations.⁸ I must content myself with defining the sense in which I shall use some terms.

The domain to which the terms "object" and "objective" apply shall be co-extensive with that comprising all which is non-ego.⁹ This objective domain must be understood as being, on one

⁷ This losing oneself has always been known, of course. Its extreme form is, probably, the *unio mystica*. The statements, however, on an apparent abolition of the subject must be taken *cum grano salis*. For the ego finds itself again after the ekstasis is over, and this finding again would be incomprehensible if there had taken place a real abolition or annihilation of the ego. This is true, at least, of Christian mystic experience. *Plus est qui amat ubi amat quam ubi animat*, says the *Opusculum De Adhaerendo Deo*, ascribed to Albert the Great; *plus*, but not wholly. The emphasis placed on participation, unification, bridging or abolishing the gap between subject and object, etc. has given rise, on the part of French and German writers, to the curious use of "exist" as a transitive verb. (E. g. Jeanne Delhomme, *La pensée interrogative* (Paris, 1954), "J'existe le tableau.") Time and again one is reminded of the language in which the mystics, Eastern and Western, expressed themselves when talking of the *unio mystica*. What one reads today often sounds rather like a sort of "secularization" of mystical experience. But several, at least, of the Christian mystics warned against assuming a true and substantial unification of divine and human being. "I speak not of the reality but of the appearance, the impression that is felt." So Johannes Tauler, as quoted by M. C. D'Arcy, *The Meeting of Love and Knowledge* (London, 1958), p. 74.

⁸ Lalande, *Vocabulaire*, 7th ed. (Paris, 1956), enumerates six meanings of "objective" and four of "object." The list is not even complete. It does not mention, e.g., the sense in which A. von Meinong uses the two terms in his *Gegenstandstheorie*; see "Über emotionale Präsentation," *Sitz. Ber. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss. (Phil. Hist. Kl.)* 1917.

⁹ Non-ego is not meant here, obviously, in the sense of Fichte. The distinctions here proposed are strictly phenomenological and leave at first undecided all epistemological and ontological questions.

hand, "intrasubjective" and, on the other, "transsubjective."¹⁰ Intrasubjective are all "intentional objects," all those to which Brentano referred as having *inexistentia intentionalis et mentalis*. The intrasubjective is not of the ego or the subject, although it may be said, metaphorically, to be *in* the subject. One cannot help using such metaphors taken from space; but one ought to be always conscious of their inadequacy and of the dangers arising whenever they are taken too literally.¹¹

Intrasubjective are not only the "objects" of knowledge, constituting the *Gegenstandsbewusstsein*, but also all that is envisaged as possible goal, all that is desired, evaluated, preferred or rejected.

To each intrasubjectively given corresponds something trans-subjective. This holds for veridical perceptions and judgments not less than for erroneous and fictitious creations of the mind. Transsubjectivity is not synonymous with "real existence" nor with "objective validity."

The relationship between the transsubjective and the intrasubjective (the intentional object or, in the parlance of Nicolai Hartmann, the objectivated) is basically constitutive of the being-in-a-world and the being-with of the existent or the *Dasein*. This relationship is an ultimate which cannot be analyzed any further although it may be described more precisely. As an ultimate and as constitutive it can never be "abolished" or "overcome."

¹⁰ I borrow these expressions from Johannes Volkelt, *Gewissheit und Wahrheit* (Munich, 1918), who, however, uses them in a different sense.

¹¹ It may not be superfluous to point out that certain meanings of "object" and "objective" are excluded. (1) That which is implied in our speaking of objective truth, objective knowledge, as in science. It is an unwarrantedly narrow interpretation to restrict the meaning of "object" to that with which science is preoccupied. (2) In English and French (but not in German), there exist idioms in which "subject" and "object" are used as interchangeable terms. One can equally say "the subject" or "the object" of this essay. The underlying difference of viewpoints is usually neglected. (3) In English, French, Italian, but again not in German, "object" may also mean "goal," by virtue of the equation: object = project = goal. In fact, "*objectum*" may designate not only *id quod objicitur mihi*, but also *quod objicio*. Anything I hold before myself, say, for the sake of protection, may be called an object. It is the same with "problem"; this names not only what is "thrown before me" but also that which I "pose"—that is, a question.

Without it there cannot be either a human mind or a human life.¹²

One of the most outstanding characteristics of this relationship is the discrepancy of the two terms. The intrasubjective does not exhaust the transsubjective; the latter is always richer than the former. The awareness of this discrepancy constitutes what I have called the solicitation or the challenge. For the mere fact that the mind needs or desires further acquaintance with the transsubjective would by itself not suffice for its moving, so to speak, towards the transsubjective. It is necessary that the latter permit of being approached. It is a one-sided view to assume that the expanding relationship of the subject and his world is dependent exclusively on the former. "All men by nature want to know;" certainly. But this tendency would be utterly idle were not the transsubjective of such a nature as to allow its being approached.

The transsubjective is more than the intrasubjective, and not only when one has to do with reality. This is, I suppose sufficiently evident to render further elaboration superfluous. But it is doubtlessly the real world which challenges first of all.¹³

Intentionally apprehended, the transsubjective is "present" to and in the mind neither in its concreteness nor in its completeness. However paradoxical it may be, it is an undeniable fact that the discrepancy between the transsubjective and the intrasubjective is one of the fundamental data of consciousness. Whether metaphysics can offer a satisfactory explanation is a question not to be raised within the context of this talk. But it must be noted that this discrepancy is the *conditio sine qua non* of all transcendence on the part of the subject. For it is this discrepancy, which opens, on the one hand, a way by which to transcend and, on the other hand, which constitutes the challenge to which transcendence is the reply.

This reply is of more than one kind. Philosophy has been mainly concerned, at least since Kant, with knowledge, and has more or less ignored the kind of transcendence called "work."

¹² *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, 2nd ed. (Berlin-Leipzig, 1925), esp. pp. 429 ff.

¹³ A man who climbed one of the giants of the Himalaya was asked what made him undertake this daring enterprise; "Well," said he, "it—the mountain—was there."

To the question "how is knowledge possible?" corresponds the equally important question: "how is work possible?" The possibility of work, that is, of the transformation of the world through man's activity has been taken, it would seem, for granted. The fact is, of course, obvious. There is no need to point out that this fact and the correlated notion of the *homo faber*¹⁴ which served as models for the metaphysical speculations of Plato, Aristotle, and innumerable other thinkers. But, as it happens frequently, it is the obvious which presents us with the most difficult problem. On previous occasions I have suggested that there is a need to devote greater attention to this problem which I propose to call that of "ergology".¹⁵

Creativity is one particular form of transcendence. It is often said that the creative spirit "passes over" into the work it creates. This cannot be taken literally. For the spirit "remains," if one may say so, what and where it was. Here one has to recall what I pointed out before: that the intrasubjective is "in" but not "of" the mind. It is not "part" of the subjective spirit, to use an Hegelian term. It is rather the counterpart of the objective spirit, if this term is taken in a wider sense than Hegel gave to it. The statement that the intrasubjective be "in" but not "of" the mind may require some explanation. It is, in fact, a common belief, or so it seems to me, that all that is found in the mind be "mental" in the sense of being of the same nature as the mind. Also the expression *inxistentia mentalis* seems to imply the same notion. But closer examination will show that this cannot be the case.

The mind is a real existent, whether it be viewed as a substance of some sort or as an accident. As real, it is subject to change. It is a "stream of consciousness"; it is active in many respects and responds to external impressions with corresponding alterations. But the intrasubjective is unchangeable. Husserl's at first sight somewhat paradoxical statement that the real tree may burn down, but that this can never happen to the intentional-

¹⁴ For a provocative, but in some respects debatable, analysis of the notion of *homo faber*, see H. Arendt, *The Human Situation* (Chicago, 1958).

¹⁵ In a paper read at the 1957 convention of the Amer. Philos. Assoc. and one communicated to the 12th Internat. Congress of Philosophy at Venice, September 1958.

object tree, must be taken literally. For it is incorrect to say that an idea or any other "content" of the mind undergoes change. No intrasubjective changes; it is replaced. And replaced so that the original remains. When I say: "I have changed my opinion," it means that I have formed a new opinion which now takes the place of the former. But the former is unchanged; it persists exactly as it was. This applies to any intrasubjective content whatsoever. One memory image may supplant another; but this does not prevent the latter from remaining what and how it was.

Consequently, the intrasubjective has to be considered as non-temporal. But "temporality" is an essential trait of the human being or the human mind. The *modus essendi* of the intrasubjective is, therefore, not that of the mind "in" which the former occurs.

If the intrasubjective is not of the mind, it can neither be said to be in the same mode of being as the mind or the subjective spirit. Brentano, following the Scholastics, had spoken of an *inexistentia mentalis objecti* and thus reintroduced the notion of intentionality. I suggest that we adopt another term; first because *inexistentia* is somewhat ambiguous; but mainly because the same mode of being is found also within the transsubjective. The mode which is proper to the objective spirit, the spiritual traces—if one may say so—deposited by man in his works, corresponds to the mode of *insistence*, as I propose to call it, of the intrasubjective.

The insistence of the spirit in the work and the insistence of the transsubjective in the mind are correlatives. In other words, one has to do with a mutual relationship, but one which is not symmetrical since the transsubjective is indifferent to and unaffected by its giving rise to the formation of the intrasubjective, whereas the latter depends in more than one respect on the transsubjective. The mutuality of this relationship, however, renders questionable the claim that "transcendence" is peculiar only to the subject. For it seems justified to say that the transsubjective, too, "transcends" itself by permitting its apprehension by a subject.

Because the transsubjective permits apprehension and reveals itself as always richer than its intrasubjective correlate it is at once indifferent and active or—envisioned from the standpoint of

the subject—it is simultaneously apprehended and not apprehended. It is the former as that which is "given in evidence" and the latter as "challenge" or solicitation.

The capacity—metaphorically speaking, the willingness—on the part of the transsubjective to let itself be both known and transformed appears to me as of paramount metaphysical significance. If it has not been given, hitherto, all the attention it deserves, at least, as far as I know, it is because of the domineering influence which subjectivism has exercised throughout the centuries of the modern age. This influence is felt also today, even with thinkers who turn against subjectivism. I have remarked before that the recognition of the being-in-a-world, of being-in-a-situation, being engaged, and so forth,¹⁶ requires an analysis of the second term as much as it does of the first.

I have also implied that the expressions like "transcendence," "ek-stasis" and so on must be used with caution and that their metaphorical nature should not be forgotten. For when they are taken all too literally, they cease to refer adequately to the phenomena they claim to describe and easily lead into sometimes fantastic falsifications.

If, for instance, one were to understand the term "transcendence" literally, it would mean that that which transcends will be found, after executing this movement, there whereto it transcended. But this is, obviously, not the case. The transcending—call it "being," "existence" or by any other name,—does not "leave" itself or its former "place"; (these very inappropriate terms are of course suggested by the spatial and motor imagery implied in "transcendence,") just as the subjective spirit does not pass over into its creation. It is only within the framework of a spirit-

¹⁶ Historical justice requires, at least, a brief reference to the fact that this idea of being-in-a-situation, as constitutive of the human being, had been stated explicitly by Ortega y Gasset long before the emergence of the several "existential" philosophies. Compare the following passage from Ernst Mayer (a follower of Jaspers), *Dialektik des Nichtwissens* (Basle, 1950), p. 25: "Denn ich finde mich nicht nur in einer Situation, sondern diese Situation, in der ich mich finde, bin ich eigentlich selbst," with the words of Ortega, written in 1914: "Yo soy yo y la mi circunstancia" (*Meditaciones del Quijote*, ed. J. Marias [Madrid, 1957], p. 43). Marias points out in his commentary (p. 239), that in 1932 Ortega characterized this formula as the shortest summary of his philosophical thought.

ualistic monism, as that of Hegel, that such a statement makes sense. As long as we move on the terrain of phenomenological analysis, we cannot speak of such a "passing over."

As little as the spirit can leave itself or, as it were, split off a part of itself to incorporate it in its work, as little can the subject leave itself, lose its identity and become one with the trans-subjective. Not only is it impossible that the opposition of subject and object ever be abolished, it is indispensable that it persist because otherwise the subject would lose its identity and literally cease to be.

It would be by far too long were I to explain why I consider this thesis as untenable and as lacking substantiation by an all-sided phenomenological analysis. Nor can I dwell on its consequences which I believe to be pernicious. I may, however, be allowed to say one word on one of the reasons which have brought about this new position. This reason is the failure to realize the manifold meanings in which the terms "object" and "objective" are used. I have referred to these ambiguities before. Those thinkers who so emphatically proclaim the "abolition" of the subject-object distance take "object" as signifying that with which "objective" science is concerned. Now, it must be admitted that the way we envisage our fellow men is not that in which we look at other data of our experience. I am, indeed, far from denying that the philosophies of which I speak have contributed new and valuable insights. It is perfectly true that a person is not an object in the same sense as is a stone. But a stone is neither an object in the same sense as, say, a mathematical proposition or a concept. Envisaging a person as a "Thou" is not the same as envisaging him as a "He" (Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel). But, again, recognizing a transsubjective as a "He" and recognizing it as an inanimate thing also are not identical attitudes. And the same may be said in regard to an element of nature and an artifact. But, different though these several "objects" may be, they have in common that they are transsubjective, pertain to the non-ego, and can in no way become identical with the subject entering in some relationship with them.

Few will deny today that the new philosophies—commonly, though with questionable right, comprised under the one name of

"existentialism"—have widened the horizon of philosophical inquiry. They have, however, contributed mainly to the extension of philosophical problematic, and have not offered solutions to the eternal quest of metaphysics. If they have failed in this latter respect, it is because of the one-sidedness of their approach. And this, in turn, is related to the incompleteness of the phenomenological basis on which these philosophies try to build their constructions.¹⁷ I need not repeat what I have said before; namely, that the unilateral consideration of the subject, existent, *Dasein*, or by whatever name it may be called, has prevented the due consideration of all that is the not-ego.

By viewing transcendence, ek-stasis, commitment, and so forth, exclusively from the standpoint of the subject, one risks overlooking the enormous variety of the situations or world-aspects involved. To be committed does not mean the same for the priest, the judge, the physician, or the educator, on one hand, and the betrothed, the friend, the soldier, or the member of a ship's crew, on the other. The "existential significance" of these several situations can be found out only by a phenomenological analysis of the situation.

Even the I-Thou relationship is differentiated in many ways.

It is only in passing that I want to point out that this undifferentiated manner of looking at the situations and the commitments which they require may have rather serious consequences in the field of ethics. If *engagement* or commitment is conceived of as of an absolute requirement, then it will be right whatever that be to which one is committed.

The references to transcendence, being-with, or communion likewise need to be rendered more precise. All these expressions are metaphors based on images taken from spatial experience. If the metaphor, say, of transcendence is to be taken literally, one would have to ask: who or what transcends what whereto? Furthermore, being-with designates a state; it is said to be

¹⁷ Not only has the phenomenology of the world and the situation been neglected, but even the phenomenology of subjectivity is far from sufficient. Thus, Heidegger's much praised analysis of anguish appears to me as incomplete. Cf. my article, "Les ténèbres, le silence et le néant," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, LXIV (1956), p. 131.

constitutive of human being. If then the being is already "beyond" or "outside" of himself, what is the meaning of transcendence?¹⁸

Most of the time the reference is to human relationships. But is it true that man becomes "engaged" only where his fellows are involved?

If these questions have been studied at all, it has been in an imperfect manner, so far as I know. But they must be answered if the phenomena justly pointed out in contemporary philosophies are to lead to a metaphysical interpretation. I submit that an approach may be found in the consideration of that transcendence which does not entail a "movement" towards a person or society or a human situation, but forms the essential foundation of human creativity.

It has, I am afraid, not become clear why I have referred to the fact of work in the context of this discussion. The reason is that I believe the transformation of the given world by man's creativity to be a definite kind of "transcendence," and particularly one which allows us to discover, if not a final answer, at least a way that may lead to an answer to the questions mentioned a moment ago.

For, as I have said, something "passes over" from the subject or the subjective spirit into the work. It is the presence of this something which distinguishes the artifact from a thing of "nature." I shall call this something, so far as it is present in the work or artifact, the latter's "message." Message is, of course, a *denominatio a posteriori*, but not an inappropriate one. For every artifact "speaks" to us, that is, reveals itself as man-made and, in most cases, also as belonging to this or that sphere of human existence. It is, therefore, permissible that the message be viewed as standing paradigmatically for all the phenomena here envisaged.

"Message" is an equivocal term. It names the physical "carrier," by means of which communication is established between a "sender" and a "recipient," but also that which is com-

¹⁸ There are also considerable terminological difficulties. In the parlance of Jaspers, e.g., transcendence means as well that whereto the subject transcends—in his case primarily the "encompassing"—as the movement by which this "going beyond the limits," if one may say so, is effected.

municated, that is, the "meaning."¹⁹ I shall use the term "message" in the second sense only. It is preferable to "meaning" because one and the same message may convey more than one meaning, as in parabolic or allegoric parlance, or in the case when there is a meaning hidden by a code or evident only to the initiate. But similar conditions prevail also in ordinary speech; otherwise the question: "What does it really mean?" could not arise.

Sent forth, the message becomes incorporated in something physical, by means of what Husserl called *bedeutungsverleihende Akte*, and may be taken out again, in a *bedeutungsentnehmenden Akt*²⁰ by the recipient. Thus, the message has its being as well in the consciousness of sender and recipient as in the carrier wherein it is embodied. This trait alone suffices to show that the being of the message cannot be either that of existence or that of essence. Neither can it be considered as an accident. It has a peculiar and, in fact, unique mode of being—precisely that which I designate by "insistence."²¹ Only by giving to the term an unwarranted width—and thus an undesirable vagueness—could one subsume the mode of being peculiar to the message, i.e., insistence, under the notion of essence. Is it meaningful to say that the essence of this article consists in the message it tries to convey? I do not think that it is. It may be that all knowledge of essence is, at least potentially, a message,²² but it does not follow that all messages are also the grasp or presentation of an essence.

Finally, insistence cannot be viewed as potential being. It is, of course, possible for one to refer to the reception of a message as

¹⁹ The same ambiguity is found with "information." Its neglect has caused some confusion in the theory of communication.

²⁰ The two terms may be taken in a wider sense than is the case with Husserl. Every creation of the mind becomes significant or meaningful by virtue of such acts.

²¹ In further elaborating on this point one would have to examine the relationship—the non-identity—of insistence with the several notices of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy. This would, however, require a discussion much too long to be undertaken here.

²² In fact, every intrasubjective is potentially a message by virtue of that being-with which is constitutive of man's being. (This idea is, for that matter, not unlike that of the *animal sociale* of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy.) "Every impression is destined to become expression": R. Hoenigswald, *Die Grundlagen der Denkpsychologie*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1926).

an actualization. As long as the text is not read, the inscription not deciphered, the usability of a tool not recognized, so long all this remains "hidden." But the reception of the message does not alter the being of that which carries the message or that in which the message has been incorporated. The actualization pertains rather to the recipient than to the received. The message operates as an actualizing agent rather than as something passively subjected to actualization.

A further characteristic of insistent being becomes apparent here, namely its actualizing capacity. The message does not exist and thus is not endowed with reality. On the other hand, it possesses an actualizing power. The vocabulary of German philosophy—and also ordinary German language—knows of two terms: *Realität* and *Wirklichkeit*. The first emphasizes thingness or thereness, the second efficacy.²³ One might say that insistent being lacks *Realität* but belongs to the realm of *Wirklichkeit* inasmuch as it is *wirksam*, that is, displays efficacy, produces effects.

Obviously the questions, here adumbrated rather than answered, imply many more. Some of these refer to the similarities or dissimilarities of the views submitted and those found in several philosophies, sometimes of a very different nature. Since it is not possible to discuss these relationships, it would be useless to mention the ideas requiring consideration.²⁴

²³ This distinction plays a great role in the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. The two terms have been rendered as "reality" and "factuality" by O. Samuel, *A Foundation of Ontology* (New York, 1953).

²⁴ Among the philosophies of which account should be taken, Hegel's is, of course, outstanding. Likewise, all those philosophies which are influenced in one way or another by Hegel; the ontology of Nicolai Hartmann is particularly interesting here. There is, furthermore, the notion of a "third realm" that is neither subjective nor objective, as found with G. Simmel, and the philosophy of *Sinn* developed by Paul Hofmann. One would also have to discuss the notions of the subject-object relationship in the several so-called existential philosophies, for they differ considerably in this respect. Martin Buber's way of interpreting the I-Thou relationship apparently would admit the notion of "mediation" as proposed here, whereas other "existentialists" reject, if I understand them correctly, all such mediation and claim that there is a direct "communion." For a thorough and, on the whole, appreciative presentation of Buber's ideas, cf. P. E. Pfuetze, *The Social Self* (New York, 1954), pp. 117 ff.

Other questions may be raised concerning further consequences and ramifications of the notion of insistent being. However, at least one of these questions must find a brief answer.

Exemplifying insistent being by the "message" may give rise to the impression that insistent being originates exclusively in the subjective spirit. The intrasubjective acquires this sort of being by virtue of being apprehended; by virtue of the "incorporation" of the intrasubjective in a material carrier insistent being is, if one may say so, conferred on the transsubjective. Hence, it would seem that insistent being is found only in subjectivity and its externalizations, that is, the artifact. This, I take it, would be too narrow a conception.

Man is always in some sort of situation. But not every situation is relevant; not everyone has "meaning" for this or that individual man. Not every situation possesses the character of challenge or solicitation. Obviously, whether or not this character be present depends on the "standpoint" from which the situation is envisaged. But the standpoint does not create relevance; it only renders possible its discovery. I believe that one is justified in holding that relevance, significance, meaning, or whatever a term may be chosen, "insist" in the situation.

That engagement in, or commitment to a situation become possible, it is necessary that there be solicitation on part of the situation. Consciousness of problems cannot arise, unless the situation be problematic. An I-Thou relationship—as opposed to the I-He or I-It—presupposes that the other reveal himself²⁵ and be accessible. There is no communion without communication. And communication implies the mediation by insistence.

The philosophies that grew out of the "crisis of our age," under the pressure of the societal and cultural plight of these times, the influence of Husserl's phenomenology, the revolt against the exaggerated "objectivity" of scientific thinking, in consequence of the spreading of the ideas of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and by virtue of numerous other factors—these philosophies have been characterized as the "Triumph of Subjectivity."²⁶ This triumph appears

²⁵ Cf. M. Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, 5th ed. (Frankfurt a. M. 1948), p. 241 et passim.

²⁶ J. Q. Lauer, *The Triumph of Subjectivity* (New York, 1958).

to me as rather precarious and hardly destined to last. The turn towards subjectivity may well have been a necessary corrective of a mentality which tended to forget the subject. But a corrective retains its significance only as long as account is taken of that which it aims to correct. If the subject is not an object among objects, it is neither the source and origin of the latter. The world may be there to be transformed by man; but one can transform only what first is put, as it were, at one's disposal. One-sided emphasis on the subject or on "existence" is as much a falsification as is the neglect of these aspects of reality.

It is not going too far if one sees in the "triumph of subjectivity" and in "existentialism" the latest form of man's imperialistic *hybris*. It has found its clearest formulation, not in regard to philosophy but to art, in the affirmation of A. Malraux;²⁷ finally man has reached the point where he frees himself completely from the bondage of things and the world, creating thus a universe of his own. But this man-made universe is one of fancies and shadows. And "then play with him the clouds and the winds."^{11 28}

It may well be that the ideas current today mark a definite advance in metaphysical thinking. But one would risk losing what has been gained, were one to forget that the understanding of "being-in-a-world" requires that account be taken of the world not less than of him who is there. Or, in other words, if one were to forget that this formula reads more correctly: "being-in-a-world that is." We should not be so fascinated by subjectivity or existence that we overlook the wealth and multiformity of being.

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²⁷ *Les voix du silence* (Paris, 1951).

²⁸ Goethe, in "Grenzen der Menschheit": "Nirgends haften dann/
Die unsicheren Sohlen,/Und mit ihm spielen/Wolken und Winde."

SUBSTANCES WITHOUT SUBSTRATA¹

N. L. WILSON

I. *Introduction*

THE PRESENT PAPER is to be thought of as part of an investigation into the nature of individuals. I shall in part be concerned to refute what I shall call the doctrine of simple individuals or bare particulars. This doctrine is to all intents and purposes identical with Locke's doctrine of the Unknowable Substratum but there may be people who would subscribe to some form of a doctrine of simple individuals who would nevertheless claim not to be following Locke. The doctrine in question I shall express as follows: An individual is what it is independently of whatever properties happen to inhere in it, or, the identity of an individual in no way depends on its properties. The doctrine is involved in any reference to "the individual apart from its properties." The doctrine of simple individuals runs parallel to the rather less subterranean doctrine of simple qualities according to which, presumably, a quality is what it is quite independently of its instances. These two doctrines jointly underlie a good part of the philosophy of logical atomism and I may say that this philosophy seems to me to be profoundly wrong.

The doctrine of simple individuals has its equal and opposite reaction in the view that an individual is simply a bundle of properties, that the identity of an individual is *entirely* dependent on the identity of its properties. This view also seems to me to be in some sense wrong and I shall attack it in passing. If all my remarks have seemed excessively polemical it is because I have been anxious to make it as clear as possible what the motivation behind this paper is. I am mainly concerned with the problem concerning the "it" which underlies or has properties and I shall

¹ Read at a Duke-UNC Philosophy Colloquium, October 1, 1958, and read in shortened form at the meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, December 28, 1958.

want to argue that the identity of an individual—what it is that makes an individual *that* individual—does not depend merely on its being *that* individual or having *that* piece of substratum, but it depends *partially* and in a complicated way on the identity of its properties. The analysis will have to exhibit the nature of that dependence. Most of the discussion will revolve around proper names and their function since it is through linguistic considerations, I think, that we get the clearest illumination. The result, in case any one is interested, will be Absolute Idealism, or something like it.

Before proceeding I want to make a few terminological remarks. On the few occasions on which I shall use the word "substance" I shall be using it as Aristotle frequently uses it, namely, in the sense of "concrete individual." The word "substance" is not quite synonymous with "individual," since there may be languages whose individuals are not substances or concrete things.

I shall so far as possible avoid the words "means" and "meaningful" and use instead the words "signifies" and "significant." I shall want to say that proper names of individuals *signify* the individuals they name and that predicates signify properties. Clearly, a peculiar semantical method is being presupposed and one would want to see it worked out in detail. Fortunately the details are not required for this paper.²

II. *The Refutation of the Doctrine of Simple Individuals*

(a) *The paradox of the state-descriptions.* Let us begin with a simple little puzzle. What would the world be like if Julius Caesar had all the properties of Mark Anthony and Mark Anthony had all the properties of Julius Caesar? I am assuming that the properties of being called "Julius Caesar" and of being called "Mark Anthony" are to be included among the properties in question. Clearly, the world would look exactly the same under our supposition. Our view of history would in no way have to be altered.

² A beginning has been made in my papers, "Designation and Description," *Journal of Philosophy*, L (1953), 369-383, and "Property Designation and Description," *Philosophical Review*, LXIV (1955), 389-404.

Our attempt to describe a distinct possible world has produced just the same old world all over again.

Now we shall have to embark on a technical digression by asking: What shall be done with the supposition in question? To dismiss it as non-significant would, I think, be imperceptive. The reason becomes clear when we rephrase the matter in terms of Carnap's state-descriptions. We are considering a class of sentences in English which constitute the true state-description, that is, which correctly describes the actual world. Next we consider the state-description which would be obtained from the first by uniform replacement of the word "Julius Caesar" by the word "Mark Anthony" and of the word "Mark Anthony" by the word "Julius Caesar." Let us call these state-descriptions "SD1" and "SD2" respectively. Now according to orthodox semantics³ these state-descriptions are both significant but are not logically equivalent. There are no deductive techniques for deducing one of these state-descriptions from the other. In fact SD1 and SD2 would have to be regarded as incompatible. Hence they would presumably describe distinct possible worlds. But it is evident that they both adequately describe the actual world. This is what I shall call the paradox of the state-descriptions and this paradox dominates the rest of this paper.*

(b) *Bridgman questions are significant.* Our original question should remind us of a question that appears in Bridgman's *Logic of Modern Physics*: "What would the world be like if the whole world and everything in it were expanding at the same rate?"⁴ The answer is of course that the world would look exactly as it does look. I propose the term 'Bridgman question' to apply to any question beginning, "What would the world be like if . . .?" where the answer is, "Exactly the same as it is." The objection to describing these questions as non-significant is that the state-description corresponding to the body of a Bridgman question is

³ By which I mean Carnap's *Introduction to Semantics* and Carl G. Hempel's paper, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, No. 11 (1950), pp. 41-63.

⁴ I may add that it was Rulon Wells who explained to me what the paradox means.

⁵ Quoted, p. 28, from Clifford. I have paraphrased.

unquestionably significant according to the best available theory of cognitive significance.* At least we should make this circumstance a defining characteristic of Bridgman questions so as to mark them off from questions which really are sheer nonsense. We have seen that the state-description corresponding to the question, "What would the world be like if Julius Caesar had all of Mark Anthony's properties and vice versa?" is significant and the same would be true of the question paraphrased from Bridgman's book. I think we shall simply have to say that at the semantical level the pairs of state-descriptions in question are not logically equivalent but that pragmatically they are equivalent. If we wished, we might permit ourselves to say something like this: It makes no sense, pragmatically, to suppose that the state-descriptions describe different possible worlds. The point of this technical digression has been to suggest that the question originally posed about Caesar and Anthony does not concern just an isolated puzzle, but rather is an example of a general technique which might be expected to take us quite a long way in quite an interesting direction.

(c) *Bridgman questions pose no discernibly different alternative.* I have been concerned to suggest that it is not a good idea just to dismiss Bridgman questions as non-significant. I wish now to tack down the other side of the paradox of the state-descriptions by defending what has up to now been merely a bald claim, the claim, namely, that it makes no sense to suppose that SD1 and SD2 describe distinct possible worlds. The issue is central, because if I can persuade the reader that the two possible worlds in question are identical, then and only then I think I can drag him the rest of the way.

And so we have to ask: What shall we say to the person who takes the line that SD1 and SD2 describe possible worlds? He might go on to say that the world of SD2 differs from that of SD1 in that, among other things, in it Anthony, not Caesar, is murdered on the Ides of March. In it, it is Caesar, not Anthony, who dallies on the Nile with Cleopatra. Offhand at least, this sounds pretty plausible. Now let us consider a second, more

* I mean Hempel, *op. cit.*

heroic opponent, who wants to maintain, not merely that SD1 and SD2 describe distinct possible worlds, but also wants to hold, along with Henry Ford, that history is bunk, that it is SD2 which is true, not SD1. We ask him what evidence he has, and of course there is any amount of evidence. We now ask him what evidence there is for SD2 which is not also evidence for SD1, and there is none at all. In short, whatever may be construed as evidence for SD1 may also be construed as evidence for SD2 and conversely.

If our opponents were fair-minded I think they would concede as much. But they may not be fair-minded. It is interesting to note that an opponent could insist that all the evidence confirms SD2 but not SD1, and so far as I can see, there is no way of convicting him either of contradicting himself or of flying in the face of facts. This shows that my own underlying philosophical thesis here is not analytic except in the trivial sense that there is in the back of my mind some axiom which I have freely adopted, and from this axiom it follows that SD1 and SD2 both correctly describe the actual world. But the important thing is that there is no way of compelling anyone else to adopt my axiom. The issue here does not concern the truth or falsity of a philosophical thesis but rather the wisdom of adopting this or that axiom. There is an important methodological point here; I do not propose to expatiate on it except to suggest that the wisdom of a philosophical decision is, in general, vindicated by its fruitfulness. The philosopher, at the moment of his crucial decisions, is rather like the composer who, having set himself to write a fugue, chooses this rather than that theme, because he senses that apart from whatever intrinsic merit it might have, it will permit a more interesting fugal elaboration.

In what follows, I shall assume that the reader, unlike my hypothetical opponents, is "fair-minded," that he finds my unformulated axiom more "plausible" than that of my opponents and he presumably does so because he senses that my axiom will turn out to be the more fruitful and therefore my decision to adopt it the "wiser." In speaking of my "*unformulated axiom*" I intended to acknowledge the fact that we should really want a fully

axiomatized system of pure pragmatics from which it would follow as a theorem that if SD1 is true then SD2 is also true.

One further observation on our opponents. The man who says that the history books are all wrong is rather like the man who says that the arithmetic books are all wrong: the number 4 is not the successor of 3 because 5 is. And in fact 4 is really the successor of 5. In this case I think we should all agree on the diagnosis. Our man is actually attaching to the numeral "4" the significance we attach to the numeral "5" and he is attaching to the numeral "5" the significance we attach to the numeral "4." In the same way it would seem at least plausible to suppose that the man who maintains that the history books are all wrong is really not guilty of historical error but is using the words "Caesar" and "Anthony" with significations we attach to "Anthony" and "Caesar" respectively. We will use this as a hint in Part III and what we get by using this hint will of course confirm our diagnosis. (The element of circularity here is inevitable.)

(d) *The relevance of the paradox to the question at issue.* Now we can ask: What has all this to do with the metaphysical substratum? Just this: If there are bits of metaphysical substratum, or, if you like, bare this's and that's, then it ought to make sense to speak of the substratum of Caesar having properties quite different from those that actually inhere in it, namely all those properties which in fact inhere in the substratum of Mark Anthony, and conversely for Mark Anthony. But we have seen that this does not make sense. At least we are not describing a different possibility. Hence the doctrine of the metaphysical substratum does not make sense. Since we have known this all along, the present result is scarcely calculated to generate much excitement.

But we still have our puzzle: one state-description obtained from another by the interchange of the names "Julius Caesar" and "Mark Anthony." In semantics they are non-L-equivalent; pragmatically, both are equivalent, both true. As a beginning we may adopt the hint that came out of our consideration of the second opponent. I mean the suggestion that the person who asserts SD2 rather than SD1 is attaching a different significance to the word "Julius Caesar." We may say that the name "Julius Caesar" has a different significance in one state-description than

it has in the other. And having a different significance it must belong to a different language in the case of each of the state-descriptions. Thus instead of having two state-descriptions which are non-equivalent in the same language we really have two state-descriptions which are mutual translations in different languages. If "Julius Caesar" has different significations in these two (true) state-descriptions it is because different things are true of Julius Caesar in each of the state-descriptions, or, what is signified by the name "Julius Caesar" in one state description is a constituent of different facts from those constituted by what is signified by "Julius Caesar" in the other. Thus the significance of a proper name is dependent upon truth, or, upon fact. In the material mode, we should say that what a certain individual is (that is, its identity, not simply its character) depends upon the facts of which it is a constituent. An individual is not only a constituent of its facts, it is constituted by its facts. But we cannot say that any given fact is an essential constituent of the individual. (Except in this case, the fact that Julius Caesar is a human being. I prefer to leave aside Aristotle's doctrine of essence for the moment.) It is a fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, but he would have been numerically, or, essentially, the same person even if he had sailed around the estuary in a boat. On the other hand, we cannot say that Caesar would have been the same individual if all the facts involving him had been different, if, for example, instead of being a Roman general in the first century B. C. he had been a juvenile delinquent in New York in the twentieth century A. D. The situation here is rather like the well known fact that you can pull out any hair of someone's head without making him bald but you can't pull out all the hairs of his head without making him bald. The matter can perhaps be made clearer by considering all possible worlds. Some of these will definitely not include Caesar, some will definitely include Caesar even though in these worlds he may be slightly different from what he is actually, and of some of these worlds we might not be able to say whether or not they contain any individual identifiable as Caesar.

It will be recalled that I am trying to show that there are no simple individuals or bare particulars, that is, individuals which have an identity in total abstraction from the properties that

inhere in them. I should think it extremely unlikely that I have made any converts at this point and so I am going to go through the whole business again from a more detailed linguistic viewpoint. The aim in what follows is to make the whole situation clearer and to vindicate the freely adopted axiom mentioned earlier by giving it some kind of systematic elaboration and tying it in with other philosophical problems.

III. *Theoretical Descriptive Semantics*

(a) *How do words hook up with things?* For my second beginning I shall do a parody of a view that nobody would take seriously. It clearly will not do and we can then look around for something that will.

It is a commonplace that philosophies of substance are inspired by the subject-predicate form of the Indo-European languages. The simplest empirical sentences are sentences like "Socrates is snub-nosed" and "Julius Caesar is Roman-nosed." The name "Julius Caesar" does not by itself mention any properties. It is purely denotative and its nominatum *as such* is therefore characterless—a 100 % pure invisible piece of substratum. We have the paradox of the characterless substratum which nevertheless possesses characteristics or properties—a metaphysical tailor's dummy which is what it is whatever clothes, if any, are thrust upon it. This is just a bald form of the paradox of the state-descriptions. However, let us play the game out by asking: How does a language manage to catch hold of the world? We offer the semantic answer: predicates hook on to properties and proper names or individual constants hook on to simple individuals or morsels of substratum. It is never put quite like this, but a metaphysic of substance does seem to be taken for granted when we lay down designation rules like: "*a*" designates the city of Chicago, "*b*" designates the city of New York, etc. In short, Locke's metaphysics lies behind what I should call primary semantics (just as a Hegelian metaphysic will fall out in front of what I shall call secondary semantics). By "primary semantics" I mean roughly the sort of thing that is done in Carnap's *Introduction to Semantics* (and in some of my own papers).

The point that I would suggest is that the doctrine of simple

individuals has its semantical correlate in the view that a name simply hooks up with an individual, the hook-up being expressed by a designation rule. It is the view, if you like, that there is a simple, irreducible dyadic relation between the name and its designatum.⁷ The view clearly won't do, as is shown by the paradox of the state-descriptions.

To get something that will do we may grant that names somehow hook on to individuals and then ask *how* they hook on. In the case of the person who maintains that it is Mark Anthony who was murdered on the Ides of March we hazarded the guess that he must be using the name "Mark Anthony" with a significance different from the ordinary one. Which raises the question: How does a name in use get its significance? And this may best be attacked by asking another question: How should we set about discovering the significance which a person attaches to a given name?

This question belongs in a field which elsewhere I have called Theoretical Descriptive Semantics—a part of pure pragmatics. Descriptive semantics presumably deals with factual questions such as the following:

(*L*) (*Charles uses L*) = ?

(Which language is the language used by Charles?)⁸ This question breaks down into a number of questions of the form :

What does the expression *E* designate in the language used by Charles?

In this limited context the expression "designates" and "signifies" may be used interchangeably. Here we shall be dealing in particular with the question:

Which individual is signified (or designated) by the name "Julius Caesar" in Charles' language?

These of course are all factual questions. In addition to the

⁷ Strictly speaking a simple triadic relation between the name, the language and its designatum in that language. I am for the most part neglecting language reference in this paper.

⁸ The procedure here, incidentally, presupposes that we have a general definition of language, for which see my *Concept of Language*, University of Toronto Press, 1959.

factual science of descriptive semantics we shall need an *a priori* science of theoretical descriptive semantics, concerned not with the truth value of these descriptive semantic statements but with their truth conditions, concerned, that is, with laying down the procedures to be used by the descriptive semanticist. What follows is strictly speaking theoretical descriptive semantics, since I shall not be concerned to arrive at any factual statements about the language used by any actual persons, but rather to show how descriptive semantics would be pursued. However I shall show this by way of a fictitious example, not by laying down the general definitions one would want.

(b) *Names are really variables.* Let us suppose that somebody (whom I am calling "Charles") makes just the following five assertions containing the name "Caesar." Let us suppose in addition that we know the significance which Charles attaches to expressions other than "Caesar" and that, in the beginning at least, we are ignorant of Roman history.

- (1) Caesar conquered Gaul. (Ge)
- (2) Caesar crossed the Rubicon. (Re)
- (3) Caesar was murdered on the Ides of March. (Me)
- (4) Caesar was addicted to the use of the ablative absolute. (Ae)
- (5) Caesar was married to Boadicea. (Bc)

It will be recalled that our problem is to determine the significance of the name "Caesar" as used in Charles' language. It will be noted at once that if Charles is not prepared to assert anything about Caesar there is no way of determining what he intends to signify by the name and we would conclude that under those conditions "Caesar" simply would not be a name in Charles' language.

Now the five statements may be taken as entailing that there is at least one individual who has the properties in question and at most one such individual. I submit that this exhausts the cognitive content of Charles' assertions. I may be fudging a bit, especially in regard to the matter of egocentricity. But whatever has been fudged can reasonably be left aside for present purposes. We have it then that what Charles is really saying is:

$$\text{E} ! (\exists x)(Gx \& Rx \& Mx \& Ax \& Bx)$$

("There is precisely one individual who conquered Gaul and crossed the Rubicon and . . . etc.") We notice that the name "Caesar" has vanished, its place being taken by the variable " x " and the E-shriek-iota operator added. We may conclude without further agony that proper names are really variables, that there is no such thing as an isolated atomic statement, that all our statements are connected by tacit conjunction signs and that every partial sentence containing a new proper name is tacitly prefixed with the E!-iota operator. Now in calling names variables I merely meant there is no real necessity of switching from the "name" " c " to the variable " x ." We could just as easily have written

$$\text{E! } (\forall c) (Gc \& Rc \& Mc \& Ac \& Bc)$$

But since a variable is any expression that can occur within an operator, the appearance of " c " with the iota marks it as a variable. I shall want to call these proper names "quasi-variables" to distinguish them from the genuine variables that occur in sentences like "Some individuals disliked Caesar intensely." (" $(\exists x)(x \text{ disliked Caesar})$ ") I should perhaps stress the fact that I am not concerned to annihilate a familiar distinction but rather to re-characterize it. Now since proper names are variables, atomic sentences are really matrices. I shall have occasion to speak of "asserted matrices." The difference between a genuine and a quasi-variable is this: When we use a genuine variable " x " we close the scope of the quantifier quite promptly and it stays closed. When we use a quasi-variable or name, the scope of the initial E!-iota operator goes right down to the end and we add further asserted matrices as conjuncts to the scope of the operator as we come to have more knowledge. Thus the totality of a person's beliefs is to be expressed in one vast multiply general sentence which changes and grows with the passage of time and the acquisition of more beliefs.

(e) *Primary and secondary truth conditions.* The trouble with this view as it stands is that it leaves out of account the fact that we do assign truth and falsity to individual assertions. We may now consider how this might be done in the case of our example. We have Charles' five assertions. We now conduct an empirical investigation, examining all the individuals in the universe. We

might suppose that Charles intends the word "Caesar" to signify or designate Prasutagus (who, as every schoolboy knows, is the husband of Boadicea). On this supposition (5) could be called true and all the rest would have to be called false. Or we might suppose that "Caesar" signifies the historical Julius Caesar, in which case (1)-(4) could be called true and (5) would have to be called false. There do not seem to be any other candidates since any number of persons must have conquered Gaul and/or crossed the Rubicon and/or used the ablative absolute to excess. And so we act on what might be called the Principle of Charity. We select as designatum that individual which will make the largest possible number of Charles' statements true. In this case it is the individual, Julius Caesar. We might say the designatum is that individual which satisfies more of the asserted matrices containing the word "Caesar" than does any other individual.

The reader may be slightly bewildered by my first stating as bluntly as possible that names are variables and then continuing to discuss the question of the designatum of "Caesar" as used by Charles. This is easily explained. Suppose I say "There is precisely one x such that x wrote *Waverley*." If I have never previously used " x " and never subsequently use it then there is a fairly clear sense in which " x " is somehow associated with the specific individual, Walter Scott. And in the same way our names or quasi-variables get somehow associated with specific individuals, and we may as well come right out and say the a quasi-variable designates or signifies the individual (if any) with which it is "somehow associated."

The preceding analysis can be redone in terms of truth conditions, the point being that according to received doctrines you get at the significance of an expression by considering the truth conditions of full sentences containing that expression. Once we conduct our historical investigation and have applied the principle of charity to Charles' five assertions then we are in a position to say that for Charles the name "Caesar" designates Julius Caesar. We might add that *any* asserted matrix of Charles' language of the form "Caesar is F " is true if and only if Julius Caesar satisfies the matrix " x is F ." These are what I shall call the *primary truth conditions* because they correspond to primary semantics. The

appellation is perhaps unfortunate because the primary truth conditions come after and are derived from what I shall call the *secondary truth conditions*, which of course correspond to secondary semantics.*

Even *before* we have done any historical research we can lay down the secondary truth conditions for Charles' sentences containing "Caesar:"

"Caesar is *F*" is true if there is one individual which satisfies more of the matrices "*Gx*", "*Rx*", "*Mx*", "*Ax*" and "*Bx*" than any other individual does and that individual satisfies the matrix "*Fx*"; and is false if there is one such individual and it does *not* satisfy the matrix "*Fx*"; and is non-significant if there is no such individual.

It is to be noted first of all that these secondary truth conditions do not make reference to Charles but do make reference to his five assertions about Caesar. And they also embody what I earlier called the Principle of Charity. It is to be noted further that these truth and falsity conditions are not expressible in Charles' language and so (not too surprisingly) there is no question of getting a translation in Charles' language of his "Caesar"-sentences. And it will be noted that these truth and falsity conditions are not exhaustive. I can only begin to indicate the rationale of his maneuver.

The secondary truth conditions correspond to what I shall call the *sense* of a proper name as distinct from its significance (i.e., *designatum*). My manner of speaking notwithstanding, I do not intend to suggest there is an entity which is the sense of a proper name. Briefly, the sense of a name is a function of the assertions which are made using the name. If we are prepared at least half seriously to make some statements about Pegasus then we thereby endow the pseudo-name "Pegasus" with at least sense. We "state" different things using "Cerberus" and thereby give it a different sense. But neither of these expressions has a significance. Further, sentences containing the expression "Pegasus" are non-significant and will have no truth conditions. The secondary

* Primary semantics is dialectically or historically prior to secondary semantics.

truth-and-falsity conditions were designed to guarantee this. We wish to avoid having to characterize the sentences "Pegasus eats oats" and "Pegasus does not eat oats" as both false, and also to avoid saying that one is true.

Again, different historians might assert vastly different things about Richard III. It would follow that they were using "Richard III" with different senses. But they presumably understand one another. Clearly if people are to understand one another they need not use names with the same sense but only with the same significance. On this account it is *significance* rather than *sense* which offers itself as a replacement for *meaning* and "significant" (rather than "sensible") which offers itself as a replacement for "meaningful" or "having a truth value." However we shall leave these difficult matters and attempt to round up some results.

(d) *Roundup.* The first thing to be noted is that to pass from the sense of a name (i.e., from a set of assertions) to its significance requires an empirical investigation. To know the significance or designatum of a proper name is to have some factual knowledge about the designatum. The point to be stressed here is that the knowledge in question is not just knowledge about Charles' verbal behavior (although there is that). For once we have Charles' five assertions we can forget about him and once we have conducted our historical investigation we can say that *anyone* who makes these five assertions about Caesar is referring to the historical Julius Caesar. The factual knowledge I am especially concerned with here is the knowledge gained from the historical investigation. We may conclude that quite apart from descriptive semantic procedures anyone's use of a genuine proper name involves his having factual knowledge of the designatum.

This should surprise us not at all. For if, as was suggested earlier, the identity of an individual is in some way dependent upon the facts of which it is a constituent, then we should expect that to know the identity of an individual or the significance of a name we would have to know some of the facts of which it is a constituent. When we say that we do not know the identity of the murderer of Sir Edmund Godfrey we mean simply that, although

we know he murdered Sir Edmund, we don't know enough other facts about him to enable us to lay our hands on him.

Earlier we had the question as to how an individual constant (or quasi-variable) manages to hook on to an individual. This may be rephrased: How does an individual manage to get itself hooked onto by an individual constant? The answer now lies before us. It does so by having those characteristics in virtue of which it satisfies more of the asserted matrices containing the constant in question than does any other individual.

We may now, for the fun of it, deal with the question: To what extent could Caesar have been different and still have been Caesar. Let us first compile a list of the true sentences about Caesar. Let us replace some of these sentences by false sentences corresponding to the qualitative change in Caesar we wish to consider. Now if Julius Caesar still satisfies more of these asserted matrices than does any other individual then we can say, yes, Caesar could have differed by so much and still have been numerically the same individual.

This account is inadequate because we have not taken cognizance of the fact that some of the things asserted about Caesar have greater weight attached to them than others. For example, we would regard the property of being a son of Caius Julius Caesar II and Aurelia or the property of having conquered Gaul as being much more essential to Caesar than the property of being epileptic and, like Aristotle, we would regard the property of being a human being as absolutely essential. With this matter of weighting assertions about Caesar we are having to do with rather fuzzy considerations which, apart from what Aristotle has given us, are not susceptible of systematic treatment.

It might be noted finally that our thesis that names are really variables receives confirmation from the fact that it explains the paradox of the state-descriptions with which this paper was introduced. It is of course a commonplace that the sentences,

$$(\exists x)(\exists y)(Px \& Qy), \quad (\exists y)(\exists x)(Py \& Qx),$$

are logically equivalent. Once we recognize this and recognize that our names are variables and that all that we say is prefixed by suppressed quantifiers then we see that the paradox of the state-descriptions is the most natural thing in the world. When

I said that there were no deductive procedures by which we might deduce SD2 from SD1 that was just a helpful mistake. The logical operation required is simply the operation of relettering.

It will be recalled that it was not possible to prove that SD1 and SD2 actually described the same world; there was no way of decisively refuting a person who wants to maintain that they describe different possible worlds and that only SD1 is true. In short, the contention that they are both true and logically equivalent had to be pulled out of the air as an unproved axiom. Yet this axiom receives a kind of philosophical confirmation by reason of the fact that, working with it, we can achieve some kind of systematic account of naming, and this I don't think our imaginary opponents would be able to do. The same point may be put the other way around. If we had started by asking: "How do you set about systematically determining what a given name in a person's language names?" then we should have got the kind of framework within which it would turn out as a theorem, not as an axiom, that SD1 and SD2 are logically equivalent.

IV. General Conclusions and Speculations

Let us now go right back to the beginning and notice with Aristotle that there are things which have properties. With Locke we get the suggestion that underlying each thing or individual is a substratum which stands under the properties and supports them. If he were explicit Locke would offer the following statement of identity conditions for individuals: Two individuals are identical if and only if they have the same properties and the same substratum. The trouble is that if I hold a piece of chalk in my hand, what is to prevent my saying that there are two or a hundred and two pieces of chalk in my hand, that is, a hundred and two individuals all having the property of being a piece of chalk in my hand but having different substrata?¹⁰ Leibniz comes to the rescue with a simplified statement of individual identity conditions: Two individuals are identical if and only if they have the same properties. In our relief at finding no mention of the

¹⁰ Max Black has made this point in his paper, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," *Mind*, LXI (1952), 153-4.

troublesome substratum we go cheerfully ahead and commit a *non sequitur*: since two individuals are identical if and only if they have the same properties, then an individual is simply a bundle of properties. We find ourselves, along with Hume, assimilating numerical to qualitative change, and holding that if a thing changes qualitatively then, strictly speaking, it changes numerically. We are now in the midst of what could be called the Berkeley-Russell-Goodman tradition. To put it as simply as possible, this tradition won't do. If an individual is a bundle of properties, then to ascribe one of those properties to that thing is to make an analytic statement and we don't seem to have resources for saying simple synthetic things about the world. Russell recognizes the difficulty and struggles desperately but unsuccessfully to cope with it in his *Inquiry*. By adopting some extreme measures Goodman evades this particular difficulty and gets a language which is presumably capable, in principle, of describing the world. But the trouble is we are left without resources for saying the particular things about the world that we want to say, e.g., that Socrates is snub-nosed. Goodman's language is remote from our ordinary ways of looking at the world and our ordinary ways of speaking about it. And at the risk of being subsequently hoist on my own petard I should be inclined to suggest that these ordinary ways should be treated with respect and, if possible, vindicated. At any rate we may quite properly be suspicious of gratuitous and unnecessary departures from common sense views.

And so we return to traditional substance philosophy and recognize that Aristotle was essentially right after all. There are things which have properties. These things are not the same as their properties. A thing could have had somewhat different properties and still have been the same thing; a thing can acquire and relinquish properties and remain the same thing.¹¹

But of course it is not enough to say that Aristotle was right.

¹¹ On this matter of changing and remaining the same, I've said my piece in an earlier paper, "Space, Time and Individuals," *Journal of Philosophy*, LII (1955), 589-98. At the end of that paper I remarked that puzzles about substance fall under two main heads, the "it" which persists unchanged through change and the "it" which underlies or has attributes. That paper dealt with the former puzzle and this one is supposed to be an attack on the latter.

We still have to face the question: If an individual is not a piece of unknowable substratum or a bundle of properties then what is it? The answer I should like to suggest is this: An individual and a quality are both abstractions from facts. Facts alone are concrete. Facts are what we primarily observe. We only observe individuals and qualities as constituents of some facts. We notice the fact that this piece of copper sulphate has a color. And we notice that Mr. Joseph's logic book has a color. And moreover we notice by a fairly simple principle of identity that these colors are the same. And so we can abstract this color and call it "blue." But if we were to imagine that this color has an identity apart from facts like those we have considered we should be making a mistake. (I have not shown this.) Now in the same way we notice that somebody conquered Gaul in the first century B. C. And we notice that somebody was murdered on the Ides of March. And moreover we notice, by a much more complicated principle of identity, that these two individuals are the same.¹² And so we can abstract this individual and call him "Julius Caesar." Again if we imagine that this individual has an identity apart from facts like those considered then we should be making a mistake. This is perhaps the main thing that I have been trying to show in this paper.

In fairness to Russell and Goodman it should be said that in a way they are right in looking at the world as a distribution of qualities throughout space-time. They are certainly right in not admitting substrata. But as plain men and Aristotelians we carve up this raw world of theirs rather differently and it seems to me that to say that the world admits of being carved up and treated in accordance with some version of traditional substance philosophy is to say something about the world which may be important.

A moment ago I said that facts alone are concrete. Strictly speaking I should have said that only a sufficiently large number of facts—perhaps all the facts—is concrete. The point is that you need enough facts to give each of the constituents of these facts its identity. This is what I meant at the beginning of this paper

¹² Again I beg leave to refer to my *op. cit.*, especially the "B" axioms.

when I said that logical atomism is wrong. This seems to me to be generally in accord with views held by Hegelians.

I shall conclude by mentioning one other respect in which this kind of analysis is moving us in the direction of Absolute Idealism. We have seen that under close scrutiny proper names of individuals turn into variables with tacit existential quantifiers prefixing the totality of our statements. If I may say so, precisely the same thing happens with quality words. Thus we are confronted with the prospect of an ordinary descriptive language being divested of what are normally regarded as descriptive expressions and reducing to a purely logical language. If this is to be adequate for describing the world it can only be because the world is, after all, an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories.

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THE WORK OF ART AND THE POSTURES OF THE MIND

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I

ONE OF THE QUESTIONS which philosophical aestheticians have asked themselves with at least some degree of clarity is the question, "What is a work of art?". But they have not asked this question as a child who, never having seen one, might ask, "What is an ornithorynchus?". They are perfectly familiar with works of art; their question is not one whose successful answering would make them acquainted with examples of what they inquire after. They have not asked a question which could be answered by showing them a painting, a building, a play, or the like, as one might answer the child's question, "What is an ornithorynchus?" by pointing to one in the zoo. They have answered their question with statements, alleging that some property or group of them is common and peculiar to works of art, or that it constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for the proper use of the phrase.¹ The question, in their mouths, is a request to be informed as to the essence of such works.

Frequently, moreover, the essence sought for has been supposed to be nothing objective; those who have asked the question have supposed, rather, that the property in which the essence of works of art consists must somehow involve human negotiation with something. A work of art is a creation by, and a cherished object in, the life of humanity; and to suppose that the essence of such works is some property common and peculiar to them but exclusive of human interests, would be as foolish as to suppose that a description of disease, in exclusively biochemical terms, with no mention of its misery and pain, could reveal the essence of such disorders. The question, "What is a work of art?" like the question, "What is a disease?" may be interpreted as asking for the essence of works of art, on the assumption that

¹ In this essay, I shall not distinguish between the questions, "What is a work of art?" and "What is the (or a) definition of the phrase 'work of art'?" Such a distinction seems useless for my purposes here.

human activities are the realizations of dispositions toward them; that to each, there corresponds a prior mental readiness which when activated leads naturally into it. Thus interpreted, the question inquires after the essence of works of art; and it presupposes that in that essence will be found some posture of the mind, i.e., that if anything is a work of art, someone has a mental disposition of some kind toward it.

In this essay I shall consider several answers to the question, "What is a work of art?" thus explained, i.e., several statements of the form: "A work of art is anything which activates a certain posture of the mind."

II

Most conscious human activity falls into one or other of two categories. It is either necessary or free, practical or disinterested. Much of the time there are a hundred things which press upon us—food to find, enemies to evade, promises to fulfill, duties to perform, demands to make, desires to satisfy. The activity in which we accomplish all these and similar tasks is directed to some ulterior objective; its nature can be understood only in terms of its target. The attitude involved in the life of necessity is a readiness to use whatever comes to hand as an instrument for achieving the goals which define it; and the posture of the mind appropriate to those things which occur in the life of practice is a disposition to use them as instruments to that future which our purposes envision.

But the hunter does not always hunt, nor the quarry always hide. At intervals, between the surges of duty and desire, disinterested activity occurs. No objective lies beyond it; no anticipation of a goal compels it. In it, the disposition of the mind is not to use something as an instrument toward some future, but simply to deal with things in a certain way in the present. The posture of the mind is free; and the interests pursued, having no remote objective, are in this sense disinterested.

Of these free activities there are three sorts: playing, understanding facts, and enjoying; and the disposition which each manifests is a readiness to deal with objects in a certain way.

Despite this similarity, there are important differences. To play or to understand is to use something according to a rule; to enjoy is to deal with something in a totally different fashion.

Play consists in the use of things according to certain pre-ordained principles; and what is used in accord with these rules, we may call the "toys" of play. Thus, the bridge player has his cards, and the chess player his pieces; and to play bridge or chess is to arrange these toys according to certain rules. The rules involved are of two sorts: some tell us how the toys may be deployed, and others not to use them under certain circumstances. Rules of the first kind enable us to play; those of the second, to complete a game. The rules of play may be very sketchy; and the two kinds mentioned, those for deploying toys, and those for completing games, are not, both of them, always present. The child at play often seems to follow only the rule that one should try to cover as much ground as possible and make as much noise as possible in the shortest time. But if there are no rules whatever there is no play, there is only aimless motion. The posture of the mind in play is a disposition to use certain things, the toys, according to certain rules; and frequently, to organize, by use of other rules, these usings of the toys in sequences which are games, and which make completed units of the activity.

In the activity of understanding, there are analogues of the elements of play. To understand a fact is to assert it or (which is the same thing here) to make an assertion about it;² and assertions consist in the use of words according to rules. These rules are of two kinds: those which enable us to form sentences (grammatical and syntactical rules), and those ways of acting, difficult of formulation, by exhibiting which we employ sentences assertively rather than ironically, ritually, jokingly, or in some other fashion. He who understands the nature of a mountain—that it has a certain altitude, a certain age, a certain origin—uses words to assert these facts; and his activity is like

² There are other uses of "to understand" and its cognates, e.g., those of "to understand instructions", "to understand another's suffering." Here, I am concerned with understanding, conceived as that which we accomplish when we make an assertion about a fact. To understand a sentence is to assert (or be able to assert) something about its employment, not simply to employ it although employing it may be a criterion for understanding it.

that of play. For each sentence is a sequence of usings of words according to certain rules; while each is, itself, employed for assertion. The words are like the toys of play; the rule of using each are like the rules for deploying toys; and the rules for assertion with a sentence is like the rule for completing a game, a way in which the usings of words are organized into games. Thus, the activity of understanding, the making of assertions, involves a posture of the mind like that in play; but while the latter is a disposition to use things as toys, the former is a readiness to use some things assertively with respect to others.

There is another similarity between playing and understanding which it may be well to notice; either may be solitary or performed in company. The very young child plays alone, and the old or friendless have invented games which require no companions. And similarly, one does upon occasion in a solitary way use language for the purpose of understanding. The string around a finger, the "nonsense" syllables, the private shorthand marks—all of these are words whose use is solitary; and from these private usings there may result assertions which no one wishes to communicate to others. But the child quickly turns to play in company as would the old or friendless if they could; and the use of much language aims at making known to others the understanding which it furthers in ourselves. And in the use of things in which both play and understanding consist, there is an analogous and consequent diversity. To a player's use of the toys must correspond his companions' acquaintance with that use. Each must know the rule for the use of the toy, but this is not all. The player's move in chess must have a corresponding, and similar use in his opponent's mind; otherwise the game disintegrates. One who did not see that his opponent had moved a knight correctly would break up the game, and seeing that it was so moved is a passive use of it which differs from the mere knowledge of the rule for its employment. So in the use of language where it is not private. One who speaks to others will speak to no one if there is not in them for each of the uses of his words a corresponding passive use by them. The listener who does not use words in these ways will not see what the speaker says; for even though he should be acquainted with the rules of the language of the speaker, he

would not see that the words are used according to them. If understanding is to be communicated, there must correspond to the active use of words a passive³ employment in the hearer. And in play and understanding which take place in company, there must, in each case, be the use of things according to rules which has an active and a passive aspect.

. There is another kind of activity which goes by the name of "understanding." It does not consist, as does the activity we have been discussing, in the use of something according to rules to make and to receive assertions. It is the activity of keeping something fully and clearly and directly before one's mind. There are many difficulties in the analysis of this kind of activity, but there can be little doubt that it occurs. There is a difference between our acquaintance with our friends, and the understanding of them which consists in assertions about them. The former seems to dispense with any kind of symbolic barrier, whereas the latter kind of understanding is always the using of a sentence to assert a fact. It is understanding as the making of assertions about facts with which we are here concerned.

There is an important difference to be observed between playing and understanding. The former is the using of toys according to certain rules, but never because of anything other than the toys and rules. To be sure, one's objective is to come off well—to break a record, or to win over one's opponent. But this objective always may be construed as that of handling the toys of the game in a certain way. There is nothing beyond the toys which motivates one's use of them; or if there is, then the play becomes professional; and is no longer play, but practical activity instead.

In the activity of understanding, things are quite different. The sentences one asserts and listens to are used as are the toys of play, but they are used in such a way that there is always something other than themselves close at hand. In understanding, what is to be understood is always remote from the actor, not as is the objective from the man of practical life, since it is not something to be achieved, but behind the transparent veil of the

³ This use is determined by that of the speaker, and acquiesced in by the hearer. Hence, the rather strange adjective "passive."

sentence which refers. So that understanding might be described as the activity of keeping things at arm's length in order to see them clearly while play is the activity of dealing with things close at hand in order to come off well.

The activity of enjoyment contains two factors, awareness of something and a feeling of favor, disfavor, or indifference toward it. One who is not aware of what his life contains, or feels in no way toward it, cannot be said "to enjoy" it. His ignorance precludes his enjoyment; and his lack of feeling, if he is not totally unaware, makes him a detached beholder rather than one who enjoys. It may sound strange to say that one who is aware of something, but feels unfavorably toward it, "enjoys" what is before him; but there is no word in English, I believe, for the activity of knowing and disfavoring a thing. One cannot, in such a case, speak of suffering from it without a certain awkwardness; for one most notably suffers from a thing when he is least clearly aware of it. The similarity between being aware of and favoring, and being aware of and disfavoring a thing suggests using the same word for both activities; and the difference may be marked by opposed adjectives. So that one may speak of positive enjoyment, and of negative enjoyment to mark both the similarity and difference between these two activities. Also, to speak of feeling neutrally or indifferently toward something may sound strange; for it is tempting to say that one who feels neutrally or indifferently has no feeling at all. But this is not quite correct. An angel who has no capacity for feeling cannot be said to be indifferent or neutral toward something; he is, rather, completely detached from it. To feel neutrally or indifferently may be said only of such things as can feel favor or disfavor for the thing about which we say that they feel neutrally or indifferently; moreover "a neutral or indifferent feeling" seems to refer not to an absence of feeling, but to one coming in a certain way between favor and disfavor. "How did you like it?" . . . "I felt I could take it or leave it." This little dialogue suggests, although it only suggests, that feeling neutrally or indifferently is as much a way of feeling, and the state as much *a* feeling, as favor and disfavor. The posture of the mind which the activity of enjoyment expresses is a readiness to notice whatever happens, and to feel

toward it with favor, disfavor, or indifference. A readiness to notice enables awareness of a thing; and a disposition to respond with favor, disfavor, or indifference when coupled with the former, is the attitude which lies beneath the activity of enjoyment.

This activity is like play in some respects. What is enjoyed is always present to the enjoyer directly as is the toy to the player; and if there is any purpose at all in enjoyment (a way of speaking which is rather misleading) it is at every moment either frustrated or accomplished. Moreover, as one comes off well, or ill, or indifferently in play, so in enjoyment, one favors or rejects or is neutral toward the thing enjoyed. But unlike play, in the enjoyment of a thing there is nothing used and no rule adopted. In this respect, too, it is unlike understanding. It has no sentences to assert, no truths to record, nothing to be known by being held at arm's length. What we enjoy may itself be the use of rules to play a game with toys, or making assertions with sentences, but enjoyment is not itself the following of rules. Behind enjoyment is a disposition passively to open the mind to whatever may be found. It is a readiness to be interested in whatever happens. The posture of enjoyment is that of the spectator and the looker-on.

There are four postures of the mind we have distinguished. For practical activity, its posture is a readiness to employ the things it hits upon as instruments to further goals. For play, its posture is a readiness to use the things it finds as toys in accord with rules in such a way as to come off well in a game. For understanding, its disposition is to use the things it hits upon as sentences for assertion. And for enjoyment, the posture of the mind is a readiness to respond directly with favor, disfavor, or indifference to what it finds.

When we think of the postures of the mind which lie behind our activities in these ways, we see that each posture has its own criterion for the excellence of the things which enter into the activity it initiates. When acting with a purpose, when intending to use whatever we can to accomplish it, it is natural to ask whether the thing so used serves the purpose well, and whether anything else might serve it better. Its excellence is judged by its utility. In the life of play, we naturally ask whether the toys are

skillfully employed according to the rules, i.e., how well a game comes off. The excellence of the game is a reflection of the skill with which toys are employed according to rules in order to produce it. When disposed to understand, we naturally ask whether the language we use is well-contrived, the uses clear, the assertions unmistakable and well-evidenced. The excellence of the sentences is their suitability for assertion and its conveyance from one to another. And when the posture is one of enjoyment, we naturally ask what it is that we enjoy. The excellence of the thing enjoyed is, in part, determined by the clarity of our awareness of it.

III

Many answers to the question "What is a work of art?" have been given by reference to one or other of the four attitudes discussed. The question itself may, therefore, be interpreted as asking, "What mental posture is it which, when assumed toward something, endows that thing with the property essential to works of art?". And it has been advanced that the posture of the mind is that of practical life, and consequently, that a work of art is an instrument toward some goal; that the posture is that of play, and consequently, that a work of art is the using of toys in a game; that the posture is that of understanding, and consequently, that a work of art is an assertive symbol for some fact; that the posture of the mind is one of enjoyment, and consequently, that a work of art is something liked or disliked or neutral as we find it in awareness. And it may be well to examine answers of these four sorts.

(1) It is easy to develop out of Freud's work an answer of the first kind. For a great variety of reasons, the libidinous instincts of the id frequently find no ordinary means of satisfaction; and in the artist's work, a substitute means to the satisfaction of those demands is found. The work of art is a socially acceptable instrument to the satisfaction of desires, whose natural instrument is unavailable.* And the posture of the mind

* Herbert Read, "Art and Society"; "The Psychology of the Artist: Freud's Theory" in Melvin Rader's *A Modern Book of Esthetics, An Anthology* (New York, 1935); Sigmund Freud: "The Relation of the Poet to Day-dreaming," tr. I. F. Grant, in the same work.

appropriate to a work of art is a disposition to use it as a substitute instrument.

The view that the creation and appreciation of a work of art is its use as a substitute instrument for the satisfaction of the id cannot be rejected out of hand. There is nothing in a painting, a quartet, or a novel which precludes this use, and which renders the posture of practice impossible toward it. If psychologists do find that artists and their public use some works in this way, it would be folly to deny it. But it would be necessary, also, to point out to such artists and appreciators that this attitude toward art, if taken to yield the essence of it, brings with it a most extraordinary result. For a work of art is a poor means to the satisfaction of the id. Who would not prefer for the purposes of the id the life of Casanova to novel reading however racy? Yet were works of art things to which this practical posture of the mind were appropriate, it would be necessary to condemn them all as poor instruments, and to hold that others served our purpose better. For with the practical posture of the mind goes the criterion that is relevant to the things toward which we assume that posture. But surely, to evaluate works of art as instruments is like evaluating spades as hammers. A spade is for digging; a hammer is for pounding. And anyone who condemned a spade as a poor instrument for driving nails would certainly be applying to a spade a criterion which was not, in any ordinary situation, relevant to it. In the same way, to condemn the painting of a woman on the ground that a woman is better than a painting can occur only because we have applied to it a criterion which, in any ordinary situation, does not properly apply. We must conclude that while from the Freudian theory we may learn something of the psychological origin of creation and appreciation, we can hardly suppose that in it we find the posture of the mind which yields the property essential for all works of art.

Any view which endeavors to understand a work of art in terms of some practical purpose is subject to a similar difficulty. For it will always be required that, as works of art, they be judged in terms of their utility to some external goal. And this utility, even though in fact it should exist, if taken as essential to them will always make intelligible the question whether something else

is not a better means. For this reason, it will always be intelligible to condemn a work of art, as such, on the ground that something not a work of art would be better in its place. And while many things may be better morally or in some other way than works of art, it is surely not intelligible to apply to such works a criterion for aesthetic value which they never were designed to meet. But this confusion of criteria will always threaten if a work of art is thought of as the private property of the practical posture of the mind.

(2) Let us now consider the view that a work of art is something toward which the attitude of play is assumed.⁵ On this view, the creator of a work of art uses the elements of his medium, like toys, according to certain rules, and his work is the using of the toys of his art as the player's game is the using of other toys according to other rules. The work of art is like a frozen game⁶ in which each use of the elements of the medium is recorded for the informed observer; but it is like a solitary game rather than like one played in company.⁷ There is no opponent for the artist and no other member of his team. The observer must know the rules to understand the work, but he must not participate in it.

We should notice that with this answer to the question "What is a work of art?" there comes a criterion for evaluating it analogous to that for the evaluation of a game. A game is a good one if, in it, the player comes off well; if within the framework raised by the rules for the uses of the toys the outcome is successful. This criterion brings with it a further consideration of the excellence of the technique. A good game is one in which the rules are applied in the uses of the toys in a way which makes a result, in some way, highly interesting. The point to notice is that the goodness of a game is determined by reference to the rules

⁵ Cf. Konrad Lange and Karl Groos quoted by Melvin Rader in *A Modern Book of Esthetics* (New York, 1935), pp. 1-52. Also Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens* (London, 1949), Ch. ii, ix, x.

⁶ Several problems, hinging upon the distinction between performed works, much like games, and non-performed works, less like them, are not discussed here.

⁷ This view is obviously mistaken since some works of art, e.g., cathedrals, result from the activity of many artists and artisans. I simply omit any discussion of the species of the play theory which would liken a work of art to the product of social play.

which define it. And if a work of art is to be understood in terms of play, it must be judged analogously. It will be a good work to the extent that the creator has used the elements of the medium in accord with certain rules, and in those uses had succeeded. Following the rules yields the form of the work, and the excellence of the work is the skillfulness of the form's embodiment. A good tragedy will be one in the creation of which the author has employed the elements of language (and the theatrical art) skillfully in accord with the rules for tragedy; a good sonata will be one in the creation of which the composer has deployed the elements of tone according to the rules for that form. And where the dramatist or the composer or an artist of any kind has used elements which, at first, seem unsuited to the form, but employed its rules in a skillful way to compress them in its frame, there is the added excellence of a difficult task well done. That a work of art is the using of toys in accord with rules for artistic play (or a record of that using) springs from the view that the posture of play, is the disposition which art activates; and this view leads, naturally, to a formalistic criterion for the value of works of art.

One difficulty with this answer to our question will be noticed here. The answer does not agree with a large part of the evaluations that we make. Many tragedies violate the rules; few sonatas exhibit the pattern of that form. The lack of technical skill in using the toys of art according to rules, or in stamping on some portion of a medium the record of such skillful use is a lack which goes unheeded in many works if not in all great ones. And the works of art which are best examples of a form are frequently most trivial. We must conclude that artists, the solitary players of artistic games, seldom bind themselves by rules, that their public is equally heedless of those rules, and that many if not most works are neither games nor like them in any significant respect. The view that a work of art is something toward which the artist adopts an attitude of play, and we, the disposition to watch him at it, must be rejected; it brings with it an evaluation of the work which is foreign to it.

(3) Many who have accepted neither the view that a work of art is an instrument in some practical concern, nor the using of toys in a kind of play, have held that such works are assertive

symbols because the attitude we harbor toward them is that of understanding. There are many varieties of this doctrine; but common to them all is the belief that a work of art provides for the artist and proffers to his public a piece of information as to something other than itself. A work of art is something by which we may come to understand some fact outside of art. This is the theme of realism as a school of thought about art.

Probably the chief contributor to this school of thought is Aristotle. He contended that most works of art are imitations,⁸ and his followers have concluded that all are. And from his writing, I suspect, the very numerous school has developed which holds that because works of art are imitations, they betray within themselves the character of the fact "in life," "in action," or "in nature" which they imitate. Many have concluded that they are imitative assertive symbols by which we understand what life and action or nature may (or does) contain.⁹

There are two ingredients of realism: One, the view that a work of art is an imitation; the other, that it is a symbol of a certain sort. Let us consider these views in order.

Let us consider, first, what kind of thing an imitation is. Suppose that rounding a corner on Fifth Avenue, we come upon a fabricated animal, some five feet high, with short fur, short forelegs, massive hind ones, standing erect, and balanced by a long tail. We would not hesitate to say that it was an imitation of a kangaroo. It is a clear case of something to which the phrase "an imitation" correctly applies; and we can discover the criteria for deciding whether a thing is an imitation by noticing some of the characteristics of our unnatural marsupial.

It is immediately clear that one reason why we call our synthetic quadruped "an imitation" is that it resembles the animal in the bush; and that it resembles him in a certain way. If it bore no resemblance whatever to its Australian cousin, it would be foolish to call it "an imitation," as it would also be, to deny that it is one. And if it be objected that every thing resembles any thing in some respect, we might add that the resemblance which an imitation must exhibit is one that is important in the context.

⁸ *De Poetica*, 1447a.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1448b.

What a child at play will call "an imitation" will differ in its resemblances from what a biologist might call by that phrase. And our Fifth Avenue artifact is an imitation because, in part, for the purposes of the passers-by, his resemblance to the Australian animal is important.

It is also clear that the resemblance must be neither too full nor too thin. Bills which too much resemble genuine currency are counterfeits, not imitations. And if our kangaroo, exhibiting every sign of life, hopped off at our approach into the zoo, he would be a counterfeit because he too much resembled his living fellow. If, instead of the furry life-like being that he is, he were a skeleton, we would neither affirm nor deny that he is an imitation. For then the resemblance would be too little. A skeleton no more imitates a live being than does the blueprint of a building the completed structure. Stage money is an imitation because its resemblance to real currency is not so much that it deceives, and not so little that it misses recognition. And the resemblance which a thing must have to something else in order to be described as an imitation must be important for the purposes at hand, and neither too full nor too thin.

Nor would it be an imitation if it were a chance result of unthinking processes. A real kangaroo resembles his parents, but no one would argue that he was or was not an imitation of them. And should our animal have been the product of a fortuitous concourse of smoke and dust, we would be at a loss to decide whether it was or was not an imitation. We agree that it is, because in part we assume that it was deliberately constructed by a conscious effort to resemble the living animal.

And last, we agree that it is an imitation because, in part, there is another thing which served as model or original for its creator. Were there no kangaroos, and had no one ever seen one, our New York fabrication might be called "a fantasy," but never "an imitation."

If anything is to be or not to be an imitation, there must be something else, the model or original, which some conscious agent knew, and that agent must have endeavored to make the thing in question in important respects to resemble the model, and that neither too much nor too little. Thus, an imitation is an imitation

of some thing. We may define "imitation" as referring to any thing which resembles some other in important respects, and to the right degree. As thus defined, the use of the word presupposes the truth or belief in the truth of each of at least three propositions: that the thing with respect to which the word is used affirmatively or negatively was made by some one, that there was a model for the making which the maker knew, and that the maker tried to make the thing in question like the model in just the right way.¹⁰

The realist's position must be I think, as Aristotle said, that works of art are imitations; and imitations are things of the kind set out above. It seems reasonable to hold that a portrait is an imitation. There is a model, the subject. The artist does in some way know the subject. He does contrive that the thing he fashions should resemble the subject; and that resemblance, he tries to make neither too full nor too thin. And the result of this examination might be extended to all art as in fact it has. Some even have held that very abstract art is imitative, but imitative of very abstract features of the world rather than of concrete and localized neighborhoods.¹¹

But this is not all the realist's position. The rest is that the imitations in which works of art consist refer to facts in such a way that the artist and his audience find in them assertions about the facts concerned. A portrait is not merely an imitation; it is a thing by which the artist tells us that there is some thing in the world, the subject, like the portrait. And so it is for works of all kinds. Realism is the view that the posture we assume toward artistic imitations is a preparedness to use them for asserting the existence or the nature of their models.

Let us ask, now, whether works of art are imitations, and

¹⁰ An unsuccessful imitation is a thing so made, but falling in the neighbourhood of too full or too thin a resemblance. Where there is no attempt at copying a model, the concept of imitation does not properly apply. Where we can say significantly "this is not an imitation," "this" is an imitation of one thing, but we assert, not of another.

¹¹ Cf. John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York, 1934), pp. 93-94, where he quotes with approval a similar view from A. C. Barnes' *The Art in Painting*.

whether they can be used for asserting the existence or the nature of any fact.

It is plain, first, that many works are imitations. They are imitations of other works of the same sort as an examination of the various schools of art makes evident. But it is clearly not the view that works of art are imitations of other works of art which realism wishes to advance or to defend.

In painting and in sculpture, we find many works which are imitations of things not themselves works of art. Landscapes, portraits, and busts are often intentionally made to resemble other things by persons who are familiar with the latter.

But in the case of architecture and music the situation is quite different. Many buildings are imitative but of other buildings only. And it is obvious that we should not say that a building is an imitation of anything else. We should not say that it is an imitation of its blueprint or of its idea in its creator's mind. For it is so unlike these latter that its creator cannot have used either as its model, however much he may have used them in some other way in its creation. Again, many musical compositions are imitations of other compositions; but they are so radically unlike anything not a piece of music that we cannot suppose their creators to acknowledge it as their original. Some exceptions, of course, occur such as songs of birds, the bellowing of bulls, and the whisk of brooms; but aside from these and similar noisy events which some music imitates, it is clear that we should describe music neither as imitative nor as not so. What could be more unlike, and more unlike in important respects, than *The Eroica* and the adventures of any hero? How could Beethoven have taken any thing as a model for his symphony?

While Aristotle was wrong about most "flute-playing" and "lyre-playing," and his followers about architecture, it might be held that he was certainly right about literary works. Novels, poems and dramas, it might be held, imitate one kind of life or another. What could be more like life in Mississippi than Faulkner's *Light in August*; or the human scene for all mankind than *Dover Beach*? And how can one deny that Faulkner tried to make his novel like that life in just the right degree, and Arnold, *Dover Beach* like the human scene?

This view, too, is a mistake. For *Light in August* is the telling of a story by a narrator more or less clearly before the reader; but there is no actual state of affairs which could serve as model to its fashioning. Life in Mississippi cannot serve this function, for no one tells that life as the narrator does the story. And to suppose that the novel is an imitation of some actual events turns them from a model for it to the reference of it; and makes what was a novel into a history or biography. *Light in August* may be an imitation of the telling of some other story, but it is idle to speak of it as an imitation or not an imitation of a certain period of cultural history in Mississippi. And so for novels generally. Considerations of the same kind lead to a similar conclusion concerning poems. In the performance of a drama, a narrator seldom is provided. Actions are performed; they are not told. But there is nothing real which could serve as a model for these actions.¹² It appears that literary works, no more than others, can be spoken of as imitations; for if one excludes other literary works, they have no models.

It might be objected that this view is based upon a misconception of literary works. A novel or a poem, it might be said, is not the telling of a story or the speaking of a speech; it is what is told or spoken. *Light in August* is the set of imaginary events which the author tells, and *Dover Beach* is the attitude toward life which its speaker utters. But neither the novel nor the poem are the words in which they are expressed. By use of this distinction between what is told or spoken and the words in which it is formulated, the realist with respect to literary art might endeavor to defend the view that literary works are imitations. He might hold, for example, that the imaginary events of the novel and the attitudes of the poetic speaker are imitations of real events and attitudes.

To hold that works of literature are what is told or spoken

¹² Some historical plays may be exceptions. Probably there are some works of art of various kinds for which there is no existing way of deciding whether they are imitations; for the class of imitations is not bounded by a sharp line. How much a thing may be unlike another, and remain an imitation of it, and the latter remain a model for the former, cannot be precisely determined.

in opposition to the telling or the speaking of it leads us to strange paradoxes. It follows that *Light in August* was neither told nor written by William Faulkner; for all he could tell or write was words. It was, in fact, written by no one. It follows that *Dover Beach* is not an English poem, for the attitudes its words express are or may be common property whereas the words alone are English. It follows that *Hamlet* is not written in iambic pentameter; for this is the meter of the lines, not of the imaginary events they mean. Such puzzles as these are involved in the view that literary works of art are imitations because what they say, as opposed to the saying of it, is an imitation of reality.

These paradoxes are generated by a mistaken assumption concerning the manner in which a noise becomes a symbol, and a consequent mistake concerning the relation between a word or sentence and what it says or means. The assumption is that a noise becomes a symbol only if something different from it is grafted to it; the something different is a meaning which the noise then has. The process of establishing a symbol is thought of as analogous to that of giving. When John gives Priscilla a gift, he presents her with something totally distinct from herself. It could have been given to no one; it could have been given to someone else; and it can be taken away. Priscilla, and the gift, would remain unchanged for all that. One can consider the gift without considering Priscilla; and her, without considering the gift. So it seems that when Adam established symbols, he simply gave to its word each fowl of the air, and beast of the field as Jehovah brought it to him, as John gave his gift to Priscilla. The fowls, and the beasts, and all other things are thus the meanings of words as John's present is Priscilla's gift, and they may be considered in isolation from their words just as Priscilla's gift may be thought of without thinking of her. In the same way, the meanings of sentences are things which are grafted to symbols and may be thought of apart from them. And so one may treat symbols as reminders of their meanings just as one might treat Priscilla as a reminder of her new possession. And one may contemplate a meaning in independence of its symbol just as one can admire the gift without admiring its owner.

But to suppose that there is this analogy is to commit a grave

error. Establishing the meaning of a symbol does not consist in doing something like giving. It does not consist in the putting of two different objects together. It does not because the meaning of a symbol is not an object at all. Establishing the meaning of a symbol is more like aiming. When we aim, we handle a missile in a certain way, a way such as to insure our hitting the target. But it would be quite foolish to speak of aiming as consisting in putting together two different objects which were formerly separated, namely, the aim and the missile. Aiming is, rather, a certain kind of action in which we engage; and so far from there being something called "the aiming of the missile" which is grafted onto the missile, the aiming is, if anywhere at all, pervasive of the entire missile, and inseparable from it. So is it for establishing the meaning of a symbol. It is a way of performing with a sound, and we cannot describe it in terms of the putting together of two different objects, the meaning and the symbol. The meaning as a kind of performance with a noise is all over the noise, and inseparable from it. Apart from the symbol there is no meaning, just as apart from the missile there is no aiming; and apart from the meaning there is no symbol just as apart from the aiming there is nothing which is a missile. To speak, therefore, of the meanings of symbols in isolation from symbols is not to speak falsely; it is to speak unintelligibly.

That the meaning of a symbol is something which must be adjoined to it is a very old view, going back in our tradition at least as far as Saint Augustine. But it generates paradoxes of the sort mentioned earlier which can be resolved by seeing that the assumption is mistaken. It causes so much trouble for any satisfactory view of symbols that, despite its venerable age, we should turn it out of doors, and let it die; or rather dismiss it from our minds since it never actually lived at all.

To hold that literary works are imaginary events or attitudes which their symbols mean, and that consequently the events or attitudes may imitate realities while the symbols do not, is to apply this mistaken assumption. A novel or a poem is not a story told or attitude recorded; it is the telling of that tale or the speaking of that attitude. And this distinction between a meaning and its

symbol cannot work to save the view that literary works are imitations, for there is no such distinction.¹³

Except for many works in painting and in sculpture, and for a very few in music, we cannot describe a work of art as imitative. Nor would it be correct to deny to it this trait. For to be or not to be an imitation requires that there should be something outside of art in whose likeness a creator attempts to fashion the materials of his medium; and most works of art are so unlike any real occurrence that we cannot suppose their creators to have tried to fashion them upon the latter. Where there is nothing which is used as model, it is folly to deny as well as to assert that the artist's work is an imitation. And the first part of realism, that all works of art are imitations, cannot be accused of being false, and, with exceptions like those noted, must be branded idle.¹⁴

Let us consider, next, the second part of the theory of imitation, the view that works of art are symbols by which the existence or the nature of their models is asserted and thereby understood. It is clear, first, that nothing may be a symbol of this kind unless it is used in this way, or unless a way in which it could be so employed has been somewhere laid down. The view that independently of conscious use or of rules that would govern it should it occur, one thing may be a symbol for another, is a plain mistake; the doctrine of natural symbols is either the doctrine that one thing is used as a symbol for something with which it is naturally connected or it is a doctrine about things which fall entirely in a genus other than the one that is here involved. With a very few exceptions, works of art are not used as symbols for the making of assertions; and nowhere, are there rules laid down by which they could be so employed.

¹³ The word "meaning" has here been used quite loosely, though clearly enough for present purposes. A detailed discussion of the subject would have to make some distinction between the rules for using a noise or mark, or other physical object, and the actual use of it on particular occasions. The former might be called the meaning of the symbol, and for the latter, some other word would then be desirable. Cf. P. F. Strawson "On Referring," *Mind*, LIX, (1950), 320-344.

¹⁴ I have here made use of a view of definition found in Max Black's *Problems of Analysis*, "Definition, Presupposition, and Assertion" (Ithaca, New York, 1954).

If we consider sentences, it readily becomes evident that they are dealt with in this fashion and that rules for their assertive use exist. They may be used for many purposes other than assertion—for questioning, suggesting, inviting, praying, requesting, deceiving, pretending, and making jokes; and in each case, the speaker and the listener, in their respective roles, employ the sentence in an active or a corresponding passive way. To assert or to deny the existence and the character of facts is on a par with these other purposes to which we put our sentences. The rules by which this purpose is accomplished cannot be decided *a priori*, nor can we so decide that other things than sentences might not be so employed. One may assert a fact by uttering a sentence in a certain tone; and there is a rule which enables us actively to make assertions and passively to receive them by uttering and hearing sentences in that manner. But there are many others; emphatic gestures, increased volume, and the use of other words such as "I am convinced" will serve as well. Sentences need not be the things we use assertively. Nods and highway signs assert some facts; and a philosopher in ancient times seems to have asserted his metaphysical belief by a wagging of his finger. How sentences are used to any purpose, and whether other things than sentences may be employed for any given purpose, are questions which must be answered by consulting the context in which the purpose and the thing occur. This consultation assures us that sentences are used assertively as well as in other ways, and that rules for this employment may be found.

It is not impossible that works of art should be employed assertively as sentences sometimes are. There is nothing in a painting, a novel or a symphony which precludes its assertive use. Just as nods, diagrams, and maps may be used to make assertions, so could we also use a work of art. If they are so used, we should be able to provide at least some instances of that use and to discover in them at least some rules for its occurrence. But that few works of art are used in this manner is shown by asking how they would be so employed. For the most part, this question cannot be answered; and this failure is a demonstration that for most works of art, no rule of any kind exists by

which the artist could employ his work to make, and his public to receive, an assertion of any sort.¹⁵

There seem to be a good many exceptions to this view. Wherever something can be translated into a sentence used for assertion, there can be no doubt that what is thus translated is a thing which is used assertively. Some artists have provided such translations. In program music, we find on some occasions, comments written out on life or nature; and these programs may be understood as translations of what the artist says with music on those subjects. Let us notice what may happen in these cases. The artist uses his work as an assertive symbol; he translates it into sentences commonly used in that way; the appreciator reads or hears the sentences; and he observes the work. For the artist's active use of program sentences, there is a corresponding passive use in those who read or hear them. And in their use, the listener and the artist may come to understand the facts concerned. The appreciator, moreover, comes to understand and to assert that the artist is saying in his music what he says with sentences. But the appreciator seldom if ever comes to use the music in a passive way which corresponds to its active use by the composer; and the music itself seldom if ever is used to make assertions that are communicated. If program music is ever an assertive symbol, it is almost certain that it is so only in the private regions of the composer's mind. If this were not so, programs would be unnecessary or, at least, forgotten as one forgets the language out of which he translates when the translation is his main concern. While program music may be an exception to the view above, it may at least be doubted that it is; one may suspect that the program of a composition is an added decoration for it rather than a translation of it. And if some program music must be so interpreted, it is certainly true that all need not be construed as made up of assertive symbols.

Realism, the view that works of art are imitations through

¹⁵ Cf. my "Is a Work of Art a Symbol?", *Journal of Philosophy*, L (1953), 485-503.

The question is complicated, however, by the fact that many literary works contain assertive parts, or presuppose beliefs about facts; so that some are more closely similar to assertive symbols than I once thought.

which the artist and his public come to understand the facts they imitate, breaks down in two ways; and each of them is fatal. Only some works of art are imitations; and few are used as symbols for assertion.

That few if any are so used appears from another, but related consideration. If every work of art were an assertive symbol, we would require of each what, in fact, it is improper to require of most if not of all. We would exact of every poem and novel that its sentences be well-contrived for conveying information, and that the assertions it embodies be well-evidenced. But to ask for assertive clarity in, and evidence for or against a poem or a novel is to ask a question which seems quite improper; while to inquire about the clarity in, and evidence for or against a symphony, a building, or a dance is obvious nonsense. A confusion of criteria generates this impropriety and obvious nonsense; we confuse a criterion for the value of a work of art with that for an assertive symbol. And this confusion, in turn, flows from the mistaken view that every work of art is a symbol. Realism with respect to works of art does not provide a property essential to them. For the property which it advances as the essence of such works does not attach to all; and if it were that essence, would require that we evaluate each such work as if its nature were to be something other than what it is.

We may wonder why, if it is in error, realism is so perennial a doctrine. The answer lies, I think, in the disposition of those who write about works of art, and in a confusion not easy to avoid. Writers on art are, by profession, interested in understanding; the posture of their minds is, mostly, a readiness to formulate a fact in an assertive symbol for it. They naturally tend, knowing works of art to be important, to hold that their importance must lie like that of sentences in furthering the understanding of the world. Thus, Aristotle declared that "to be learning something is the greatest of all pleasures"¹⁶—a view not unmixed with a high degree of pedantry. But were realism correct, we should have to require that a work of art be a clear assertive symbol and its employment a true and well-evidenced

¹⁶ *De Poetica*, 1448b.

assertion; for with the posture of understanding come naturally the criteria for the things that attitude employs. That this attitude is not assumed toward art, all would readily conclude from the inappropriateness of these criteria to its works, if it were not for the confusion mentioned.

This confusion consists in the identification of sentences about works of art with those works themselves. "*Light in August* resembles life in Mississippi." "*Hamlet* has its counterpart in human affairs," "*Dover Beach* expresses a pervasive attitude"—all these sentences and many others like them are unquestionably true. We may put this by saying: "*Light in August* resembles life in Mississippi" is true, and so for the others. If we do not notice the difference between the sentences quoted and the works they are about, it is easy to suppose that the novel, the play, and the poem are themselves true; for each work could then be substituted for the sentence which describes it. And if they are true, they must themselves be sentences used to assert the nature of the facts which they imitate. But it is clear that a sentence can not be identified with what it is about; and once this is recognized, the truth of sentences about works of art and their relation to other things will not tempt us into realism.¹⁷

(4) A work of art is neither an instrument in some practical purpose, nor the using of toys in a game, nor an imitative symbol which we use to understand some fact. And these considerations suggest that the answer to the question "What is a work of art?" is that it is a thing toward which men assume the posture of enjoyment. Not, of course, a thing of any kind whatever; for a natural thing is not something of which we are tempted to say that it is or is not a work of art. It seems pointless to describe every object in nature as not a work of art; but it is quite proper to say of any artifact that it is or is not such a work. And this fact, together with the difficulties of the other views suggests that the phrase "work of art" is used with respect to artifacts, and refers to their being objects for the posture of enjoyment. This is the

¹⁷ There are many kinds of works about which we never would be tempted to make such statements; and realism may have part of its origin in a generalization from those about which such statements are often made.

tenet which might be expressed by saying that a work of art is any artifact capable of arousing esthetic experience of it, positive, negative, or neutral.

The view that a work of art is any artifact which is enjoyable, because of the nature of the posture of enjoyment, is the view that such works can activate a disposition to know, and a readiness to respond with favor, disfavor, or indifference to the object known. This two-fold character of the disposition enables us to distinguish between informed and uninformed enjoyment. In the presence of a work of art, a child may sit in rapt amazement, in stupefied indifference, or bored disgust; but whatever emotion he exhibits toward the work, there can be little doubt in many cases that it remains untempered with much knowledge concerning it. He is aware of very little of the work; and one who, like the child, enjoys a work but knows little of it enjoys it in a way which is relatively uninformed. No enjoyment may be completely uninformed; if it were, it would be an enjoyment of nothing. Nor, barring omniscience, does any enjoyment direct itself upon a thing whose every aspect is revealed to the enjoyer; if it did, the latter would know every fact about the object he enjoyed. A critic, nonetheless, brings to bear upon a work much more knowledge than does the child. Its place in history, the details of its construction, the technique required for its creation, its relations to other things in art and nature—all these he may be aware of. And the difference between the informed and uninformed enjoyment of a work of art is that in the former activity, the readiness to know is more successful than in the latter, that more of the object is revealed in informed enjoyment of it than is vouchsafed to the uninformed.

Knowledge of a thing is essential to, because one part of, its enjoyment; and this kind of relevance of knowledge to enjoyment is peculiar to that posture of the mind. This is a vehicle, and it may be used for transport; this is a knight, and it may be employed in chess; this is a sentence, and it may be used for understanding something. Knowing that a thing is not a vehicle, or not a knight, or not a sentence makes it unreasonable (but not logically absurd) to assume toward it a practical, a playful, or a cognitive attitude. It would be folly in ordinary circum-

stances to transport things with sentences, to play chess with vehicles, or to understand a fact with a knight. And knowledge of a thing is relevant to our attitude toward it in the sense that it determines, in ordinary circumstances, that we can treat it as an instrument, a toy, or an assertive symbol.

We might express a similar feature of enjoyment by saying "This (whatever this may be) is known, and it may, therefore, be enjoyed." But there is a difference which this formulation overlooks. The relevance of the knowledge of a vehicle to its use for transport, of the knight for play in chess, or of the sentence for cognitive employment depends upon the nature of the things known. The use to which a vehicle may be put grows out of its being a vehicle as does also that of a knight or sentence; and the posture of the mind toward things of these sorts might easily be irrelevant if we did not know the nature of the things with which we dealt. But the relevance of our knowledge of a thing to our enjoyment of it does not depend in this way upon the nature of the thing concerned. Knowing it does not determine whether or how we enjoy it as knowing other things does determine the posture we can assume toward them. The relevance of knowledge to enjoyment is expressed by the simple truth that unless a thing is known, it cannot be enjoyed at all; and this simple truth is guaranteed by the two-fold character of the posture, and our capacity to favor, to disfavor and to be neutral toward anything whatever. We can know something without enjoying it because we need not respond to it with favor, disfavor, or indifference. Moreover, where knowledge is supplemented by enjoyment of a thing, we cannot infer that that enjoyment is of one kind rather than another. Mathematical equations, shrunken human skulls, trees, mountains, cartwheels, and quartets—things of many sorts, when known, have been at once the objects of all three sorts of enjoyment. We cannot infer from the nature of a thing, even though it be enjoyed, that its knowledge will exercise exclusively some one variety of that disposition. Our enjoyment may be made more adequate by an increase in our knowledge of the thing enjoyed; but our knowledge of it requires neither that we enjoy it at all, nor that if we do, we enjoy it in some special way.

Enjoyment, thus, is an attitude of mind to which any case

of knowledge may be relevant since any case may provide an object on which it focuses; and our enjoyment is more informed as we possess more knowledge of its object. The view that a work of art is any artifact which men can enjoy requires that such a work be known to its enjoyer, but does not require that all artifacts be works of art, nor that those which are, be enjoyed in some special way. It is a view which admits a difference in the enjoyments of such works, that between the relatively informed and uninformed.

What we enjoy in a work of art may include those properties which some views take to be essential to such works. A bridge is an instrument in practical activity; and the discovery of its practical role, the knowledge that it is something more than a construction, may either make it an object of enjoyment or enhance a prior enjoyment of it.¹⁸ A delicately carved chess set, while it may be enjoyed as a group of artifacts merely, is interesting in a different way when regarded as a group of toys. An illuminated manuscript, similarly, is enjoyable in its own right; but is differently so when recognized as a group of assertive sentences. Knowledge of an artifact is requisite to its enjoyment, and may be the knowledge that a thing is an instrument in a purpose, a toy in a game, or a sentence in an assertion. Such properties may attach to works of art of many sorts; and if we know them, however non-essential to such works, they may be among the properties we appreciate when we enjoy them.

In literary works a special kind of knowledge often is required to bring them before our minds, and consequently, to make them objects for enjoyment. As we have seen, sentences may be employed in a great variety of ways other than to make assertions. The latter is their use wherever the embodiment and communication of our knowledge is concerned. In the case of literary works, however, they are employed in other fashions. A literary work is a more or less complex tissue of these other uses of language. The narrator tells a story, not a history; and the fictitious speaker in a poem heard by many actually speaks to no one. Imaginary persons speak to each other; and birds and mountains sometimes do the same. These uses of sentences are infinitely various as are also those of the author when he enters

¹⁸ Cf. George Boas, *A Primer for Critics* (Baltimore, 1937), p. 11.

in his own person; but in most, if not in all cases, they are non-assertive.

The knowledge required is the knowledge of these non-assertive uses. It would be good to know the rules for them if any could be formulated, but we must at least understand the sentences of the literary work as we understand our every day speech despite ignorance of its grammar. And since these works are made for company, there must for each active use of the sentences in the work be a corresponding passive one in the reader or the hearer. If we have knowledge of this sort, the literary work will be in our minds for our enjoyment; and to the extent that we do not, our enjoyment of the work will be uninformed. Perfect knowledge in the reader or the hearer assures communication by the author; and to the extent that our knowledge falls short, our enjoyment of the work may be impugned not because it is wrong, but because it is an enjoyment of less than all the author says.

Literary works of art, in this way, are communications; but they are seldom, if ever, communications of assertions. We shall seldom, if ever, have a literary work fully before us if we treat its sentences as if they conveyed information to us. To treat a novel as a history or a lyric poem as a diary will be, almost certainly, to miss the novel or poem altogether. The enjoyment of works in this way mishandled will not be the enjoyment of what the author has created. It will be the enjoyment, perhaps, of something which the reader or the hearer has introduced. But it will not be a work of art on the view now under consideration; for whatever intends to be true is not, as such, an object for enjoyment, but a record compelled by the pressure of external facts. In arts which are not literary there is analogous knowledge required for a relatively informed enjoyment of their works, e.g., knowledge of the rules of harmony in music and of composition in painting.

The view that a work of art is any artifact we enjoy seems not to involve any confusion of criteria for the evaluation of such works. A work is excellent if someone enjoys it in a positive way and to a high degree; it is deficient if someone enjoys it in a negative way, and to a high degree. Something like a continuum of favor and disfavor uniting the extremes and running through indifference, might be set up in an obvious way, and utilized in

formulating a criterion for aesthetic value, and for its degrees. Such a criterion grows naturally out of the appreciative disposition contained in the posture of enjoyment. It gives rise to the objection that the conception of a work of art as an object for enjoyment makes it impossible to reconcile any difference of judgment with respect to its value; for since favor, disfavor, and indifference are not true or false, they are not susceptible of correction by rational considerations. But this objection may be diminished in force by noticing that the appreciative disposition in the posture of enjoyment cannot be exercised upon a thing unless the cognitive disposition in it is aroused as well. We naturally ask of anything we enjoy, how much we actually know concerning it; and we naturally impugn an enjoyment of a thing if it involves only little knowledge of it. So that the excellence of our enjoyment of a work of art may be measured not by the degree of emotional response to it alone, but by the degree of our knowledge of it as well. The view that the enjoyableness of an artifact is the property essential to works of art carries with it a criterion for the value of such a work which we may express roughly by saying that the excellence of a work of art is a function of the degree of favor and informedness of someone's enjoyment of it; its deficiency, a function of the disfavor and informedness of someone's enjoyment of it; its indifference, a function of the neutrality and informedness of someone's enjoyment of it. This criterion does not require that we treat a work of art as if it were something other than it is: an instrument, a game, or an assertive symbol.

Those artifacts which are works of art are not, as such, instruments to external goals; to assume this posture toward them requires a criterion for their excellence which is foreign to them. Nor are they toys deployed in games; for to assume toward them the active attitude of play as the artist in some cases might, or the passive attitude of the spectator, is to involve ourselves again in a confusion of criteria for their excellence. The realist's position seems in no better case; for many works cannot be described as imitations while none need be used as an assertive symbol for understanding some reality other than itself. And the criteria

which the posture of understanding would impose upon a work are, like that of practice and of play, alien to the work of art.

It seems plausible to conclude that works of art are artifacts; and that the property essential to them, that the necessary and sufficient condition for calling any artifact "a work of art" is its being an object which can activate the posture of enjoyment. The effort to answer the question, "What is a work of art?" by appeal to the postures of practice, of play, and of understanding breaks down in each case; and there seems no other disposition which, when directing us toward things, will provide them with a property which might serve as reference for the phrase. Moreover, in the knowledge of an artifact which constitutes part of our enjoyment of it, we may find knowledge of the facts from which have grown the theories of the nature of a work of art we have rejected. For an informed enjoyment of artifacts may well, where it exists, include a knowledge of their roles in practice, in play, and in assertion as well as their likenesses to other things. So that the view that a work of art is any artifact we may enjoy seems correct, not only because others are unacceptable, but because it accounts for the facts which seem to give rise to those others.

Still, however plausible, there may be a fatal difficulty in the doctrine that a work of art is any artifact which activates the posture of enjoyment. In the form provided for it here, and which it usually has taken in the history of philosophy, it asserts that the capacity to be enjoyed is the essence of a work of art, the connotation of the phrase, or the necessary and sufficient condition for its application to an artifact. The difficulty is that there seems to be no single activity with respect to a work of art which we engage in when we enjoy it. Our enjoyment of a work of art, what the posture of enjoyment readies us to do with respect to such a work, differs greatly from one time and person to another. "Knowing," "favoring," "disfavoring," and "feeling neutral toward"—each stand for some way of experiencing a thing or group of experiences of it; and all together stand for the enjoyment of it. Still, each component word seems to refer to a family of similar ways of experiencing or experiences, not to a

clear-cut class.¹⁹ If this is correct, then enjoyment consists in no such class but in an overlap of families of ways of experiencing or of experiences. And if this be correct, the readiness to enjoy when exercised, cannot confer upon those artifacts which awaken it a single essential trait; rather, it can, at most, outline an area of artifacts which correspond to the overlap of families of experiences which, taken together, they awaken. That a work of art is any artifact which we are disposed to enjoy seems highly vulnerable as an answer to the question, "What is a work of art?", if it be taken as the statement that the capacity to activate the posture of the mind is the essence of such works. It is difficult to think of any other postures of the mind which might plausibly be advanced as sources of this essence. If there are no others, and if an essential trait cannot be found among those properties which characterize works of art in independence of our attitudes toward them,²⁰ the question "What is a work of art?", must either be abandoned as unanswerable, or some answer other than one referring to an artistic essence must be sought. There seem to be no others, and there seem to be no such objective properties. The question does not seem unreasonable; and if these are not but the trappings and the suits of seeming, philosophical aestheticians must give over searching for an answer to their question in the realm of essence and begin to look for it in some region where it might be found

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¹⁹ Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1953), esp. paragraphs 156-171, concerning "reading." They have direct application to experience of literary works, and suggest analogous treatment of works of other kinds.

²⁰ Works of art are so enormously different one from another that a set of objective properties common and peculiar to them all, constituting the connotation of the phrase is extremely hard even to imagine; and none, I think, has yet been advanced against which successful objections cannot be made. In any case, as pointed out earlier, it seems wrong to suppose that anything could be a work of art by virtue, simply, of the possession of some property logically independent of human life.

WHY SHOULD I BE MORAL?—A RECONSIDERATION

DONALD WALHOUT

IT IS TIME that the question, "Why should I be moral?", which was the subject and title of one of F. H. Bradley's essays in the nineteenth century, and which he treated very inadequately, should be reconsidered. By "reconsidered" here I mean reconsidered in philosophy, since in practical life the question has always been a pressing one. Moral philosophers have been too content to accept Bradley's solution to the problem. He maintained that if you ask the question, "Why should I be moral?", you are implying that there is some end, some ulterior purpose, for being moral, which runs counter to the very meaning of morality. Being moral means doing right actions because they are right and not because of some ulterior end beyond morality. He therefore concluded that the question is not a legitimate one, not philosophically meaningful, and so he spent the bulk of his essay not discussing the main question but expounding his favorite theory of self-realization. Philosophers in the rationalistic school have tended to agree with this solution. Philosophers in the emotivist camp join with them in ignoring the question on the ground that it is meaningless, albeit for different reasons. But Bradley's solution is inadequate because he failed to consider the various contexts in which the question can be asked, and because he failed to give a proper analysis of the terms involved in the question and consequently of the main question itself. As a result we are given a dismissal rather than an answer.

Before we can approach an answer we need to distinguish various meanings of the question and determine what the ultimate question is. In doing this it will be necessary first to analyze some of the principal terms in the question, particularly the terms "I," "why," and "moral."

Contexts of the "I"

Beginning with the term "I," we note that the most obvious use of the term is in reference to the speaker or writer who uses

it—the autobiographical context. But philosophy is not autobiography; so it is quite proper (and I shall follow the custom) for philosophers to use the term "I" in a generalized sense. But granted a generalized usage of the term, there are still several contexts of usage, several frames of reference, which are possible and which ought to be kept in mind for any particular discussion. Three of these contexts are relevant to our problem.

One context is where "I" is simply a convenient word for the author to use in speaking for people or mankind in general—the theoretical context. Here the term could be replaced without loss by such synonyms as "one," "anyone," "any person," "the individual," or "man," without further demarcation. This apparently is the way Bradley used the term, and accordingly his discussion is a purely theoretical one. In this respect H. A. Prichard showed deeper insight into the personal source of our question when he wrote as follows in his equally famous essay, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?":

Any one who, stimulated by education, has come to feel the force of various obligations in life, at some time or other comes to feel the irksomeness of carrying them out, and to recognize the sacrifice of interest involved; and, if thoughtful, he inevitably puts to himself the question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?"

Such passages as this (and even more so those of recent writers with an existential interest) indicate another context for the discussion of our question. This context is that of a person who is involved practically, personally, and often despairingly, with the question, "Why should I be moral?"—the existential context. Here the term "I" is not a synonym for the abstract "anyone," but refers to the unique self, the concrete "I," gripped in the throes of anxiety and uncertainty over the importance and rationale of the obligation to be moral. The existential "I" is a general term, but it has a radically different connotation from the purely theoretical "I."

The third possible context for the discussion would be that of the "I" who is preoccupied with the question, "Why should I be moral?" in some irrational way or due to some irrational compulsion—the psychiatric context. Although there may be

many differences between this context and the previous two, I would like for the present purpose to define the difference in this way: in the psychiatric context reasoning in the philosophical sense is not helpful to the person, whereas in the other two contexts it may be so. What is needed in the psychiatric context is not the reasoning of philosophers but the guidance of trained psychiatrists or at least qualified counselors. Thus we shall not be concerned with this context in the present paper. Of course there is still relevant the matter of the relation between a philosophical answer to the question and any psychological guidance concerning the question; but that too is beyond our present scope. Nevertheless, one may at least record the hope that applications will be found by individuals and that more unity between philosophy and the practical disciplines will be achieved.

The contexts for our approach, then, will be the existential and the theoretical. Of these two, I think it goes without saying that the existential question is more fraught with concern from a personal point of view. To mention only a physical difference, the theoretical question can be dealt with by the philosopher at his leisure, in a remote chamber, and during the daylight hours; but the existential question must be faced more immediately, in a situation demanding decision, and perhaps during sleepless nights. But another difference is that the existential "I," especially if the person is not prone toward philosophy, may be satisfied with answers which, from a more theoretical point of view, would not be regarded as entirely satisfactory. Thus it would seem that the deepest context of all is reached when we consider the "I" who is existentially concerned with the question but who is asking for an answer which is not only existentially helpful but also theoretically plausible and satisfying. This is the most challenging context for the question, and the one with which philosophy must deal if it is to be a meaningful enterprise on this topic. The existential "I," for whom a satisfactory metaphysical answer is the ground, or at least part of the ground, for an existential solution—this will be the principal context for the remaining treatment of the question.

Meanings of "Why"

The term "why" in our question also calls for some clarification. When we ask, "Why should I be moral?", what sort of answer do we expect to satisfy the interrogative "why"? Different questions may be present if questioners have different meanings of "why" in mind. It is not unusual to distinguish three main uses of the term "why"—the teleological, the causal, and the logical. The teleological "why" asks for the purpose or goal of something; the causal "why" asks for the source or cause of something; the logical "why" asks for the reason or justification for something. Examples will help to make these distinctions clear. When we ask, "Why should we have a Social Security program?" we are looking for the purpose of the program in terms of good consequences which it promotes, important ends which it serves; and a fitting answer would be that Social Security enables older people to live in freedom from economic fear and want. This is the teleological "why." When we ask, "Why does the Colorado mountain region affect some people adversely at first?", we are asking for the cause of the adverse effect in terms of the physical conditions accounting for the phenomenon; and a fitting answer would be that the body, accustomed to lower altitudes, has not yet built up enough red corpuscles to offset the decreased oxygen supply. This is the causal "why." When we ask, "Why do two triangles with two of their angles equal have their third angle equal also?", we are asking for a logical explanation in terms of a justification by, a deduction from, original definitions and axioms; and the fitting answer would be a geometrical demonstration. This is the logical "why."

In the question, "Why should I be moral" it is important to know which meaning of "why" is being intended. With the teleological use of "why" in mind, one asks for the purpose or end of being moral. This apparently is what Bradley understood by "why" in the question, and he gave his cursory answer accordingly. But others seek an answer to the question in the light of the causal conditions—individual, social, or cosmic—which have brought about the moral sense. Still others are searching for a logical justification, an ultimate reason, for being moral. The teleological "why" looks to the future for an explana-

tion in the consequences of morality; the causal "why" looks to the past for an explanation in the origin of morality; and the logical "why" looks to the (timeless) present for an explanation in a metaphysical justification for morality.

Now let us ask which of these "why's" is most significant for the context of the "I" that we have adopted as most crucial. The causal explanation seems least helpful. In this type of answer the philosopher asserts that what we call morality is part of the evolution of society and is rooted in the very make-up of human beings; it is part of life itself. Human beings have come to have a moral sense; they simply *are* moral, and to ask why they should be is not intelligible. If a person does ask this, he must be questioning life itself, and this is irrational. From this point of view, therefore, the question is not philosophically meaningful. We may wonder first, however, whether no people ever question rationally the worth of life itself, and with it all of morality also. If they do, our question is certainly meaningful. But more importantly, it is doubtful whether many people who are struggling existentially with the question, "Why should I be moral?" would be satisfied with a sociological report on the origin of morality or on the universality of the moral sense. They want a reason why they should conscientiously cultivate a moral sense within themselves. But there is this much truth in the causal approach : that an answer is not likely to be fully adequate for a person unless it also justifies the belief that being moral is causally grounded in the individual, in society, in life, in the world, that somehow the world itself is making for morality.

An answer in teleological terms may be helpful to more people. In this type of answer the philosopher points out some worthy end, some consequence regarded as intrinsically good, which being moral brings about. A typical example would be the claim that being moral produces the greatest amount of happiness in the world. One should be moral, according to this point of view, because doing so will result in this good effect which is desired. Such an answer will be satisfactory, however, only if the good consequences that are pointed out are not doubted to be really valuable. But more importantly, the answer would apply only if morality is thought to be confined to the production of

certain ends, and to have nothing to do with intentions, motives, and virtues apart from consequences. Such a confinement of "being moral" to "producing good consequences" is generally regarded as too narrow. Furthermore, if this answer is helpful, it is likely to be so only because it affords a reason, a logical justification, for being moral, i.e., because it answers the logical "why" also. But there is this much truth in the teleological approach: that a sufficient answer, in order to be meaningful, must also justify the belief that being moral makes a difference in the world, that it does ultimately help to bring to fruition the highest end that ought to be.

We are thus led to the conclusion that it is the logical "why" which must be answered in the context we have adopted. This is also what we might have expected from a common sense point of view. A person in existential doubt, who is seriously using his mind, is searching basically for some logical reason, some motivating justification, for his being moral. We need to qualify this only by saying that the answer must have supporting causal and teleological aspects, and that the answer must be not merely a first principle but a principle which has deductions of existential relevance.

Meanings of "Moral"

The different usages of the term "moral" seem to result from different objects that may be referred to, rather than from different contexts for the same object, as in the case of the term "I," or from quite different intentions, as in the case of the term "why." Thus we might allow for a unifying concept of morality which will include all of these referents, although it is not my purpose here to develop that theme. Also it may be useful for some occasions to distinguish more referents than those given below. But my purpose will be served if several of the leading ones are indicated.

Sometimes, then, the term "moral" refers to the doing of certain particular actions and the not doing of others. "Why should I be moral?" in this case, means, "Why should I perform or abstain from performing the particular actions in question?" Saving money or studying diligently, avoiding gambling or show-

ing no race prejudice, might be examples of what being moral in this sense is taken to mean.

Another referent of the term "moral" is that of general principles or standards of right conduct, so that being moral means holding or following such principles. The principle of human equality in rights, or the standard of the golden mean, would be examples of this usage. Here the question, "Why should I be moral?" means, "Why should I accept the principle or standard under discussion?"

Again, the term "moral" may refer to certain virtues or personality traits regarded as desirable. Fairness, modesty, or benevolence would be typical examples. In this case a person asking, "Why should I be moral?" may mean, "Why should I cultivate the particular virtues or traits in question?"

Still another aspect of the term "moral" is in reference to certain motives from which it is thought actions should derive, such as altruism or equalitarianism. In this case a person who asks, "Why should I be moral?" may really be asking, "Why should I seek to do actions from this or that motive rather than from some other?"

Finally, the term "moral" may refer not to any of these special referents but to the moral capacity itself, the moral sense of a person, so that being moral means having and intelligently developing a sense of obligation, seeking to clarify and apply one's moral sense. "Why should I be moral?" means, in this sense, "Why should I have a cultivated sense of obligation at all, why should I seek conscientiously to discover and do right actions rather than ignore the whole business?"

The last formulation clearly brings us to the heart of the question. In fact, we can see a fundamental difference emerging when the last sense of "moral," as distinguished from the first four, is intended. Where the term "moral" signifies some action, some principle, some virtue, or some motive, the question seems to resolve itself into why a person should accept one action, principle, virtue, or motive rather than another as being genuinely moral. The questioner is not so much asking whether he should have a sense of morality at all, but rather what that morality consists in. In contrast, the question involving the last sense of

"moral" goes farther and asks why there should be a sense of obligation at all. Both of these questions—"What does morality consist in?" and, "Why should we cultivate morality?"—are basic to ethics. Today moral philosophers are almost exclusively preoccupied with the question of analyzing what morality consists in. But it is clear that the existential substance of the question, "Why should I be moral?" concerns the second of the two questions: "Why should I cultivate a sense of morality at all?" Since both sorts of questions may be expressed in a similar verbal form, it is important to recognize the difference, so that on any given occasion we can address ourselves to the question really being asked.

The Ultimate Question

We have now called attention to a number of different usages for each of the key terms, "I," "why," and "moral." From this analysis it will be evident how many possible meanings of our question there might be on any particular occasion of its being asked. Little point would be served by enumerating a detailed conspectus of all these possibilities. Some of them have been mentioned, and all have been implied, in the foregoing analysis. The main point of the whole analysis is a simple one: that any person who deals with the question, "Why should I be moral?" whether it be the philosopher or the counselor or the existential doubter himself, must look beneath the words in order to find the real question that is confronting him.

For our aim in this essay, we have concluded that the existential context of the "I," but an "I" who is also searching for a theoretically satisfactory answer, is the most significant and challenging case for philosophy. We have also seen that the self in such a context demands a logical, not merely a causal or teleological, answer to his question, and that he is concerned not just about the meaning of being moral but about the reason for cultivating a moral sense at all. Putting these things together, the question, "Why should I be moral?" might be rephrased most accurately in some such fashion as the following: "What logical reason is there for me, who am gravely concerned about whether having a sense of obligation in life is important or not, but who am also desirous of an answer that will satisfy my reason as well

as the rest of my searching self, to acquire and deepen a cultivated moral sense?"

Now when we reach this ultimate question after such a long analysis, a qualm delays our immediate advance to an answer. Could anyone ask such a question without already having a moral sense? Does not the very asking of the question presuppose a deep moral sense within the questioner? Could a person without a deep moral sense ever reach the sophistication needed to ask the question?

In reply, I would say it is probably true that some persons ask this question out of a profound sense of obligation and are far advanced in what we would agree to call being moral. But I see no reason why this should always be so. The situation would seem to vary among individuals. If it does, the question might be asked out of an existential anxiety which need not be an index to superior or even moderate moral development. Moreover, even if we admit that a minimum moral sense is universally present in all sane persons, the real question concerns the conscientious and deliberate cultivation of the moral sense, and this latter characteristic might not be present where the former is. Thus it seems that people can be, and often are, existentially concerned about the question even though, and perhaps because, they are at a low moral ebb. In short, while some people appear outwardly to be content to stay in a state of general indifference, others seek liberation. Finally, even if it is a deep moral sense that prompts the question, a philosophically minded person will be interested in pressing the question to a theoretically satisfying solution for the sake of integrity and unity of thought.

Some Existential Answers

We are now ready to see what might be said in answer to the ultimate question. I shall first present some answers that have been existentially helpful to people, i.e., have served to assuage rationally the doubt concerning this question. These first answers, however, although they often have the power of reason to dispel practical doubts, are somewhat incomplete or inconclusive from a strictly theoretical viewpoint. Each answer will therefore be stated in its own terms and then followed by what can be

regarded as its theoretical limitation. Some writers, like Dewey, would deny the distinction between an answer that meets a practical demand and an answer that is theoretically adequate. But it is evident that the distinction is a real one to many persons, including people in practical situations. So we must treat the question in its fullest ramifications. There are four of these existential answers that are most prominent.

1. The first of the answers consists in the appeal to what has variously been termed private good, self-development, prudence, and the like. A common phrasing of this answer is that it is to a person's own good that he be moral. A person's own fulfillment, his own maturity, his own happiness, is incomplete and even warped without a moral dimension. This moral dimension would normally be taken to mean both the following of principles and practices generally regarded as comprising morality, and also the conscientious cultivation of the sense of obligation itself. Empirical evidence for the need of morality in personal happiness can be cited from history, psychology, and ordinary life. Without moral growth, we do not become fully human and cannot experience the greatest enrichment which life has to offer. Quite apart from the influence on other people, which morality naturally has, we ourselves will remain floundering, immature, and indecisive without an inward moral sense that gives our life direction. In brief, this answer strikes at what is closest to most of us, at what is often the sorest spot in us—our own ego, our own personal center, our own happiness. Because of this close and intimate challenge, it is a powerful argument in its existential appeal. And it has as many prongs to be explored as there are personalities to whom it is relevant.

It might be suggested that one theoretical difficulty in this answer is that a person may not really value his life and happiness with sufficient ardor to make this a convincing reply. The argument runs adrift, it might be urged, on the island of indifference or the cliff of daredevil unconcern. But this is not a real theoretical objection, since it rests entirely on the vagaries of individual personalities and preferences. That is, the original answer maintains that being moral is best for a person irrespective of what his momentary wishes about his own happiness might happen to be;

its validity as a truth claim is therefore not affected by private idiosyncrasies and unconcerns.

The real philosophical difficulty in this first answer is that it bases itself solely on an appeal to egoistic morality. If we can assume that being moral involves concern for the interests of others as well as of oneself, it would be insufficient, and also submoral, to defend being moral by appeal to one's selfish advantage alone. You cannot rest the case for being moral on a foundation which, taken by itself, is far less than what being moral means. This may be helpful in practice, but it is theoretically inadequate. If this first answer is to carry any theoretical weight, then, as I believe it does, it must be seen as part of a greater perspective.

2. A second common answer to our question is that one should be moral because this brings the greatest benefits to other people. This is an answer appealing to social utility, the good of others. If a person is moral himself, the people around him will be helped and improved, and this influence will radiate, to a greater or lesser degree, to wider circles of people, so that in a sense it can be said that society itself is bettered by a person's being moral. Probably such an answer has most personal force when it is phrased in terms of not hurting the people we love or others immediately known to us; but it may also be effective when emphasis is placed upon community or national needs, or even upon the more abstract plane of other people's interests in general, the good of mankind. For people who have reached any degree of sensitivity to interpersonal welfare, such an answer is again a powerful one.

It might be suggested by some that this answer flounders theoretically because it assumes altruism as an obligation, whereas one might be inclined to defend total ethical egoism. "What if I don't care about other people?" is a familiar cry. Doubtless such a response is for many people a serious obstacle to finding the answer helpful. Nevertheless, we need to distinguish again between a practical difficulty and a philosophical one. It may be that, due to certain environmental factors, some people have developed little social feeling or sense of obligation toward others. But this fact would not destroy the validity of the objective truth

claim that for all people being moral is important because it benefits others and betters society as a whole. That other people's interests need to be considered would remain a duty despite individual immaturities.

A real theoretical difficulty can be found in the supposition, implicit in the answer, that social betterment in its usual senses is always furthered by being moral. That is, the consequences looked for from being moral might not always pan out as they were planned. There might not always be an exact correlation between being moral and increased social utility. Yet there should be a reason for being moral anyway, even though the calculated effects of our actions on other people miscarry. To this should be added the Stoic and Kantian doctrine that being moral means cultivating right intentions, right motives, and a good will, and not just improving society. Taking these points together, we must say that, even if the good of others remains about the same through our being moral, or is even diminished due to some miscalculation, still there is something in the idea of being moral which ought to be preserved and fostered despite this contingency. Why is this so? For the answer we must look beyond social utility, and in turn social utility must be seen as part of a wider perspective.

3. A third answer brings us beyond the individual self and other people to the whole realm of life. Being moral is important, according to this answer, because it furthers life. It is the distinctively human way of sustaining and augmenting the life process. Life is seen as evolving into ever newer and higher patterns, with human life as its present culmination; and being moral is the way in which man can best organize, consolidate, and continue existence at this level of development. He will thus be advancing most intelligently the movement of human life in general, and with it the whole process of life development. Such an answer may carry less weight with many people because it seems more remote from the immediate moral situation. But it may appeal strongly to people with a more philosophical temperament.

As before, it is no theoretical difficulty here to point out that some people do not see morality in any wider relation to the life process, or may not care anything about it. That is a prac-

tical defect, a narrowness of outlook. The real theoretical difficulty in this answer is, I would say, that it is incomplete. No self-evident truth shows that being moral is the tendency which carries forward most exactly the tendencies characteristic of the life process as we have known it in the past. Since the nineteenth century many have argued for a considerable opposition in this respect. Furthermore, even within human life itself, it is not clear that what is understood as being moral is always the best thing from a strictly biological viewpoint. This is why thinkers with an exaggerated biological interest often scoff at ideas of morality. Now without defending either of the claims just mentioned, I merely want to point out that, if we look at evolution and human life from within evolution and human life alone, it is not obvious that being moral can be justified on the ground that it promotes the life process most efficiently. Some wider perspective is needed if such a claim is to be upheld, on the analogy of Adam Smith's appeal to a more ultimate law of harmony to guarantee that economic freedom would promote the good of society. The answer is therefore incomplete in itself.

4. The fourth of the common existential answers is the religious one. We should be moral, according to this answer, because it is required by God, because it is God's will, because it pleases God. God is the supreme power and will in the universe, and if he desires us to be moral, he is to be obeyed. This answer is held by many people as sufficient without any further discussion. Also for persons within our chosen context who have latent but unscrutinized religious beliefs, the answer may be very influential because it may put the moral situation for them in a new light. But for persons with a persistent philosophical bent in the existential context we are considering, the reply will probably be much less influential for the reason that, where a person is questioning the idea of being moral, he will almost invariably be doubting religious beliefs as well. I know of one case where this was not so, i.e., where the person apparently held to a traditional conception of God, but did not think that this led to any deductions at all about being moral. Usually, however, if morality is being questioned, religion is also; and this means that the questioner

will find no support for morality in religion, and the discussion would have to shift to the justification of religious beliefs.

This last difficulty might be set down by some people as the theoretical difficulty in the present answer. However, I would classify it as an individual difference, a practical difficulty, as in the previous instances. For if morality really does have a religious basis, then it would be an individual idiosyncrasy, not a theoretical defect, that this or that person did not accept it. Nevertheless, the answer, as stated, is not without difficulties. For one thing, the answer appears to be cast in the form of legalistic or authoritarian acceptance, which may be in itself something less than being moral. We think that being moral should be a matter of internal thought and conscience, and not just of external submission. Kant was wrong in saying that theological ethics is always heteronomous, but right to the extent that it sometimes is. Again, we like to ask certain questions that carry us beyond this answer taken by itself. Granted that being moral is God's will, why does he will us to be moral? What is his nature and relation to the world that make morality so important? What is the purpose in the universe as a whole which requires being moral as an integral part? How is being moral related to the ultimate scheme of existence—origin, purpose, and culmination? With these questions we are led into religious philosophy, and we thus see that the religious answer, in order to be theoretically meaningful in an existential context (that being our frame of reference), must be part of a total metaphysical perspective.

Axioms of a Theoretical Answer

We have now passed in review the chief existential answers to our question. I should be moral, these answers say, because this benefits myself, betters society, furthers life, or pleases God. Each of the answers is effective in individual situations, but has theoretical limitations. None is false, but only incomplete. Each is relevant for practical life, but in need of more theoretical ultimacy. It remains for us, then, to exhibit the philosophical principle which will satisfy our theoretical understanding in regard to this question and which will also include these other answers as subordinate parts.

We must recognize immediately, I think, that the question, "Why?" must have a stopping point somewhere. We can easily conceive of someone always continuing to ask why, no matter what answer is given by anybody on any subject. Such an uncritical continuance of the question is acceptable in children, but is not theoretically admissible in rational inquiry. That is, we must assume that, within a given realm of discourse, there are solutions which really do answer the questions raised, really do end those particular problems, except for review, so that the continual asking of why is redundant or foolish. I am not saying that any particular contemporary solutions can make an absolute claim, but only that there are such answers which we are seeking to fathom. Also I am not denying that, as a practical attitude and as a method of inquiry, the healthy continuance of asking why is a good thing. I am only saying that from a theoretical standpoint there must be a solution, a stopping point, whether we have found it or not, which genuinely satisfies the mind regarding the questions within any realm of discourse. Thus it will not be legitimate to criticize what follows solely on the ground that one can repeat the words, "Why this?" once again. If the principle below is not the true stopping point, then some other is, and the critic must supply it if he can.

If this point be granted, I will suggest the final theoretical answer as follows: one should be moral because this fits into a pattern of universal harmony of all things, both as a means to that end and as a part of the end itself; and, furthermore, anyone who possesses full understanding will see this relationship to be so and will see it as a sufficient reason for being moral. There are two main parts in this answer—two axioms as they may be called. One I shall term the axiom of universal harmony, and the other the axiom of potential acceptance. The first is the strictly logical axiom in the sense of being a first principle. The other is more of a psychological axiom in that it claims what would be so of an individual under certain conditions of knowledge. Both are important because one gives us a metaphysical basis, the other an existential link, in the treatment of our question.

The universal harmony of all things can be regarded as the ultimate culmination of all existence, not indeed as a description

at any particular moment of time, but as an all-pervasive ideal. It is a normative concept. It is the underlying goal of life and conscious striving—a future goal when chronology is used, but more especially a qualitative goal. Thus it is a present, contemporaneous, dynamic, as well as a future goal. Also it may be regarded as rooted in the ultimate power of being that produces what is. It is the answer to the question of what God is about, viz., striving for the harmonious fulfillment of all beings. If we ask what this universal harmony consists in, or how we can distinguish objectively between a harmonious state and a disharmonious one, the answer must be that we discover empirically what this means in so far as it is revealed in human experience. We must also add (or does it go without saying?) that this conception involves the awareness and the value judgment that such universal harmony is in fact a good thing, an intrinsic value, the *summum bonum*.

Now it is into this pattern and process of universal harmony that human morality, i.e., being moral, fits as an essential component. It fits in, first of all, as a means to the end, seen especially through the harmonization of human interests which morality promotes. We can infer from this human focus that being moral has a great deal to do with the harmony of the whole. But morality is also part of the end of universal harmony. That is, irrespective of its consequences, there is something about being moral which, in Kant's words, shines like a jewel, and hence is one of the very ingredients in the completeness of life and existence. This relationship to universal harmony is the sought-for justification, the *raison d'être*, for being moral.

But suppose a person does not accept this axiom, or at least does not receive it as a sufficient reason for his own being moral? In this case we hold out the claim that he would do so under conditions of fuller understanding. This is the axiom of potential acceptance. In so far as a person comes to have more knowledge of instances of harmony, more experiences of its worth, more awareness of what being moral means, he will come to see that being moral is both mandatory and valuable. This axiom is an existential link because it immediately shifts attention from the purely theoretical contemplation of our question to the consid-

eration of what practical steps can be taken to bring about the fuller understanding that is indicated. In other words, there is no claim here that our final conclusion, our ultimate theoretical answer, will, even though logically adequate, necessarily convince anyone in existential doubt. For this to happen there is generally needed more vividness, more immediacy, more concreteness concerning the experiential contents of morality and harmony. The first axiom gives only the logical principle that will resolve the doubt if it is to be ended at all—it may not be a sufficient cause. How this concreteness of moral awareness, this fuller understanding, is to be attained will vary with individuals. But one thing would appear to be certain, namely, that some acts of decision and some decisions to act are necessary. Fuller understanding in these matters comes from decision, venturing, possibly risk, certainly the willingness to go beyond the merely conventional to discover what being moral may really involve. Being moral may then be seen to be self-illuminating, self-authenticating, because of what it leads us thus to know and believe. The theoretical answer will then be reached via the road of decision.

Some Implications

It now remains for us to connect the theoretical answer with the existential answers enumerated before. The connection is that the existential answers can be looked upon as inferences or deductions from our theoretical answer. If the axiom of universal harmony is our primary principle, it can certainly be maintained that the good of the individual will be part of such harmony, and hence the appeal to personal happiness is a justified, albeit derivative, reason for being moral. The betterment of other people is also a part, and so the appeal to social utility as reason for being moral is warranted. Likewise, the continuance of an orderly process of life development makes for total harmony, so the appeal to furtherance of life is relevant. Finally, if the stimulus to universal harmony has its origin in God and has its maximum power and envisagement in God, the religious motive for being moral is also justified. These inferences from an ultimate principle make these answers theoretically justifiable as well as existentially more meaningful. They then have the capacity of satisfying

the existential "I" whose doubt is marked not only by personal anxiety but by theoretical concerns.

It is important for practical situations to exhibit these inferences. People are sometimes asked what they would say if somebody questioned in their presence the idea of being moral; and counselors might be asked this question directly. In such situations it is sometimes thought that the use of the existential replies lowers the idea of being moral, puts it on a vulgar plane, degrades it to mere utilities or commands. But this is not so if these answers are understood, even if not expressed, in their metaphysical perspective. For if universal harmony is the fundamental tendency and ideal in the world, is also rooted in the cosmic power of origin and destiny, and if such harmony includes the good of the individual and society, the furtherance of life, and the purpose of God, then morality, in so far as it promotes these in its capacity as a means, can be justified by appeal to these grounds. Of course morality is also justified as an intrinsic part of the end itself. These existential answers are therefore legitimate inroads at the practical level. They may, in fact, be a significant way of getting an individual to see the theoretical answer, in accordance with the axiom of potential acceptance.

Another implication to be mentioned concerns the various meanings of "why." We said that while the question, "Why should I be moral?" demands chiefly an answer to the logical "why," the best answer would also have causal and teleological implications that would support it. This condition is satisfied in the present case. Along with the norm of universal harmony as the logical basis for being moral, we claim that this ideal is causally grounded in the power making for existence, so that this harmony is what has been and is now coming about. Conscious moral agents have been created as an indispensable condition for the fullest of harmonies. In being moral we are therefore fulfilling most fittingly that which was most characteristic of us in the beginning to become. Again, since morality is not only part of, but contributes to, universal harmony, we can look to the consequences, the teleology, of being moral as an additional justification. Our answer is thus buttressed by answers to the other meanings of "why," if they should be intended in the question.

Now, to summarize: the question, "Why should I be moral?" is a frequent and important one, although not always expressed in this form. The question may, however, have different meanings for different inquirers due to variant meanings attached to the key words, "I," "why," and "moral." It is necessary for theoretical purposes and in practical situations to know which question is really being asked. The most penetrating form of the question occurs when a person, existentially concerned with this moral problem, asks for a logical justification for being moral in terms that will satisfy his theoretical understanding. Four existential answers to the question are common and often persuasive, namely, that being moral benefits oneself, betters other people, furthers life development, or pleases God. Each of these answers has theoretical limitations when taken by itself. Therefore they need to be brought under an ultimate metaphysical principle. This principle is that of universal harmony, which means the harmonious fulfillment of all things so far as possibility permits. It is the normative ideal inherent in all existence and all tendency; it is causally grounded in the origin of the world and is also its qualitative end. The existential answers are legitimate because they point to elements in the composition of universal harmony which morality promotes. Since the theoretical principle is too abstract to be of much direct lure, it must be supplemented by the axiom that this theoretical answer, with its existential deductions, would, with fuller understanding, be accepted as a sufficient justification for being moral. For this fuller understanding of morality and harmony there are required not only abstract ideas but decisions and moral action. Knowledge in contemplation must be certified by, or perhaps arrived at through knowledge in action.

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CRITICAL STUDIES

THE DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS OF FREEDOM

NATHANIEL LAWRENCE

PHILosophical insight, to survive, must overcome two main hazards. (1) It should remain more or less intact in the face of changing intellectual experience. For example, the notion of abiding form must be as true, if it is to survive, for a field theory of matter as for a stuff theory. (2) The converse hazard is rigidity. Plato's *Seventh Epistle* argues that a book, having only fixed answers, can not be party to thought. Hence it is unsuited for philosophy, which is an undertaking shared by engaged minds. Plato's solution of how to keep an idea alive but not embalmed is familiar: the postulation of latent form underlying both actuality and knowledge. Form, actualized in passing fact and elicitable from within human thought as unchanging knowledge, must be in some sense recovered anew for each discoverer. The dialogues of Plato immortalized this dialectical process in the use of living dialogue to which the reader *can* be a party, rather than being a mere accepter or assailant.

The subsequent history of philosophy can be profitably viewed as the history of dialectic. The most didactic presentation must present, if only implicitly, the views against which it contends. No author is completely non-dialectical; the question is, "How dialectical is he?"

In the past year two outstanding examples of the dialecticians' art have appeared. One is primarily systematic, the other critical. One insists upon its completeness; the other is confessedly incomplete. Both are monumental. They are, respectively, Paul Weiss's *Modes of Being*, and Mortimer Adler's *The Idea of Freedom*.

It is the latter work¹ which is examined in the present essay.

¹ Mortimer J. Adler for The Institute for Philosophical Research, *The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1958). A further differ-

The essay falls into several parts: (I) an account of the nature, thesis, and accomplishment of the book, (II) an estimate of the success of the book with respect to its objectives, (III) an estimate of the success thus far of the general enterprise of which this work is the first part, (IV) some concluding remarks. Parts II and III will partially overlap, since the same book is being reviewed, but in two quite different ways. Part II treats the book as a work more or less self-contained; Part III treats it as the first part of a vast philosophical enterprise.

I

The Idea of Freedom is the first effort in an extraordinary undertaking. This undertaking is nothing less than a massive "stock-taking" of the main ideas which recur through "twenty-five centuries of inquiry and speculation" (p. xvii). What the total list of these ideas may be has wisely not been settled upon, but they will include at least the following: freedom, law, justice, knowledge, and love (pp. xvii, xix, xxv, xxvii).²

Research for this task was apparently undertaken jointly by the twenty-two members of the research staff of the Institute for Philosophical Research. Additional help, varying from secretarial assistance to guidance, counsel, and criticism seems to have been derived in unspecified ways from five "consultants" of national standing, seven administrative assistants, and a miscellaneous list of forty-six individuals, including such figures as Walter Lippman, Mark Van Doren, and Clifton Fadiman. Seven of this last group read early drafts of manuscript. Nine foundations and friends

ence between the two is that Adler undertakes to remain neutral on every systematic subject encountered, save that of the dialectical method itself, which he deliberately urges. Weiss, on the other hand, develops his own view systematically, using, rather than primarily arguing for, the method. Even this contrast does not altogether hold, however. In Part II of *Modes of Being*, Weiss reviews his method, insists that it must show how it can include theses opposed to those which it develops, or suffer incompleteness (chap. 8 and ff). Weiss thus recaptures a neglected feature of the Platonic dialectic which often skillfully develops the contrary position and thus exhibits its own inclusiveness.

² The idea of love is not listed on p. xxv, although twenty-one others are.

have assisted on the financial side. Eleven colleges and universities contributed either men or conferences to the subject matter of *The Idea of Freedom*. Thus the overwhelming task seems to have been met by overwhelming resources.

It should be evident that what we are considering is a genuinely new kind of scholarship. Its novelty is independent of its worth. I know of nothing like it in Western literature. The name of Herbert Spencer comes to mind, but the differences are immediately apparent. Spencer worked largely alone, took thirty-six years (Adler has taken about six), covered the whole field of human learning—or at least of inquiry, had a central philosophical theme, and attempted a uniform conciliation of the conflict of ideas. In Oriental philosophy there are compendious and eclectic works,³ but since these are all of intentionally normative import, they remain at best literary cousins of Dr. Adler's work.

Adler's book itself is incomplete, in that it does not represent all of what the Institute wishes to say about the idea of freedom. But it is not incomplete in that its sequel, Book III ("to be published in the near future"), is not needed for the understanding of what is here set forth. It is merely that the sequel "is needed to complete the story" (p. xxvii).

Book I of *The Idea of Freedom* is not merely an introduction to the rest of this study and the sequel to follow. It is a general introduction to all the books to follow. To be sure, this part of the study is oriented toward the subject of Book II, so that almost invariably the idea of freedom is used as the significant example of how a subject may be dialectically approached. But in most cases, the mere substitution of "justice" or "law" for "freedom," in Book I would not seriously alter the exposition. There is one marked exception. In chapter v Adler plays with the idea of a conference large enough to accommodate spokesmen for all the main views of the idea of freedom. He then tries to show how a dialectical approach would permit organization of spokesmen and their views so as to accomplish the grand task of classification. And here, coming to grips with an imaginary case, he actually first introduces his main divisions of the idea of freedom. The

³ In particular the *Chuang-tzu*, which is clearly of multiple authorship and conciliatory in its eclecticism.

thesis of the main part of the book is then brought forward in illustration of its method.

The conception of dialectic which Adler holds he first exposed in his book *Dialectic*, published better than thirty years ago.⁴ For him, dialectic is not primarily a tool of philosophy, nor within philosophy, nor for philosophy. Rather it is a non-voting chairman for contestant philosophies, performing the functions of parliamentary arbiter: "To do so [speculate on what a philosopher might have said to an issue on which he was actually silent] would be to substitute the role of the philosopher for that of the dialectician" (p. 50). The dialectician can not go beyond the actual data, says Adler. The two roles are quite distinct. Not only are they distinct, but it is quite difficult to engage in both!

Conceivably both kinds of work might be done by the same individual. But it is difficult for the same individual to engage in both at the same time. The philosophical and the dialectical tasks are so arduous and exacting that it would be very difficult for an individual to meet the demands of both upon his time and energy. (p. 58).

They may, says Adler, call for quite different talents and temperament. There is an implied thesis, in this last remark, about freedom and genetic determinism. Ironically, the impossibility of neutrality on philosophical issues thus appears to rear its head in the very middle of talk about dialectical neutrality. Criticism of this notion will be developed below in Part III.

For Dr. Adler, dialectic is concerned with the "problems raised by the diversity of philosophies" (p. 58). These problems lie in the high order abstractions with which philosophies deal. Thus the task of the dialectician is (a) to identify the distinct subjects of controversy so that contestants addressing themselves to distinct issues having the same apparent scope may be relieved of their confusion, (b) to group the main notions together under distinct general headings, (c) to define analytically the issues of controversy within large areas, and (d) from these to reconstruct

⁴ (New York, 1927). The original inspiration for this conception of dialectic seems to have been Arthur O. Lovejoy (pp. xv and 58-59, fn. 6). Adler's peculiar conception of dialectic should not be attributed to Lovejoy, however. Adler distinguishes philosophy from dialectic. Lovejoy virtually identifies them; v. *The Revolt Against Dualism* (New York, 1931), p. ix, cited in part by Adler, p. 63.

the general controversy in which the original themes were all entangled in disorderly array (pp. 38-44).

Book I gives us the outline of method, Book II takes us from step (a) through step (c); step (d) is the project of Book III, which has yet to appear.

Book II introduces the conception of three types of freedom: circumstantial, acquired, and natural—no more, no less.⁵ Not only are these three said to be exhaustive of the whole range of possible types of freedom; they are exclusive, as well. Moreover, their exclusiveness means that they are “never fused into one” (p. 163), although any given author may deal with two or three “modes of possession of freedom” in the same theory, with or without knowledge or acknowledgment. The claim that these three are exclusive and exhaustive is held to be empirically, rather than logically justified (pp. 162-163).

(a) *Circumstantial freedom* is that which “depends upon whatever external conditions affect human behavior is so far as that consists in bodily movements” (p. 122).

(b) *Acquired freedom* “depends upon a change or development in human beings whereby they have a state of mind, or character, or personality which differentiates them from other men” (p. 135).

(c) *Natural freedom* is one which all “men always possess . . . under any circumstances” (p. 154).

The circumstantial mode of possession is connected to the self as a condition of *self-realization*, the acquired mode of possession is the condition of *self-perfection*; and the natural mode of possession is the condition of *self-determination* (pp. 587 ff.).

In addition to these three freedoms, there are two others which are variants of two of the main types. These are *political liberty*—a particular kind of circumstantial self-realization (pp. 329 ff.), and *collective freedom*—a particular kind of acquired self-perfection (p. 370 ff.). It can be seen from the descriptions of these subordinate types that each “mode of possession” has a “mode of self” corresponding to it.

⁵ This last phrase is the title of Book II, chapter 10.

The whole of Book II (better than five-sixths of the entire essay) is the close-grained and highly detailed working out of these three (or five) modes of possession of freedom and their relations to the self which enjoys them, coupled with a similarly detailed analysis of the authors whose views have been hammered into one or more of these molds. Book II is completed with an experiment in finding common meanings and common terms which underlie the disagreements among the various approaches to the idea of freedom. Book III, the unpublished sequel, will discuss the genuine disagreement in these approaches (pp. 601-620).

II

The task which Dr. Adler and his associates have set for themselves is an enormous one. The sheer bulk of what must be collected and collated, not to say sifted and interpreted, is impressive. I respect and admire the skill and patience which have been invested in this enterprise. The essay has its shortcomings at several levels of scope, interpretation, and usefulness. These limitations must be exposed against a backdrop of the main virtues which it exhibits, however.

The scope of the work can be considered from four sides: space, time, topic, and personnel. Spatially the scope is more limited than it should be: Europe, Britain, and the United States. Europe is largely represented by western Europe (Bakunin and Lenin are exceptions). These areas represent about one quarter of world's population. Another quarter of the world's population, to be sure, has no literate culture, common or diverse, from which to derive its ideology; the peoples of non-Mediterranean Africa, Polynesia, Melanesia, etc., admittedly will borrow, adapt, or submit to geographically alien conceptions. One half of the world's population, however, over one billion—the peoples of Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the western Moslem states—live in ideologies whose literate past is not discussed by Dr. Adler at all.

These omissions I should rather call limitations than shortcomings, the latter term depending partly upon taste. And they are not quite so serious as they seem, for two reasons. (a) The geography chosen by Dr. Adler and his associates in that in which

there has been the clearest fusion of continuity, vitality, and progress of the idea. (b) Moreover, this geography, through the early part of this century, included a great portion of the world's usable wealth, military strength, political power, and economic enterprise. As a consequence, Western ideas have overflowed their geographical containment and assume an importance incommensurate with its population. Nonetheless, the ideas did not flow into a vacuum. They encountered political and ideological factors requiring their modification.*

No notion is today more important than that of freedom, and in Dr. Adler's book *Russia and the East* are silent. A serious limitation of *The Idea of Freedom* is thus its geographical insularity. This limitation is of a sharply practical nature for a book appearing in a world suddenly grown small.

As to temporal scope (the past twenty-five centuries), the book is, I think, complete. The struggle for freedom and its relation to the concept of religious nationalism and national salvation among the Jews, for example, may be an important preface to both political and religious conceptions of freedom, but the *ideas*, in so far as they bear upon us, are caught up again in

* For example, the tradition of élitist collectivism in Russia, dating from the time of the superimposition of an aggressive Nordic nobility on the Russian people and perhaps as old as the rule of the Khans, did not subside when the excited young Lenin arrived at the Finland Station. The tragedy of Marxist idealism in Russia is the crushing defeat which sheer political fact dealt Lenin. Lenin was politically naïve, but he had leadership thrust on him and he learned fast. There are thus two Lenins, the one who talked Marxism and the one who talked Communist élitism, who developed the theme of the vanguard of the proletariat. This latter Lenin is the one who directly through his own writings and action and indirectly through those of his vicegerent, Stalin, shaped contemporary Russia. Here is a case where brute political fact became articulately formulated idea, but we do not encounter this latter Lenin at all in Dr. Adler's book. We see only the Lenin who echoes the ideas of freedom of Marx and Engels.

In China the same phenomenon repeats. Here once-digested Marxism is served up again, this time to the geography of Tao, Confucius, Mencius, and migrant Buddhism. There are powerful traditions, deeply instilled, invested with authority and literate expression. Finally, to the south there is a great melting pot of socialism and democracy, plus the ancient ingredients of Hindu, Buddhistic, and Moslem thought, each of them with something important to say about freedom and the self. They will add their talk and their ideological strictures to any immigrant ideas.

the subsequent history of ideas and thus do not have to be exhibited in primordial form. One might indeed speculate that Marx's collective freedom for the proletariat is nothing but a secularization of the Judaic conception of collective freedom for a racially defined group, in which divine election had been replaced by natural selection, and the chosen group defined in terms of its vital function instead of its primacy of status, but such speculation is precisely what Dr. Adler has properly eschewed.

The question of topical scope and scope of personnel overlap, since a limitation on the former automatically imposes a limitation on the latter. Dr. Adler's coverage of personnel is excellent, within the limitations of topic which seem to me the most serious limitations of the entire study.

The topical coverage of *The Idea of Freedom* is that of the political, physical, ethical, social, and religious aspects. The omission of the *aesthetic dimension* seems to me extraordinary and is not one omission, but many. In fact each of the types of freedom with which Dr. Adler does deal can be analogized in some aspect of aesthetic process. (1) Political form can be extended to the point where freedom all but vanishes, or it can be relaxed to the point where all discipline is merely self-imposed. Analogously, poetic form can be extended beyond the authoritarian sonnet to the dictatorial Japanese *hokku*, or it can be relaxed to the point where we have the romantic anarchy of *vers libre*. (2) Physical freedom is not only analogized but exemplified in the plasticity of the pigments, words, sounds, etc., which comprise, the raw materials of the aesthetic object. (3) Ethical freedom is that through which a self is built, and the same is true of aesthetic expression⁷ (4 and 5). Again the social and religious aspects of freedom are exhibited in the communicative and devotional features of art.

The parallels could easily be pressed too far, but they need to be taken no further than the rough analogies just given to show that to speak of freedom without a *single* foray into art or

⁷ Plato and Whitehead recognize the commonality of the ethical and aesthetic freedoms, and if this fact is not observed then Whitehead's protest against inflexible morality seems ugly and Plato's protest against aesthetic license seems immoral.

aesthetics is to engage in a very bob-tailed enterprise, regardless of the number of pages involved.

The results follow from the method. As a consequence, there are serious omissions of personnel. I do not recall a single reference (and there is none in the index) to Jakob Burckhardt. We are thus denied the resources of a book like *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, which is directly related to questions of aesthetic and political freedom. Even more mysterious, putting aside any immediate concern with aesthetics, is the omission of the same author's *Force and Freedom*. Benedetto Croce, one of the few moderns to write in the area of both politics and aesthetics, is similarly missing. And when we look for Santayana, we find him briefly, but the missing aesthetic dimension excludes any reference to *The Sense of Beauty*.*

Creativity of the sort which Adler⁹ discusses is largely that which makes the self and alters the world. Aesthetic freedom is that through which a self *projects*, in a summary way, a portion of itself into the world as a fragment of immortality. There is a difference between founding an industrial empire and writing the "Jupiter" Symphony. It may be that, as Plato suggests, the moral good and the beautiful are, in final form, the same. It is also likely that many actual creative acts incorporate both kinds of creativity, so that all actual cases lie on a line between two poles, the one of sheer aesthetic expression, the other of considered preferential choice. But creativity is concerned with becoming, and the multifarious modes of natural choice can not be substituted for those of aesthetic achievement, even though the former may be the necessary condition of the latter. Adler himself would not treat of artistic creativity under the rubric of self-determination, but rather under that of self-perfection. The only reference to the aesthetic dimension which I can recall is one in which Adler dismisses Daniel Christoff's recent *Recherche de la Liberté*. He says,

* (New York, 1896). See, for instance, pp. 239 ff., of that work, in which Santayana deals with question of the liberation of the self and its relation to art and morality.

⁹ V. pp. 495 ff.

For instance, he treats as a distinct freedom the release afforded by art and aesthetic preoccupation, but this seems to be only a special case of our freedom of self-perfection and one that is not exemplified in the major works on the subject (p. 509).

III

When we consider the essay as a pilot project for a total undertaking, we must examine it in a quite different light.

First, what does it do? It seeks to identify points of similarity among myriad views, to classify them under major headings, and to clarify the issues involved. It is thus a dialectical critique. It proposes to be philosophically neutral, taking philosophical insight itself as its object and setting itself up as a kind of meta-philosophy, urging no persuasion of its own and using neutral language in the interests of objective scrutiny (pp. 37 ff.). Only then is the ground-work laid for Book III, the unpublished sequel to the present essay.

These ends have been sufficiently well served, I believe, to warrant the enormous effort involved in the publication of the book. *The Idea of Freedom* will have many uses. First, it will be an excellent reference work of interpretation in the non-aesthetic fields which it covers. No one will be able to write responsibly on the subject of freedom without consulting and exploiting the pains-taking unravelling of this highly tangled and very significant subject. Secondly, it should be an excellent secondary source, a kind of Guide to the Perplexed, both graduate and undergraduate, whose passion for the subject sometimes exceeds their capacity to deal with it. Thirdly, it is to be hoped that it will nullify some prevailing controversy and forestall some future controversy, where the fundamental issues are obscured by multiple ambiguities. Fourthly, and this is closely related to the preceding point, it should, in distinguishing the several kinds of topic which the term "free" covers, delineate with substantial clarity areas of further research, providing handrails in the mist. And finally it should show how some of the major tools of what is called philosophical analysis can be put to worthy and constructive use on a larger scale than has hitherto been attempted. Philosophical analysis has unwittingly disguised its own virtues

by applying its methods on a microscale and by functioning therapeutically, rather than constructively. Dr. Adler's book thus has one of the hallmarks of the great work, the conciliation of warring schools of thought.

The book itself, however, presumes a set of standards which it can only partly meet. In attempting philosophical neutrality, in attempting to place itself above philosophical dispute, and thus rising to a position of transcendental critique, it undertakes what is manifestly impossible. These standards are early compromised with, as a few citations will show.

- (1) The dialectician must be "selective," and this selection is "controlled by his purpose" (pp. 46-47).
- (2) His work necessarily involves interpretation (p. 48).
- (3) He must be engaged in construction, not in mere reporting (p. 49).
- (4) Finally,

... the limitations the dialectician's method imposes upon him do not prevent him from criticizing the controversy he constructs. There is no reason why he cannot expose its weaknesses and blemishes. In fact it is his duty to do precisely that, so far as it can be done without forsaking dialectical neutrality and without judging the truth or falsity of any of the philosophical positions represented in the controversy. (pp. 50-51).

The task is one of selecting purposefully, interpreting, constructing, and criticizing, then, but always in a neutral way and without philosophical persuasion. I confess myself unable to see how this can be done. Every one of these functions can be practiced only under certain value standards, logical and otherwise. Taking the value standards for granted, and leaving them inarticulate, in order to get on with the matter in hand, does not render them any less philosophical, although they may be bad philosophy in not being explicit. The justification of value standards is a troubled subject, and there is no need to find a work defective which assumes standards in order to urge their correctness by the application of them. But no one should suppose that this procedure is somehow philosophically neutral or, worse, above philosophy.

IV

When the uncommitted approach is undertaken, it is the need for pragmatic justification which finally overtakes it. A set of standards of some sort is needed, as Dr. Adler's own remarks show. If these standards are mainly exhibited in their use, as is the case with his study, then their usefulness, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness in clarifying the common experience to which they appeal will serve in turn to measure their worth and indirectly and partially, therefore, the worth of the position which they represent.

I have already suggested above that the aesthetic freedom and its opposite—I have called it restriction—are ignored or subordinated to the point of unrecognizability. I can only conclude that the implicit theory of human nature underlying the standard of selection—or interpretation—is defective. This defect could be partly overcome by looking further afield for philosophical insight, in the great philosophies of the East, for example. It could be partly overcome by not deliberately excluding just those works in which aesthetic freedom is a matter of major concern. I have mentioned Santayana's *Sense of Beauty*, and the works of Burckhardt and Croce. There is still another stunning omission, Søren Kierkegaard, one of whose most important works, *Either/Or*, could fairly be caricatured as a study of the dialectical tensions among aesthetic freedom, ethical freedom, and religious freedom.

Praise for this work must be high, which, within the limitations which I have mentioned, has been undertaken with great thoroughness.¹⁰ The diligence with which a given view is laid out exposed bit by bit, is a model of scholarly integrity.

¹⁰ It is inevitable that multiple scholarship makes it impossible to bring all of a manuscript under single authoritative scrutiny, and thus an occasional blunder must be expected. One such blunder is the assertion in a footnote on page 507 (fn. 37) that for Whitehead the subjective aim "limits and violates the ontological principle." The passage from Whitehead (*Process and Reality*, p. 108.) which is supposed to support the idea that the subjective aim *violates* the ontological principle has been misread. What Whitehead actually says is that it is the thoughtless *exclusion* of the subjective aim which violates the ontological principle, q.v. Blemishes of this sort are in very short supply, however. Picayune reading might expose at the most a dozen.

It remains to be seen whether or not the subsequent volume dealing with the genuine differences in the great controversies are as lucidly exposed. If they are, the worth of the present volume will be enhanced.

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PEIRCE VOLUMES: VII AND VIII

IRWIN C. LIEB

THE FIRST SIX VOLUMES of the *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* were edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, and published between 1931 and 1935. Now, two more volumes¹ have appeared, edited by Arthur W. Burks.

The new volumes look like the earlier ones. The paper and the binding, except for a slight difference in the red, are about the same. So is the typography—though the print line has been made a little longer. The volumes are shorter than all but one of the first six. They do not have any photographs. But otherwise, in appearance, they are uniform with the others.

Their major editorial policy is the same too. Professor Burks has continued the earlier editors' policy of publishing "only parts of some of the works, omitting large portions altogether" (VII, xii). He also selects and compiles "a draft for publication whenever there are several drafts available" (VII, xii). And like the editors of the earlier volumes, he breaks up manuscripts and arranges "the resultant material primarily by subject matter rather than chronologically" (VII, xii-xiii).

Professor Burks' practices are, in many details, different from those of the earlier editors. Instead of heading the left hand page with the subtitle of the volumes, Professor Burks uses the title of one of the books in the volume. He numbers every paragraph, runs footnotes serially through the article, has inserted dark, dash separations between sections, has no uniform policy about italicizing book titles, and lets spelling vary throughout the volumes. None of these differences is very important. The difference in the quality of the indexes is more important, because it

¹ Volume VII, "Science and Philosophy," xiv, 415 pp. \$8.00; Volume VIII, "Reviews, Correspondence, and Bibliography," xii, 352 pp. \$8.00. References are to volume, and to page or numbered paragraph. Both volumes, strangely enough, contain the same preface by Harvard University, and Professor Burks begins both with the same introduction.

affects the way we can use the volumes. Compared with the full, reliable indexes of the first six volumes, the new ones are unreliable and far too skimpy. They don't have headings enough, or cross references enough; and they don't have enough, and accurate enough, entries to be a good guide to the volumes.

The most important policy change (not Professor Burks' alone) is that, with these volumes, Harvard is done publishing Peirce's papers. Originally, the idea was to have ten volumes. Beyond the sixth, there was to be a volume in physics and psychology, a volume of Peirce's reviews, another of his correspondence, and a biography. The present volumes have two scientific papers, a small selection from Peirce's correspondence, a few of his published reviews, and no biography. The reason for discontinuing the original plan is simply that eight volumes contain enough. Professor Burks says that they include "all manuscripts that would be of interest to a general philosophic reader"; and that "they also include sufficient material for the Peirce specialist to trace the development of Peirce's thought in some detail" (VIII, 254)—though apparently not in *great* detail. For Professor Burks goes on to add that "the quantity of unpublished manuscripts is enormous," and that among them there is "much material of value for a personal biography of Peirce and for very detailed studies of Peirce's intellectual development" (VIII, 254).

I don't know whether the eight volumes really do contain enough—enough for both the "general philosophic reader" and for the "Peirce specialist". That conception of an edition is hard to make clear. But in any case, only a look at the remaining papers could settle the matter. Short of that, and from the outside, there has to be just a little uncertainty: if only for the reason that some reviews, important enough to quote occasionally in the bibliography, have not been chosen for publication.

But this niggles too much on the thanks these volumes make us owe.

There is one more thing, though. Now that they are done with publishing Peirce's papers, there should be a word, critical and appreciative, about the custody Harvard gave to them.

Harvard got Peirce's papers, and some of his books, from Mrs. Peirce, having paid for them several times over. After they

bought them, people at Harvard were undecided about what to do with them. Members of the department valued them differently. Some thought that two or three volumes ought to be published. Some thought more, and some responsible people were indifferent to publishing them at all. These differences and the indecisions they led to are easy to understand. But while they were being settled, there should have been good custody upon the papers. And it is hard to understand why there wasn't.

There is no catalogue of the books that had originally been bought. Most of them, I've heard, were given to libraries in Japan. But there doesn't seem to be a record of which books they were and where they were sent; and there is no copy of the annotations which Peirce was likely to have made in them. Then too, without having been summarized or catalogued, the papers were made available: to scholars—sometimes, I understand, only after undue difficulty—and to graduate students, for whom the access was much too easy. I've heard that, for a while, a *Peirce paper* was a standard graduate student's souvenir. No one seems to know what was taken. But it is a bad business that the collection was run so that anything could be taken at all. Whatever the indecisions about publishing, it should have been very clear that, apart from the completed essays, most of Peirce's things were notes, sketches, and started pieces. And until their disposition was settled, even the scraps should have had a tighter custody than Harvard gave.

Still, weak cataloging, free picking, foot dragging, and all, Harvard's custody of the Peirce papers has issued in eight, well-edited volumes. Those volumes are an enormous credit to their editors, and to Harvard too. If the interest in Peirce continues, as it shows signs of doing, perhaps there will be a re-issue of the earlier volumes, which would be an additional service; and perhaps, since they are not publishing more papers themselves, Harvard will open its collection to the commercial presses that are interested in new selections from Peirce's work.

Volume VII of the Peirce papers is divided into three books. The first contains the two pieces in science, one on pendulum

measurements and one on small differences in sensation. The second book is on scientific method. The third is on the philosophy of mind. Volume VIII is divided into two books—reviews and correspondence. It contains Professor Burks's superb, fully detailed bibliography. It also contains a list of errata for the first six volumes. That list is incomplete. (At the end of this notice there is a supplement to it, and a list of errors in the new volumes.)

More plainly than the first six volumes did, these two show something of the sort of man Peirce was. The image I get is of a crusted, distant, self-consciously hectoring man, who was discerning but not tender in his feeling for people. I imagine Peirce was very edgy about the respect he thought he was owed. But he had almost no notion of how heavy, vain, and tactless he must have seemed to others; or how irresponsible editors must have thought him to be. Time and again, instead of the studies he promised, Peirce sent long letters about what he was going to do when he got to doing it. It was as if everyone was supposed to understand and be patient when he didn't carry out the ambitious strategies he sternly ordered himself to do. But then, they didn't understand and weren't patient enough, and Peirce was left exasperated and angered. What made others impatient is easy to catch in some of Peirce's letters. But what I find harder to see is the understanding and patience Peirce could have had with himself, as one great projected work after another was conceived and left, often unstarted, always unfinished. Whether Peirce saw the bonds and locks within his own mind, the waste of so much of his rewriting, and of so many of his incidental studies—these are some of the things at which these volumes only hint and which only a biographer will be able to tell.

About the stature of Peirce's philosophy, these volumes won't qualify our judgment either way. I think that the important things in them have been said, or suggested very plainly, in the earlier volumes, though the new ones develop many doctrines somewhat differently, and somewhat more fully.

Generally, the new volumes are likely to be of most help on topics about thought, signs, and inquiry, rather than on issues in metaphysics and cosmology. But then, with Peirce, there has been the question, whether these things don't go together. Peirce

thought they did. And now, more and more, trying to see all the volumes together, it has seemed to me that Peirce is right: that he has one, whole philosophy, and that it can't be cut into separate pieces without serious misunderstanding.

There certainly are difficulties in seeing Peirce's whole philosophy. Peirce said that he was the "sole depository" of "the completely developed system, which all hangs together" but which "cannot receive any proper presentation in fragments" (VIII, 255, 1902). For him, almost anything less than a twelve volume edition was a fragment. I suppose he even thought the Pragmatism lectures of 1903 were fragmentary. But anyway, even in the extended lectures there are difficulties about connecting the very issues that commentators have thought discrepant. The key, the connecting, the binding idea, Peirce thought, was that logic is a normative science. Before he saw that, he said that he "had not really gotten to the bottom of . . . [pragmatism] or seen the unity of the whole thing" (VIII, 255). And perhaps it is because commentators have begun their discussions in a too special way, and then neglected this idea, or have treated it too simply, that there has been trouble about how Pierce's philosophy hangs together.

If we start by separating Peirce's logical and epistemological things from his ontology and cosmology, the notion that the principles of inquiry are founded in ethics, and in esthetics, is a better way of connecting Peirce's thought than any other I know. It is certainly better than starting with Peirce's *empiricism* and then arguing that the empiricism has the ontology and cosmology for its presuppositions. It may not be a good thing to start by making those separations. But if we do, then we might go on to make use of the notion of normative science, in roughly this sort of way:

Inquiry begins with *a doubt*, not doubt about everything, for we move from doubt partly through beliefs we don't then doubt. Inquiry aims to settle belief. A belief is (consciousness of) a habit of action, a habit of the actions that (are believed to) lead to satisfying our desires. From the outset, then, inquiry aims, not at *satisfying* beliefs, but at beliefs on which we can act to satisfy our desires. Then the question is, what desires ought we to satisfy, or to aim to satisfy, not just in special, but in all circumstances? How we answer the question affects our theory about what

inquiries are good. For an inquiry is completed when we are satisfied at having substituted one set of thoughts or signs for another. And the idea of substituting is the idea of taking one thing in place of another for a certain purpose. In inquiry, we substitute signs for signs to settle belief. And some ways of substituting, of conducting inquiries, are better than others, because they achieve that purpose better. Inquiries by tenacity, authority, and sentiment do settle beliefs. But the beliefs they establish tend to be idiosyncratic; or at least, by those same methods we can't know that they're not, and, besides, the beliefs tend to break down. The lesson in this is that we ought to use different methods for settling belief. For just as we are enjoined not to make an exception of ourselves in moral action, we are enjoined not to settle our beliefs by a logic that makes an exception for our wills or times, or our own set of mind. The desires we ought to satisfy are the *summum bonum*, and our logic is an instrument for achieving it. All the parts of logic have a contributing role to play. A theory of definition, for example, can't just call for definitions to be clear or finally clear, as though there were some abstract mark of crystal clarity. Definitions are to be *clear enough*—clear enough to have a place in inquiry. For that, they have to tell us what the things, described by terms, will show themselves to be. If they didn't, there would be no expectation in our beliefs. And we could never confirm them, be disappointed by them, or use them in action.

It is the ideas in them that make beliefs expectative. But beliefs are not wholly that. They can and have to tell us what things now are, as well as what they could be found to be. And so there has to be something in a present experience to answer to the generality of the ideas. Besides something answering to the generality of ideas, there should be something that answers to their being special and single ideas; and then too, there should be some mark that whatever is there to answer, is *there*, to answer *now*.

It is only because experience has these characters that we can formulate and use ideas. When we have come into doubt, we sense general features of the phenomena we are in doubt about; and then, through the beliefs we already have, using analogies we feel are appropriate, we can take what we sense vaguely, and

abductively come to a definite idea of what would be found under different, definite conditions. The whole abductive inference is restrained by what we had at the start, by a feel for the kind of complexity there was in the phenomena that caused us to doubt; it proceeds by using distinctions we feel to be fitting; and it ends in what is fit to be an hypothesis, because the ideas articulate and define the possibilities we had only vaguely at the start.

But it is not enough just to use ideas to settle this or that doubt, or fix this or that belief. We have a general aim, and have to focus it in belief. We have to settle all doubts and all beliefs, in a general way—to settle the belief that all doubts can come to rest, and to catch the sense not just of this or that but of everything there is. We do this in philosophical inquiry, in asking how the features we find in each experience all go together. Our doubt is not whether they do go together, but at the way in which they do. It is not doubt or wonder about how we would act under special circumstances, to get at special ends. It is more general than that, but it is no less a doubt or wonder for being so. It is settled through an inquiry in which, as in others, we propose ideas that define the feel we already have for the sense of things. The ideas Peirce proposes are "quality," "fact," "law," "chance," and "continuity." Like the ideas used in other inquiries, these ideas are to be tested; though the test for general beliefs is not so definite and controlled as the test for those less general. Being so general, they have no special consequences. And because of the generality of the *facts* they explain, there are no other facts besides them that could test the explanations. But that doesn't mean that there is no test at all. Philosophy, no less than any other inquiry, serves a moral end, and it has its test against that—as it specifies our end and contributes to our moving toward it. This is as much a test as any hypothesis has, though, again, not so definite and controlled a test. The fact that no particular consequences follow from a general hypothesis is no bar to its being evaluated. An hypothesis that explains a particular phenomenon is confirmed if it explains and predicts other phenomena too—or so it seems at first. But there are really no *different* phenomena that an hypothesis explains. The differences are inessential to the hypothesis that explains them. The hypothesis doesn't distinguish the cases it

explains. Things incidental to and outside of the hypothesis distinguish them. The hypothesis explains *just* the fact it does, and it explains it wherever *it* occurs. It doesn't explain a lot of facts. It explains just *one*. There only seem to be a lot when we start. But, after a while, we see that all along there was only one fact, *one general fact*, and that the hypothesis explains it. The stringency of requiring an hypothesis to explain many different facts is no more than a special way of asking about the generality of the idea in an hypothesis. But there are other ways of doing that. And it is no disadvantage to the hypothesis in philosophy that its ideas don't show their generality in the same way that less general ideas do. Every hypothesis explains just *one* fact. A philosophical hypothesis, like any other, explains *one* fact too, and it is tested by seeing whether it explains that fact—not whether it explains that fact in this or that special case, but whether it explains it in all its cases; and that is, in all the cases there could be. The test of a philosophy, then, doesn't depend on its predicting the differing details of different facts, but on whether its ideas and principles articulate and specify what we always have and have in every case—a sense of the order and unity of the features of the world and of our communion with it. Judgment on a philosophy, Peirce says, is the work of a civilization—the work of seeing, in every feature of life, how far ideas of the kind that a philosophy makes central do really serve to catch the sense of things. A philosophy, like any belief, has to contribute to and be embodied in all that goes toward achieving our ultimate end. It can do this by generalizing and relating the kinds of ideas we use and by guiding our feeling and action. It is confirmed or not, as what it gives us serves or fails to flesh our feel for the sense there is in things. Not much is definite in this confirmation, perhaps. But it is a confirmation still.

—All this, though, is only suggestion about the way we ought to look at Peirce's thought. It applies *only* if we make those radical distinctions that commentators have made, and by which Peirce himself seemed sometimes troubled. Its outline, sequence, and items need to be adjusted. And there are no doubt other, different suggestions to be made. Still, whatever these may be, whether we make the old, sticking distinctions or not, it seems

very clear that from now on, in studies of Peirce's philosophy, the conception of the normative sciences ought to have a central place.

*Supplementary List of Errata for volumes I, IV, V:*²

Volume I: p. v, line 9, unpublished/u published; p. 6 n., 8.7 ff./9; p. 292 line 2 from bottom, the/he; p. 314 n., 2.7/2.8 n; p. 321 n, line 5, 12/11; p. 365, add: Boethius 659, Eckius, 405 n., Petrus Hispanus/Petrus, Hispanus.

Volume IV: p. 217 n. line 1, add.; p. 367, figure 105 is wrong; p. 458 n., 8.380 f./vol. 9; p. 584, add Achilles, The, 677.

Volume V: p. 14 line 5 from bottom, delete the second "to find"; p. 96 n., 3.532 n/3.532; p. 123, transpose footnotes; p. 185, change section heading from "5" to "4"; p. 199, transpose last two footnotes; p. 212 line 15, delete the second "it"; p. 249 n., 382/383; p. 278 line 14 from bottom, an/n; p. 291 line 17, than/th n.

Errata for volumes VII, VIII

Volume VII: p. xi, line 8 from bottom, investigations/investigation; p. xiii, line 3 from bottom, Weiss/Wiess; p. 28 n. line 3, insert dash between seem and "and"; p. 37 line 2, concision/concison; p. 86 line 15, that/than; p. 90 n. 2 line 2 f.b., c.1901/lc.901; p. 96 line 3 f.b., lower case "a"; and last line, lower case "a"; p. 108 line 18, "belief"/belief; p. 112 n. 10, l f./l; p. 121 line 3, delete bracketed addition; p. 127 line 17, delete second comma; p. 143 line 20, lower case "a"; p. 150 line 15, :/.; p. 159 line 1, the objection/objection; p. 190 line 26, "rigid"/rigid; p. 195 n. 4 line 6; insert "their engagements" after "breaking"; p. 203 line 13, lower case "o"; p. 203 line 7 f.b., premisses/premises; same on p. 212 line 9, p. 215 line 21; p. 242 line 15 f.b., a fellow creature/fellow creatures; p. 258 line 7, sometimes/somtimes; p. 269 line 25, concerning/concentrating; p. 278 line 15 and p. 278 line 10 f.b., premiss/premise; p. 279 line 1 f.b., insert commas between footnote

² (Professor Weiss gave me most of the entries on both these lists.)

numbers; p. 293 line 8 f.b., of a/of; p. 295 line 12, futurity/futury; p. 301 line 6 f.b., some time ago/time; p. 302 line 1, be by/be; p. 310 n. 16 line 5, discussed/dicussed; p. 319 n. 6 line 9, delete comma, insert "of" after "all"; p. 352 line 3 f.b., "feeling"/feeling; p. 357 line 18, which/whom; p. 378 line 11, firstly/first; p. 394 line 19, ?/.; pp. 399-401, Mendeleef/Mendeleev, and complete proper names of Albrecht, Bassevi, Cellerier, Strümpell, transpose "Descartes" and "Deville", and delete at Eumenes, King of Pergamus.

Volume VIII: p. xi line 3 f.b., Weiss/Wiess; p. 13 line 2, ?/.; p. 33 line 2 f.b., minus 1/minus; p. 60, transpose paragraph number 67; p. 71 line 2, not/no; p. 94 n. 19 last line, self-consciousness/self consciousness; p. 96 line 8 f.b., the self/self; p. 100 line 9, Shakespeare/Shakspere; p. 115 line 24, delete comma; p. 128 line 10 f.b., stands by an/stands and; p. 135 line 10, "determine"/determine; p. 136 line 7, lower case "c"; p. 139 line 1, "Leopardi"/Leopardi; p. 152 line 19, ruin/run; p. 181 line 10, "anatomy"/anatomy; p. 188 n. 10, 5.130 ff./1.573 ff.; p. 196 line 14, on from fatigue/on fatigue; p. 199 line 16, "consciousness"/consciousness; p. 211 line 10 f.b., curtains; whose/curtains. Whose; p. 219 line 8, lower case "I"; p. 220 line 1, . . . But/But; p. 221 line 6, "being"/being; p. 238 line 16, kind 'Any/kind of 'Any; p. 239 line 3 f.b., 1, the/1. The; p. 260, 1864 item 3, line 2, intended to be given/given; p. 262, c. 1868 line 3, A/This; p. 275 line 3 f.b., personal, annotated/personal; p. 277, 1892 item 2, wrong punctuation; p. 284 line 6 f.b., impossible/impossible; p. 290, item 4, line 5, 18/7; p. 319 line 14, quotation/quote.

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A METAPHYSIC OF EXPERIENCE

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ONE OF THE STRONGEST and most fruitful areas for the philosophical understanding of our world and our experience is found in contemporary phenomenology. This is almost entirely a continental movement. Merleau-Ponty and Sartre have been the center of the modern resurgence of phenomenology; they have linked the phenomenological method to the close study of man living in the world. What has emerged is a philosophy of human action: the stress has been upon "comportement," "rencontre," the give and take of organism and environment.¹ Psychology has been useful for these analyses of experience but the notion of experience has sometimes changed under the influence of the phenomenological categories.² Even within the more technical, formal empiricism in the Anglo-American world, the movement away from the traditional empirical philosophy has been discernible. Price's *Thinking and Experience* is much closer to actual experience than his *Perception*; his important but often overlooked "Touch and Organic Sensation"³ reveals an intimate understanding of the acting organism. Other empiricists have tried expanding the older variety, stressing context instead of one particular kind of experience as the defining mark of its approach.⁴ Chisholm's recent analysis of perceiving finds the empiricist criterion of knowledge deficient; he replaces the empiricist's

¹ Vide the recent *Rencontre/Encounter/Begegnung. Contributions à une psychologie humaine dédiées au Professeur F. J. J. Buytendijk* (Utrecht/Antwerpen, 1957).

² Two essays in particular in the Buytendijk volume are important for bringing out the interplay between psychology and phenomenology, as well as for stressing the ontology implicit in the phenomenological attitude. Vide C. A. van Peursen, "Phénoménologie et ontologie" and A. de Waelhens, "Sciences humaines, horizon ontologique et rencontre."

³ *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, XLIV (1943).

⁴ Vide Quine, *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953) ch. i and ii, and Alan Pasch, *Experience and the Analytic* (Chicago, 1958).

paradigm of "seeing" or "appearing" with a "taking" which more nearly does justice to our perceptual situation.⁵

If these realignments in philosophy are to produce an understanding of man and his world, three main areas must be re-examined. Philosophers must offer an account of the context of human action (an ontology), an account of the cognitive processes of man (an epistemology), and an account of the evaluative reaches of man's reactions to his context (a theory of value). Contemporary phenomenology constitutes the only concerted effort to cover all three of these domains, although even it is stronger on ontology and epistemology than on value theory. Sartre has tried to see the evaluative reaches of man in the context of ontology, and Gabriel Marcel has been much concerned with the emergence of ethical and value attitudes from action. H. G. Bugbee⁶ seeks to survey the alternatives to the traditional empirical approaches; he does so from a point of view markedly phenomenological, influenced somewhat by Marcel but developed independently under dissatisfaction with the current modes of philosophizing.

Bugbee has studied philosophy formally and acquired his credentials in the official manner. But when he checked what the formal part of his philosophical education had taught him with direct and intimate contact with the world, he found a great discrepancy. Empiricism, which purports to be the philosophy based upon experience, seemed to Bugbee sterile and foreign to experience. Something was lost between human experience and philosophical reflection upon experience. Bugbee has accordingly tried to work out a philosophical approach and a set of affirmations which can lay claim to the title of "experiential philosophy." Tradition is flaunted in *The Inward Morning*, not only with respect to content but also in point of style. Bugbee writes in journal form. That form of publication is defended by both Bugbee and Marcel (who contributes a long introduction) on the grounds that only this style can fit his thought and approach. He tells us that

⁵ *Perceiving. A Philosophical Study* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1957).

⁶ *The Inward Morning: a philosophical exploration in journal form*, with an introduction by Gabriel Marcel. (State College, Pa.: Bald Eagle Press, 1958), 232 pp. \$5.00.

the attempt at a more formalized order of presentation took the life out of his ideas (p. 9). He decided to let the thought flow where it would: "Fluency is the stylistic counterpart of the way present experience is invaded by authentic meaning" (p. 34). Meaning does not arise in experience all at once nor in the formalized fashion of systematic philosophy. It appears and disappears; it is elusive but commanding; it flows from one point to another. The journal form is an attempt—more deliberate than Marcel's (p. 19)—to reproduce the actual flow of meaning in his experience as well as the turns and returns of his thought which seeks to grasp what is significant in experience (pp. 19, 79).

Like the phenomenologists, Bugbee gives priority to meaning over being. The meaning of being, of reality, emerges from acting and interacting with our environment. Whereas the older ontologists sought to locate reality in some one area, e.g., in the material world, in the mental world, in a supra-sensible world, the phenomenologist "vise le sens qui n'est jamais une chose en soi, mais qui implique toujours une structure relationnelle, une référence mutuelle entre conscience et chose."⁷ Formal philosophy either overlooks these relational dimensions necessary for explicating the nature of reality or treats them much too technically and abstractly. In one of his entries, Bugbee records his attitude to formal philosophy: "It will ever be important to me to give attention to technical philosophy, but I will never be able to take technical philosophy as the ultimate phase of a reflective life" (p. 139). "Technical" philosophy is primarily empiricism, but any systematic philosophy comes under Bugbee's censure which analyzes experience and the world into subject and object. Experience cannot be represented in this way (pp. 40-41, 58). Our conceptualizations of experience must be kept intimate with our experiencing.

Experience, then, is not something standing over against us (a *Gegenstand*, an object) from which we are removed to the capacity of observers, about which we are in a position to make assured reports. Experience is our undergoing, our involvement in the world, our lending or withholding of ourselves, keyed to our responsiveness, our sensibility, our alertness or our deadness (p. 41).

⁷ C. A. van Peursen, op. cit., p. 309.

Formal philosophy is more concerned with the intelligible content of existence than with existence itself, with the rational order of our thought about reality than with reality. Bugbee and Marcel seek to replace this point of view by one which will deal with the presence of things to the person who contemplates and experiences them.⁶ Instead of technical, empirical, objective knowledge of experience, Bugbee's experiential program calls for an *understanding* which must emerge from actual living: "The understanding of reality and human fulfillment are bound up with effective action" (p. 85). He makes good use of the knowledge-understanding contrast. He reads Spinoza's *scientia intuitiva* as understanding which, from the point of view of the second sort of knowledge, is not knowledge at all.

We come to *understand* the reality which we know according to the second kind of knowledge in the moment of effective action . . . Thus apart from one's own commitment, one's own complete commitment in action, the distinct things which we know, however systematically conceived, must remain as noise; they fail to make ultimate sense (p. 85).

Experience and cognition are contraries for Bugbee. Philosophy is concerned with understanding through experiencing, while science is concerned to know. The problem of our knowledge of the external world should not be considered as a question in optics: of how that which is outside and distant from me gets inside. This *optical mode of thought* (p. 130), the *reportorial* vein of analysis of rationalism and empiricism alike (p. 98), is inadequate for an understanding of reality (p. 87). "The more we treat the world as a spectacle, the more unintelligible must it necessarily seem from a metaphysical point of view, because the relation then established between us and the world is an intrinsically absurd one."⁷

Understanding emerges from wonder rather than from reflective explanations (p. 39). The wonder which is understanding comes with our immersion into life, into some task (a genuine vocation, pp. 64, 190) which commands and absorbs; it comes at sea in the routine of duty (pp. 181-184), in walks in the

⁶ Cf. Marcel's "Existence et Objectivité," reprinted in *Journal Méta-physique*, p. 309.

⁷ Marcel, *Being and Having*, trans. by K. Farrer (New York, 1949), pp. 18-19.

woods (pp. 42-45, 86), in the effort of physical exertion (pp. 45-51). "Le sens n'est pas un fait donné, il est plutôt une tâche, une vision à conquérir."¹⁰ Absorption in a task to which we give full effort and commitment leads to a feeling of reality as flowing "directly and simply from within oneself" (p. 102). There are occasions when the same feeling arises on a purely perceptual level.

Moi qui contemple le bleu du ciel, je ne suis pas *en face* de lui un sujet acosmique, je ne le possède pas en pensée, je ne déploie pas au devant de lui une idée du bleu qui m'en donnerait le secret, je m'abandonne à lui, je m'enfonce dans ce mystère, il "se pense en moi", je suis le ciel même qui se rassemble, se recueille et se met à exister pour soi, ma conscience est engorgée par ce bleu illimité.¹¹

Reality is concretely present to us in such moments and actions, rather than merely observed (pp. 148, 175-176). Some of Bugbee's most forceful entries are those illustrating the givenness of reality in concentrated action, "the constancy of the definite task at hand," a "monotonal, polyphonic inculcation in here-and-nowness, in on-goingness in what is so, forever and ever" (p. 181). The uniqueness of the here and now replaces the objective universality of technical knowledge (p. 161). The strong existentialist strand of Bugbee's thought appears in this stress upon concreteness, upon being "conclusively defined in action" (p. 184), upon leaving reflection behind for the sake of the vocation of the moment. A man finds himself drawn to give his all for the exigencies of the task confronting him; he gives reluctantly but, finally, wholeheartedly. In such moments he experiences a genuine, concrete rooting in reality.

Bugbee portrays the forceful, compulsive character of much of human action, but for all his objection to technical, formal philosophy he tends to intellectualize man's existential, experiential grounding in reality. He is more at home in the value areas of action, but the very logic of his position involves him in a perceptual and affective base for man's explicit appraisive actions. Marcel frankly admits that the presence of reality is primarily a

¹⁰ Peursen, op. cit., p. 317.

¹¹ Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, p. 248.

feeling which cannot be translated into judgment without changing the nature of that initial affective response.¹² We can, he insists, make no distinction between the idea of existence and existence itself. This separation arises when we try to intellectualize the feeling of existence by translating "une connaissance immédiate et une participation" into an assertion about objects.¹³ Reality in this sense is "incaractérisable," but not because it is unintelligible or irrational but because it precedes all characterization.¹⁴ It is this "presence effective" that Bugbee refers to when he speaks of a "somewhat absolute" in experience (p. 134), but he does not stress the precognitive nature of this presence so much as other writers of a similar persuasion. He agrees with Marcel in not treating sensation as the reception of a message by a subject from an object: sensation is, rather, "une participation immédiate de ce que nous nommons habituellement le sujet, à une ambiance de laquelle nulle frontière véritable ne le sépare."¹⁵

The fundamental ontological notion is not that of an independent reality apprehended by man but of an interactive situation where the meaning of the world for man is constituted out of man's experiences. The most primitive level of experience is that of a feeling, of an almost non-cognitive, pre-personal response where subject and object are intermixed. This is "l'expérience vécue," the "Umwelt," the primitive "Lebenswelt" of the phenomenologists.¹⁶ The stress upon this level of experience poses a problem of formulation; for, if this sort of experience is so indefinite and inarticulate, can we in fact make any assertions about it? Bugbee meets this problem on a more complex level. His journal purports to be a reflective analysis of experience as well as an insistence upon the need to reflect upon the kind of experiential action he finds important. How to accomplish this

¹² "Existence et Objectivité", p. 314.

¹³ Ibid., p. 315.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 320.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 322.

¹⁶ Vide p. 313 in Peursen, pp. 496-503 in de Waelhens, op. cit. Husserl's *Erfahrung und Urteil* is another standard phenomenological analysis of the primitive "Umwelt." My own discussion, "Philosophical Realism and Psychological Data," to appear in the June 1959 issue of *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, surveys some of the other sources for this view.

objective without violating his existentialist and experiential convictions? Isn't the very attempt to talk about reality and action subject to the technical, denatured analysis of traditional empiricism? Bugbee is aware of the problem and even concedes that the "attempt to develop ideas of reality and of action undoubtedly incurs a measure of the attitude which I am calling in question" (p. 103). In so far as it can be talked about, reality is not given, it is abstracted from; at least, we cannot "state unqualifiedly what is given" (p. 133). Reflection, he confesses, is "a trying to remember" (p. 140) what experience was like. Nature and the wilderness instruct but do they not instruct in a mystical way? The reflective mode may succeed in leading us to give up reflection for action but can it really capture what Bugbee experiences as the meaning of reality? Isn't it the very nature of reflective and discursive thought to seek to fit our experiences into some sort of theoretical and cognitive framework which will shed understanding upon the world as experienced? Can the conceptual framework capture the experienced meaning? Bugbee rides the sharp ridge between experienced but ineffable meaning and reflective distorting thought upon that meaning.

The function of reflection upon feeling and acting is to reestablish the continuity, or to capture that continuity for thought, between the organism and its environment; but all characterization, all analysis, all talk seems to involve a "measure of abstraction from reality" (p. 169). Bugbee strives to replace the cool empiricism of Hume with the warm but turgid experiential analysis of reality felt as presence. But, "how shall a man find a word to say" the meaning of such presence (p. 169)? Language and thought can point to experience but can they *say* what it means? There is much stress in this journal upon the "communion of silence" in the absorption of vocation (p. 179), upon the force of the word uttered from the silence and stillness of action (pp. 84, 87).

It is in and out of silence, a deep stillness, that the full honesty of the true human spirit is born—and born to sing in word and deed—that demand their own increase. This, this song that each of us must find his own voice to sing, and this alone, can incarnate for him explanation of his life.... True response, then, is from silence, the still center of the human soul, and the corollary to this is patience (p. 222).

One begins to wonder whether the result of Bugbee's experiential philosophy is not, inevitably, a metaphysic of silence. Even if we are prepared to accept his insistence upon an experiential attitude which takes things as they are experienced, what more can be said beyond this?

The phenomenological analysis of "l'expérience vécue" has said a good bit more beyond calling attention to this basic point of departure for knowledge and value, but what has been said may be as objectionable to Bugbee as traditional empiricism since both are concerned to conceptualize upon experience. Merleau-Ponty's *Phénoménologie de la Perception* in particular is a careful reconstruction of the perceptual "Umwelt." Many of the essays in the Buylendijk Festschrift indicate the lines that have been or could be taken in dealing with this approach to man and his world. Bugbee's journal should be placed in the context of this phenomenological approach. In his general orientation, he is working old (though recent) ground, but he has attempted to deal with the value aspects of experience in some significantly different ways. Marcel catches the originality of Bugbee's effort when he says, in the Introduction to *The Inward Morning*, it consists in "illuminating the co-articulation of the ideas of responsibility, of understanding, and of reality" (p. 30). Bugbee tells us that the unifying theme of his work is the notion of "finality" and finality is a value—even a moral—concept. His analysis of live experience discloses it, when committed and dedicated to some task, to be primarily evaluative and moral. The commitment to vocation does not begin as ethical, but the pull of this commitment, its own logic, seems to generate a feeling of responsibility, of obligation. Bugbee finds the moral ought emerging from the non-moral commitment of acting. The distinction between value and fact does not arise for the man of action. The blending of fact and value for the phenomenologist arises out of the primitive response to the world. The organism responds and reacts to those features of the environment relevant to needs and preferences. The *bête noire* is always the "objective," spectator view of man and existence; but the phenomenologist is surely correct in claiming that the basic character of the existing organism is direction, choice, tendency. If man's perceptual world is a product of his

own activity in selecting significant features from the many stimuli, "the world" ceases to be a neutral entity existing in itself, upon which the world of man's meaning—his social, religious, cultural, ethical world—is superimposed. "The world" in this sense is intimately bound up with man and cannot be separated from him. But if our appraisive responses are an important determinant of this world, the fact-value contrast becomes artificial and analytic: "on pourrait dire que la valeur n'est pas un étage en dessus des faits, mais que les faits sont des valeurs réduites."¹⁷

It is not this level of value-genesis that Bugbee has primarily in mind. He is much more concerned with ethical notions, those of responsibility, obligation, and commitment. He sees these ethical properties emerging from human action. Man's action is not only evaluative but moral. The device which enables Bugbee to find *moral* action in *action* is the notion of commitment. The commitment in action of which he talks cannot be described in the language of goal-directed behavior, nor "in terms of the fulfillment of explicit moral standards" (p. 53). It is an act which seems required by our situation. Such an action cannot be described as a choice action since we find ourselves drawn into the act, compelled to play a role, to "*become* this sort of person or that in a more radically irrevocable way" than that resulting from choice (p. 68). When we finally come to accept the role required by the action, when we *become* the helmsman in the storm, the rower in the shell, we find ourselves involved in an "unconditional affirmation" (p. 74). The link between this evaluative notion of affirmation and the understanding of reality is that the former is the criterion for the latter: "the measure of our *understanding* of reality lies in our capacity for the responsible realization of unqualified affirmation" (p. 75). When we can affirm some course of action without qualification, because we seem identified with that action, our experience is embued with "authentic meaning" (p. 82), and the "authenticity of our deeds is the basic condition of our concrete understanding of reality" (p. 85).

¹⁷ Peursen, op. cit., p. 316.

When we understand, we are committed. "Therefore there is reason to suspect that a reflective understanding of reality is bound up with a reflective understanding of responsibility, in the concrete moment of willingness and fulfillment" (p. 101). Bugbee finds the intuitionist's notion of the "fittingness of right action" a helpful one for setting forth the way in which he sees obligation and responsibility engaging a man in action. But he finds something artificial in most present-day ethical theories: they suppose a case, rather than taking the case that is (p. 116).¹⁸

Someone refers to a state of affairs with which I have no intimacy and asks: How does your philosophy deal with that? Another, with a few casual strokes portrays a situation as a scene for action and then wishes to know: How, in terms of your position, ought a man to act in this situation, and why? (p. 117).

The reflective dissection characteristic of empirical and scientific approaches to reality and experience reappears in such portrayals of value contexts. Ethical action is not like this. Ethical decisions arise in the heat of acting and are made, when genuine, out of the structure of the total situation commanding and compelling. The imperative mood, Bugbee insists, is "not the mood of assertion. It is the mood of affirmation, the mood in which we truly respond" (p. 117). "True" response is action fully committed, finality accepted not as a goal to be achieved but as the motivation for action (pp. 207-208).

Responsibility and obligation thus conceived seem to place events and situation above the individual moral agent; in fact, they make the agent a function of the events and situations. It is in this sense that "reality" can be said to define and generate responsibility. There are some situations, some tasks, which cannot get accomplished without man's agency. The very structure and dynamics of these situations demand fulfillment. Man becomes a moral agent in so far as, without qualification, he becomes the efficient cause of the fulfillment of that which is implicit in events and situations. Man as moral agent must identify himself with the situation and must rise to the level of acting in and with the events and the task because he responds to

¹⁸ Cf. William Gass, "The Case of the Obliging Stranger", *Philosophical Reviews*, LXVI, (1957), 193-204.

the pull of the situation. Sartre's praise of Jean Genet comes to mind as a possible illustration of Bugbee's meaning.¹⁹ But would Bugbee sanction any and all sorts of actions as moral?—those of Jean Genet and of the characters in his macabre plays are sordid, to say the least. Is the only criterion he has in mind for the ethical nature of actions that it be a response to the "somewhat absolute" in experience which compels unconditional identification of our effort with the task? The examples offered in his journal are all taken from respected vocations: work on ship board, coaching, youthful games and escapades. The call of nature, of mountains and trees, is strong; Thoreau and Wordsworth inspire the spirit of this work. If we take seriously Bugbee's criterion for responsible action, we must pursue it wherever it leads; it very easily leads to the excesses of a Genet. If Bugbee does not wish to follow the logic of his analysis this far, then he has not derived ethical behavior from reality alone: he has prefaced his analysis with some value distinctions such that he is then able to show how, given certain kinds of activities, the grounding of these in human experience and in reality can be made. But then, the extraction of responsibility and obligation from commitment to a vocation is like the magician's producing a rabbit from a hat.

If we follow the phenomenologist's replacement of being by meaning, we generate a new concept of being: the metaphysic of experience becomes the theory of reality. Instead of the traditional realism which talks of man and the world of independent objects, the phenomenological ontology limits our talk of reality to the organism and environment operating together to produce the known, meaningful world. The world of phenomenological meaning is a form of idealism or phenomenalism where all meaningful being is a correlative of the self, and self is a correlative of being.²⁰ Since man is the definer of this world, his physical and physiological reactions to the environment are constitutive of this world. Since even on the physiological level, needs and preferences are manifest in action, it is not surprising that values and facts get mixed up in this phenomenalist world. The fact-

¹⁹ Vide *Saint Genet, Comédien et Martyr*, 1952.

²⁰ Peursen, op. cit., p. 310.

value distinction is posterior to the emergence of self and object from the primitive pre-personal environment. Bugbee finds something significant in this way of structuring our thought about the world and experience, but instead of allowing the fact-value distinction to arise, once the phenomenological world has been defined in action, he wants to keep our analysis of value phenomena close to the original situation. That there are situations where man individuates himself in act, that there is something genuine about such action which is often lacking in normal ethical action, are facts about our world we must recognize along with Bugbee. But I wonder whether Bugbee has seen that even for his kind of "authenticated" individual, selectivity of situation occurs. If a man is thrown into a situation not of his choosing, he may still be able to respond in the responsible way required by Bugbee. But would Bugbee not recognize some situations where it would be better for the individual to withhold his commitment? There is a ring of stoic fate about Bugbee's journal, so he might not.

The value presuppositions of Bugbee's own reflections upon experience may be hidden beneath his pretense at deriving values and imperatives from facts. His metaphysic of experience is offered as an exposé of the ethical nature of experience. He has presented his case in a forceful, sensitive manner which has a subtle persuasion about it. His experimentation could have a marked salutary and remedial effect upon philosophy by inducing us to cast a serious eye upon the work of recent phenomenologists. Bugbee's journal may be symptomatic of and influential for the future growth of philosophical thought in this country. It is a work indigenous to America. It returns to the frontier, to the wilderness both in symbol and in fact. There is much that needs to be explored, staked out, and cultivated in the experiential frontiers. I am inclined to say that the particular experiential philosophy advanced by Bugbee is not so valuable—in many ways it is only programmatic—as is the general claim for such a philosophy. It is this claim and the concrete phenomenological work of Buyten-dijk and his followers and co-workers that I would commend. Read in this context and in this way, *The Inward Morning* is a significant departure in Anglo-American philosophy.

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DISCUSSIONS

THE PRE-OBJECTIVE RECONSIDERED

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IN A RECENT ISSUE of *The Review of Metaphysics* (September, 1958), Messrs. Charles Taylor and Michael Kullman question the validity of M. Merleau-Ponty's pre-objective world and his ability to talk about it in a pre-objective language. Since their effort represents the burgeoning interest of analysts in European Continental philosophy, and might be construed by some to be a reply in the negative to John Wild's question of a common ground of linguistic analysis and phenomenology (*The Philosophical Review*, October, 1958), this writer feels that some defense of Merleau-Ponty should be made.

To this end, I propose to follow a somewhat unusual pattern, in that there will be no point-by-point consideration of issues raised by Taylor and Kullman. Instead, I intend to outline Merleau-Ponty's position on language, speech, and meaning as presented in the *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, and proceed from there to a discussion of the pre-objective.

This choice of procedure has been dictated by several considerations. First, what is at stake in this controversy is the phenomenologist's "point of view." An explication, therefore, of his treatment of these topics of paramount interest to his analyst critics will undoubtedly deepen our appreciation of his approach. Second, the chapter of the *Phénoménologie* on "The Body as Expression and Speech" presents the problem of the pre-objective in vivid terms. And third, the placing of this problem on a wider field will enable us to introduce some striking comparisons between Merleau-Ponty and Miss Iris Murdoch and Mr. A. C. Lloyd (Symposium on "Thinking and Language," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Suppl. Vol. XXV, 1951, 25-82). Here our purpose is not a detailed study of this symposium but rather the stimulation of interest in some remarkable articles by analysts who evince at least a sympathy for the "pre-objective."

There is, of course, a definite disadvantage in this procedure. It will necessitate a partial repetition of the exposition of the Taylor-Kullman article.

In this paper we will proceed as follows: I) An exposition of M. Merleau-Ponty's chapter (six) which treats the topic of language and thought. II) A consideration of some of the counters of the language-game: *word, language, meaning*. III) Some reflections on the foundation of language-thought: the pre-objective or "situation dans le monde."

I

The title of Merleau-Ponty's chapter is significant: "The Body as Expression and Speech" (*la parole*). We should first note that the word *parole*, as distinguished from *mot* (the physical word) and *langage* (which includes the cultural overtones of expression) signifies speech in its origin. *Région originale*, says the author, (p. 203) or *l'acte de parler* (p. 211).¹ In other words, the viewpoint is basically that of Heidegger who describes *Rede* (the equivalent of *parole* here) as an existential component of *Dasein*. The power of significant utterance is a given of man in his situation in the world. It marks his *Sein*; it springs from and expresses the *Da-*, and simultaneously can be considered as that which admits the possibility of *Da*. But the more important aspect of Merleau-Ponty's title seems to be "The Body as Expression . . ." And when we page through the *Phénoménologie*, we see that this chapter represents the final stage of a lengthy analysis of body; where body is no longer viewed as a thing or an object of impartial biological or other scientific inquiry, but rather as a means of

¹ The word *parole* in French is as ambiguous as the word *speech* in English. We might have emphasized the activity which Merleau-Ponty seems to have foremost in mind by the paraphrases "speech activity," or "the power of speech," or even "speaking." Cf. Lloyd, p. 55: "We must distinguish two senses of the word 'language.' There is (A) language as the acts of speaking and writing done by people (*Sprechen*). And there is (B) language as an abstraction from the speaking and writing done by some group of people (*Sprache*); this is roughly what is common to the sounds and marks made in their acts of speaking and writing; and, roughly, it is expressed in grammar, logic and syntactic definitions."

manifesting a sense or meaning which is other than the body which brings it into being, projects it, communicates it. In carefully-chosen words Merleau-Ponty summarizes the state of the analysis as we find it at the beginning of this chapter.

We have recognized in the body a unity distinct from that of a scientific object. We have just finished uncovering even in its sexual function an intentionality and power of signification. By seeking to describe the phenomenon of speech and the explicit act of signification, we will have the opportunity of surpassing definitively the classic dichotomy of subject-object (p. 203).

For the sake of simplicity, we might say that Merleau-Ponty enunciates and elucidates two theses. 1) The word (*le mot*) has a sense (p. 206). 2) Speech (*la parole*) is a gesture and its signification is a world (p. 214). Let us consider each of these in turn.

First, "the word has a sense." An empirical theory, as Merleau-Ponty understands it, reduces a word to a verbal image, and denies that speech is an action in which a subject manifests its interior possibilities. The phenomenologist checks the validity of the theory against one of the facts it should explain: a case of aphasia. And contrary to the verbal image theory, the analysis brings to light an attitude behind the word, and a function of speech which conditions the word. The empirical theory breaks on the difference between word as instrument and word as disinterested denomination. In like manner, an intellectualist theory which makes a word into an empty envelope for some hidden process of thought runs aground on the ordinary cases to be explained: Why does thought seek its achievement in expression? Why do familiar objects remain somewhat undetermined until we find their names? In a word, the intellectualist faces all of the problems of the Cartesian dichotomy. And at the same time, he is apparently unaware of the thought *in* speech: of the fact that language is learned in a context of action where gesture, accent, and tone contribute to and modify the common understanding of words. The orator's words are not to be artificially sundered from mysterious representations; his speech is his thought.

M. Merleau-Ponty is very painstaking in elaborating his second thesis—that speech is a gesture and its signification is a world. A failure on our part to grasp the intentionality of the

body at this moment of giving meaning would indicate that we have not caught the drift of the past 200 pages of analysis, and that we are probably in the subject-object rut of thinking of a *thing* instead of "my body." It will be impossible to follow Merleau-Ponty in every detail—from the role of the body in memory and feeling to the meaningfulness of sound in music, form in painting, gesture in drama. But throughout his main theme is clear. I present it in his own clipped statements (pp. 216-217).

1) It is by my body that I take a hold of another,² just as it is by my body that I perceive "things." (The point being made is that thinking is "in a situation," and that body is what situates.)

2) The sense of a gesture thus "understood" (*compris*) is not behind it; it fuses with the structure of the world which the gesture delineates. (A gesture of my right arm, for example, arises in a situation and draws its meaning from that situation. Thus we say that it *has* a meaning in the sense that it *conveys* a meaning, and to that extent *is* its meaning.)

3) The linguistic gesture utilizes a culture. The meaning, then, of speech is none other than the manner in which this act of expression manipulates the common linguistic world. (Here is the terminus of Merleau-Ponty's train of thought. In the first point: body in world; in the second: body as conveyor of meaning; and now: body as conveyor of that world's meaning.)

Merleau-Ponty is not crystal clear at every point of his exposition. He passes from "les mots" to "les paroles" to "la parole" to "la parole ou les mots" without discrimination or shock. And people who are accustomed to thinking in frozen concepts, or who conceive language in terms of "natural" and "arbitrary" signs, will find that Merleau-Ponty moves dialectically and has effected a synthesis of *natural* and *arbitrary*. There is here a Hegelian dialectic which may strike a familiar chord only when the author

² The literal meaning of *com-prend* is to grasp, possess. Miss Murdoch writes: "If we think of conceptualising rather as the activity of grasping, or reducing to order, our situation with the help of a language which is fundamentally metaphorical, this will operate against the world-language dualism. . . . Thinking is not designating at all, but rather understanding, grasping, 'possessing'" (p. 33). In line with the main purpose of this paper, we must ask ourselves the *why* and the *what* of the "fundamentally metaphorical."

talks of action or culture. But one who has grappled with *Dasein* as "in-der-Welt-Sein," or who has followed the reciprocal action of body and world in *L'Etre et le Néant*, will be dialectically undisturbed, and will find little that is novel in a conception of body as a focal point from which we deploy a world. Here, to be sure, there is greater emphasis on the act of expression as simultaneously constituting and utilizing a culture.³ But has not Heidegger suggested a relationship between the senses (*Sinne*) and significance (*Sinn haben für*)?⁴ M. Merleau-Ponty has provided us with an explication of this idea.

II

1) Words for Merleau-Ponty have no grammatical attraction, though he manifests a definite interest in their logic or use. He is fascinated by the meaningful halo which surrounds a word because it is learned in a bodily situation and because it may carry a bodily reaction. He cites, for example (p. 272), cases of rigidity of the back and neck in response to the word *hard*. In brief, words have a physiognomy because they are given to us in a definite *projet*.

2) As for Wittgenstein, so for Merleau-Ponty, language is always in a situation, in the context of a certain culture. We shall return to the problem of a universal or natural language in the question of the pre-objective.

3) We will not find a theory of meaning in the Meinongian or Russellian sense in Merleau-Ponty. But for that matter, some analysts would consider a question concerning the meaning of meaning as meaningless. A significant question for Merleau-Ponty, as for the analyst, would be of a precise meaning . . . in the *projet* of a certain world. But why *projet*? Why world? Why meaning? "That," he replies, "is neither more nor less miraculous than the emergence of love in desire or of a gesture in the un-

³ In this connection, Lloyd (p. 53) talks about the "good sense" of using the expression *a priori*.

⁴ *Sein und Zeit*, p. 137.

coordinated movements of early life" (226). The phenomenologist accepts conscience and its intentionality as a given.

III

Let us now turn our attention to the fundamental point at issue for Messrs. Taylor and Kullman, the pre-objective, which Merleau-Ponty insinuates in the following interesting passage.

We lose consciousness of the contingent factor in expression and communication, whether in the case of an infant learning to speak, or in that of a writer who says and thinks something for the first time; in fine, in the case of all those who transform into speech a certain silence. It is nonetheless very clear that established speech, such as has a play in every-day life, supposes the decisive step of expression as finished. Our view concerning man will remain superficial to the extent that we will not go back to that beginning, that we will not seek once more beneath the clamor of words that primordial silence, that we will not describe the gesture which breaks that silence (p. 214).

Taylor and Kullman are anxious to take Merleau-Ponty at face value. How, they ask, can silence be linguistically approachable? But must Merleau-Ponty be taken *vi vocis*? Can he not be talking about that "lower level" of thinking which Mr. Lloyd characterizes in psychological jargon as "primitive" or "infantile"? He says of this plane where we do not as yet discriminate between our senses:

It is only as we grow up that we come to distinguish the *brightness* of a light from the *loudness* of a noise. But the primitive reactions (which include symbols) are not obliterated, only overlaid by more sophisticated habits; indeed at moments of stress and probably in dreams the covering wears thin. And it seems to make sense to associate this covering with the more systematically "meaningful" level of thinking in our earlier picture, and the primitive reactions (here so-called synesthesia) with the deeper levels (p. 41).

And if this level is what Merleau-Ponty means by the pre-objective, then I suggest, as the corollary, that *objective* means "nuanced" or "attitude-loaded," or "built-in-with-a-theory" talk. *Pre-objective* would be "free-from-Cartesian-dichotomy" (or any other scientific or philosophical commitment) talk.

Messrs. Taylor and Kullman recognize, to be sure, that their

difficulty goes beyond Merleau-Ponty. The primacy of the world of "perception" of the real natural world, over the world of culture was a fundamental thesis of Husserl.⁵ And Taylor and Kullman cite two places in the *Phénoménologie* where Merleau-Ponty uses Husserl's word *Fundierung*, which they translate, perhaps a little tendentiously, as "presupposition."

I would like to suggest now three points which seem to me to clarify Merleau-Ponty's position and, if not resolve, at least to make sense out of this language-thought imbroglio.

1) Merleau-Ponty is not making common cause with Gilbert Ryle who says in his contribution to the Thinking-Language Symposium that he has tried to show that there can be thinking where there is no talking and no attempt to talk (p. 80). Merleau-Ponty is not talking about words—"dicta"—whether outwardly spoken or secretly uttered to oneself. Rather, he has in mind a distinction of the speech of empirical discourse, the utterance of every-day language which is freighted with the attitudes of our cultural world, from "authentic" acts of expression. On the one hand we have "second expression," speech "sur des paroles"; on the other, speech which formulates for the first time and which is to be identified with thought as its accomplishment (footnote p. 207). The latter is the gesture which breaks the primordial silence. It is because of this orientation that Merleau-Ponty's analysis takes the turn it does, where verbalization is on a par with expression in music and drama. The point made is that "thought tends to expression as to its fulfillment" (p. 206) and is not a process behind the gesture, i.e., expression. And in that Merleau-Ponty agrees with Mr. Ryle.

2) Are we to conclude from 1) that at least those of us who are not infants or writers of new things or paranoiacs (like the one whose neologisms included: "Well goodbye; I've got to go and see my unkbut.")—are we to conclude that we normals are enchain'd in a meta-language and quite incapable of breaking the

⁵ Cf. A. de Waelhens, *Une Philosophie de l'ambiguïté : L'existentialisme de Maurice Merleau-Ponty*, Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1951, p. 161. M. de Waelhens cites *Erfahrung und Urteil*, p. 29.

bonds of our culture to be able to describe the "natural" world with "natural" unbiased speech?

I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different, people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize—then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him.⁶

I suggest that Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty have somewhat of the same feat in mind. It is not a question of somehow subtracting the differences from these divergent worlds and their expression and thereby arriving at the *really real*, the natural world. Rather, I think of this natural world as a limiting concept, as what necessitates constant reductions and keeps the phenomenologist a perennial beginner in the presence of mystery.⁷ In this connection, it is interesting to note that Miss Murdoch makes use of this notion of a regulative idea.⁸

3) The very dialectic of natural-cultural, objective-pre-objective, inevitably introduces a temporal priority of one before the other in our thinking and its expression. And if we are inclined to think of the prior moment as spontaneous and infra-linguistic, then we can never arrive at describing it in its own unprejudiced terms. Merleau-Ponty is no exception to using this misleading talk: *first*, *second*, *fundamental*, etc. I cite one of several passages which is open to serious misunderstanding.

But if one betakes himself to concrete descriptions, he becomes aware that the categorial activity, *before* being a thought or knowledge, is a manner of relating oneself to the world (p. 222, emphasis mine).

⁶ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 230e.

⁷ Taylor and Kullman (p. 131) refer to Merleau-Ponty's statement in the introduction, ix.

⁸ In the context Miss Murdoch is talking about the privacy and unity of our "selves" and "personalities." To escape an ontological coloring, she uses the expression "illusion of immanence," which "is rather a necessary regulative idea" (p. 31).

I would like to interpret Merleau-Ponty as really saying: . . . before being an *explicit* or *reflective* thought or a *thematic* knowledge. Or we might prefer to interpret the word *before* as meaning a dialectical or logical priority, somewhat in the sense in which Aristotle speaks of the priority of form to matter, or matter to form, depending upon the viewpoint. I would like to think, in the wont of philosophers, that Merleau-Ponty would say: "Of course. That is what I meant. In fact, I say it explicitly two pages over (p. 224) where I make my own an opinion of Gelb and Goldstein: 'Categorial behavior and the possession of significant language express one and the same fundamental behavior. Neither of the two can be cause or effect.'"

In conclusion we might ask ourselves what kind of answer is given here to the difficulty of Messrs. Taylor and Kullman. The real crux of the matter, as Taylor and Kullman remark at the end of their criticism, is the validity of the existentialist's starting-point: that of finding himself hurled or thrown there; he is "in-der-Welt-Sein." And because language, as Merleau-Ponty states, "presents or rather *is* the subject's positional attitude (*prise de position*) in the world of his significations" (p. 225), an interrogation of a pre-objective, which would somehow come *before* this situation, is self-defeating. I suggest that the kind of answer Merleau-Ponty offers in the three above-mentioned points is a "proof-of-the-pudding-in-the-eating" type which Hegel and all phenomenologists give. It is a response with a question: "Does this way of approaching the problem make things more intelligible, or differently so?" At that point we are left with a Wittgensteinian question: "What are *your* criteria of intelligibility?" *

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* Cf. *Phénoménologie*, 31—a passage used by Taylor and Kullman, 112.

INTERMITTENT EXISTENCE AND THE IDENTITY OF WORKS OF ART

HILDE HEIN

PROFESSOR JOSEPH MARGOLIS, in a recent article in *The Review of Metaphysics*,¹ asserts that a work of art has an intermittent existence. He takes great pains to distinguish the *existence* of a work of art from its *identity*. The latter is meant by the questions "What is a work of art?" "In what does the work of art consist?" Such questions are not evaluative, but rather matters of location. Where do we look (literally or figuratively) to find the work of art? That there is a work of art to find is presupposed by the question.

Professor Margolis indicates that the problem of the identity of a work of art is a difficult one to resolve. Shall we locate the "work of art" associated with a musical composition in the score or in a performance; and, if the latter, in which particular one? Similarly in poetry, shall we identify the work of art with the printed characters upon the page or with an oral rendition of them? If we call an etching a "work of art," are we referring to the copper plate or to one or more of the prints drawn from it? Some philosophers claim that the "work of art" is none of these; that, in fact, it is not a material object at all, but an experience existing in the mind of the artist and, possibly, in the minds of those whom he has induced to share his experience.²

But in this particular article Professor Margolis disclaims any explicit interest in the question of the identity of the work of art.³ He is here concerned exclusively with the mode of existence of a work of art. It is my contention, however, that Professor Margolis' theory of the intermittent existence of a work of art pre-

¹ "The Mode of Existence of a Work of Art," XII, No. 1, Sept. 1958.

² Cf. I. A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, Ch. XXX, and B. Croce, "The Breviary of Aesthetic," quoted in Rader, *A Modern Book of Esthetics*, rev. ed. (New York, 1952).

³ Professor Margolis refers us in a footnote to a forthcoming article on the topic, Op. cit. p. 28.

supposes a particular answer to the question of the identity of the work of art. At least, any answer other than the one which he tacitly supports would render the "intermittent existence" theory either false or trivial.

If, for example, we were to identify the "work of art" with the original material object which the artist creates, the completed score, the painting, the finished manuscript or poem, the copper plate or even the first print, it would clearly be false to say the work of art has intermittent existence, for it would exist as long as the object remained intact. If, in the case of the performing arts we were to identify the "work of art" with one or more performances of the play, poem or piece of music, it would be true but trivial that the work of art exists intermittently; for performances obviously must have an end, and the work of art would, in this sense, cease whenever the curtain rang down. Finally, if the work of art is an experience possessed by the artist or spectator or both upon proper stimulation, then the mode of existence of the work of art is identical with that of the experience. And, in this case, it would, I believe, be more fruitful to determine the mode of existence of the experience and derive that of the work of art from it than the reverse procedure. Experiences are still more plentiful and more easily observed than works of art.

Professor Margolis does in fact hold a theory of the identity of the work of art. He locates the work of art in the combination of the physical object and the experience which the beholder has when viewing the physical object as an aesthetic object. The material object alone has a stable existence, but it is merely a necessary, not a sufficient condition for the existence of the work of art. The experience occurs only when someone is having it; and, consequently, the work of art exists only whenever a material object is contemplated in such a manner as to give rise to the experience required. Thus the work of art exists intermittently as an emergent entity supervening upon a more or less permanently existing material object conjoined with an occasional experience.

Professor Margolis refers to this composite work of art as a "two-storey" object.* The lower storey is the physical object,

* Op. cit. p. 30.

which persists whether or not it is contemplated as an aesthetic object. Obviously it can be appreciated for its own merits. The perception of the upper storey, and hence the existence of the work of art, occurs only during what Professor Margolis calls "properly oriented attention to" ⁵ the material object. It is for this reason that he feels the necessity to differentiate sharply between the mode of existence of the work of art and that of the material object. The difference lies not merely in the fact that the existence of the former depends upon that of the latter, but also upon the curiosity (which Professor Margolis notes) that a work of art may intermittently cease to exist, while this is impossible for any single material object.⁶

In order to account for the differences in existence of material objects and works of art Professor Margolis considers the possibility that a work of art may exist as the actualization of a potentiality possessed by a material object. However he rejects this analysis on the grounds that the potential-actualized distinction is applicable to things which have temporal phases, but not to things which are "one and the same individual object".⁷ In this respect he holds material objects and works of art to be alike: they are both the sort of thing which we would call "one and the same individual object," things whose potentiality would be equivalent to their non-existence. Furthermore, Professor Margolis insists that the perception of the work of art is not merely additive to the lower storey, (as he presumably believes an actualization-potentiality relationship would be) but involves the incorporation of the physical object in an entirely novel context.⁸ Thus he adopts the "emergent entity" theory as most descriptive of the nature of works of art.

I am inclined to agree with Professor Margolis' rejection of

⁵ Op. cit. p. 31.

⁶ A discussion of the legitimacy of this differentiation does not fall within the scope of my paper, but one might argue plausibly that material objects as well as works of art can exist intermittently, or that neither class of objects can.

⁷ Op. cit. p. 29. Professor Margolis grudgingly concedes that the potentiality-actualization vocabulary is applicable even to "individual objects" when restricted to "their properties taken serially."

⁸ Op. cit., p. 31.

the potentiality-actualization theory as an adequate analysis of the relationship between the material object and the work of art. However, I believe it gives us a clue to a simpler solution to the problem than the alternative which Professor Margolis offers.

When a potentiality is actualized a particular entity undergoes a change of character due to an effort applied either from within or without. When a particular painting or statue is viewed as a work of art no actual change takes place in the nature of the material object, but a kind of development is realized through the existence of certain relations acquired by the object. The work of art on this view is not a new entity which comes into existence under certain conditions and goes out of it under others, but is simply the material object itself with the addition of a class of relations (the aesthetic attention of the spectator being one of these) which sometimes exist and sometimes do not. This analysis spares us the necessity of duplicating the entities in our already overpopulated universe. Nothing is held to spring into existence whenever someone contemplates a teaspoon "with appropriately oriented attention;" but even a teaspoon can (but need not) be a work of art if it stands in the relationship of being aesthetically appreciated.

The preceding treatment of the identity of the work of art moves it closer to the material object than Professor Margolis would have it, but it leaves open the question whether or not the existence of the work of art is intermittent. There is much to be said in favor of maintaining a distinction in our characterization of the existence of works of art and that of material objects. Obviously there are differences between them. We might all agree that a particular object is a painting while disagreeing violently whether or not it is a work of art. Similarly we could all describe the general nature of a table sufficiently so that one could be recognized by someone who had never seen a table, but this would be difficult if not impossible with a work of art. Furthermore, if we assert that works of art have the same kind of existence as material objects, then we are hard put to explain how certain material objects (e.g. the cave paintings or the pots and pans of extinct civilizations) can sometimes be merely material objects, sometimes works of art. We cannot even

account for the disagreement on the so-called classic works of art, which to many observers are only so much marble, so many words, or so much noise.

But Professor Margolis' suggestions do not really solve these difficulties. On the contrary, they seem to lead us into deeper aesthetic puzzles on the one hand by blurring the distinctions which we ordinarily are able to make between works of art and non-works of art and, on the other, by depriving us of the relative security that certain particular objects are and will remain works of art.

Are we to say, on Professor Margolis' view, that any painting, or any physical object whatsoever, when viewed with "properly oriented attention," gives birth by that token to a momentarily existent work of art? Undoubtedly a great variety of things—dinners, murders, scientific proofs to name a few—have been called works of art, but surely only in a derivative sense. Must we grant that any physical object may be the lower storey of a work of art?

What shall we say, furthermore, about the many instances when we do look at physical objects with what I assume would pass as "properly oriented attention" only to receive an aesthetic disappointment? Would such an experience still yield a work of art? A bad one perhaps? Professor Margolis is not obligated in this paper to set down criteria for good and bad works of art, but some standard is necessitated by his position, particularly if he really does intend to be so catholic in his requirements for admission to candidacy.

While apparently allowing anything to subvene a work of art intermittently, Professor Margolis seems to exclude the possibility that anything might be a work of art permanently; and yet there are a number of objects which I and, I imagine, many other people would wish to characterize as works of art, having at least the same permanency as works of art, as they have as material objects. Professor Margolis is quite correct in his contention that "as a work of fine art, the *esse* of an object is *percipi*."⁹ Without human experience there would be no works of art. But one can-

⁹ Op. cit., p. 34.

not conclude from this general principle that each individual work of art exists only in so far as it is actually contemplated as a work of art, or that whenever one refers to a work of art one is referring to the experience of it as such. I should say that the "Mona Lisa" used to cover a hole in the plaster would be no less a work of art than it is hanging in the Louvre at the height of the tourist season.

I believe that much of Professor Margolis' difficulty lies in the fact that he is not clear in his own mind whether to regard the term "work of art" as an honorific appellation or a neutral expression. This is a choice which must be made, whether the option be for one side or the other. I would suggest that the term is evaluative. It differs from the terms "good" or "bad" as applied to paintings, poetry, and the like, for one can without redundancy talk about good or bad works of art. The term "work of art" is what I would call a "congealed valuation," for it is not necessarily a valuation which the user of the term is making, although he may be concurring with it. To call an object a work of art is, in effect, to call attention to a longstanding (or short but determined) practice of valuing it.¹⁰ The advantages of this analysis of the term "work of art" over the one which Professor Margolis proposes are 1) that it does not force us indiscriminately to regard anything contemplated in a certain way as a work of art, 2) that it permits us to attribute a relative constancy to those objects which we unhesitatingly would call works of art, and 3) most importantly from a general philosophical approach, that it frees us from the encumbrance of multiplying entities. On this view the physical object itself, when attended by the pertinent relations, is the work of art. This method of accounting for the features of the universe is not a new one in philosophical literature.

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¹⁰ I would cite as evidence for this view the fact that in the case of contemporary artistic creations we frequently withhold the title "work of art" except in these few cases where authoritative critics have set the fashion. In the daily run of paintings, poetry, and compositions, we speak of good ones and bad ones, but rarely of "works of art".

FRANZ BRENTANO'S AXIOLOGY:
SOME CORRECTIONS TO MR. KUBAT'S PAPER

D. B. TERRELL

SOME SIGNS of a revival of interest in the philosophy of Franz Brentano have lately been evident. There are various reasons for this development, among them the beginning of an awareness, long overdue, that Brentano not only published in 1874 a work of solid and lasting value—the *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*—but continued to apply himself ably and fruitfully to philosophical and psychological problems for more than forty years thereafter.¹ These years were not years of philosophical stagnation; yet, if there is only the most superficial knowledge of the views he set forth in 1874, there is almost none concerning the changes which occurred in them later on. Mr. Kubat's article, "Franz Brentano's Axiology: A revised Conception," which appeared in this *Review* recently,² purports to remedy our ignorance of Brentano's final views on the subject of value-theory. In this brief reply I do not propose to set forth systematically and thoroughly the facts which he has so seriously misinterpreted and distorted, but I do hope at least to restore to that relatively healthy state those who were ignorant before.

Mr. Kubat attributes much of the misinformation about Brentano's theories to the lack of an edition of Brentano's collected writing. If anyone *should* wish to know more about Brentano's doctrines, he may have been led by this remark to despair of finding them anywhere in print. The three works which Mr. Kubat mentions, *Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik*, *Religion und Philosophie*, and *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, all edited by F. Mayer-Hillebrand and published by A. Francke in Bern, represent no more than a continuation of the *Gesamtausgabe* of Brentano's writings

¹ To those who have come to think of Brentano as a figure of the dim and distant past, it may be a surprise to learn that he did not die until 1917 and that he was doing significant philosophical work until the very end of his life. Some of it has been published in the volumes listed in note 3.

² XII, No. 1 (September, 1958), 133-141.

which was begun by Oskar Kraus and Alfred Kastil after Brentano's death.³ The volumes in the *Gesamtausgabe* represent ten numbers in Meiner's *Philosophische Bibliothek* and are listed under the heading, "Gesammelte philosophische Schriften." They contain not only new editions of much of the work which Brentano published during his lifetime, but a large amount of material which Kraus and Kastil selected from his enormous *Nachlass* as well. I am sure that Mrs. Mayer-Hillebrand herself would be the first to recognize that the three published volumes she has edited, and the one on esthetics which is soon to appear in print, are part of a whole which also includes the volumes edited by Kraus and Kastil. Taken altogether, the thirteen volumes that have been published by Meiner and by Francke can well be viewed as at least an adequate substitute for a collected edition. Surely they include everything which is necessary to dispel the common misinformation which Mr. Kubat tries to explain by denying their existence. The trouble has not been the lack of a collected edition, but the lack of readers.

Some of the difficulty in understanding Mr. Kubat's article is probably to be explained by his lack of familiarity with the English language. To take an obvious and philosophically insignificant example, when he writes in his bibliographical footnote (p. 133), that "a fourth volume, dealing with Aesthetics, is in print," what he means is that it is in the press. When he says in another foot-

³ These were all published by F. Meiner in Leipzig:
Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (1922, 1934); Republished in Hamburg, 1955.

Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, Bd. I (1924); Bd. II ("Klassifikation psychischer Phänomene" und "Anhang" von 17 Nummern) (1925); Bd. III ("Vom sinnlichen und poetischen Bewusstsein") 1. Teil (1928); Bd. I republished in Hamburg, 1955.

Versuch über die Erkenntnis (1925).

Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand (1926).

Über die Zukunft der Philosophie (1928).

Vom Dasein Gottes (1929).

Wahrheit und Evidenz (1930).

Kategorienlehre (1933).

Meiner published *Die Lehre Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung* (1921) also, but it is not included in the *Philosophische Bibliothek*.

Mention should also be made of Oskar Kraus: *Franz Brentano* (Munich: Beck, 1919) and Alfred Kastil: *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos* (Bern: Francke, 1951).

note (p. 136), that "according to Brentano's division into classes, ideas make up the basic class, and comprise the logical and the practical judgments as well," I am led to suspect that he is somehow misusing the word, "comprises." He surely can not suppose that what he calls logical and practical judgments were regarded by Brentano as sub-classes under the general class of ideas, which is what that word would lead us to believe. But what he really means is not clear to me. One way of putting what he ought to mean is that both judgments and attitudes are based on ideas. There are other perplexing features of Mr. Kubat's article which I find myself unable to judge conclusively. Perhaps they are obscure because of the odd use of a word, perhaps because of an obscurity in Mr. Kubat's mind, perhaps, of course, because of an obscurity in Brentano's doctrine (although this last is by long odds the least likely of the three).

The cloudiness of Mr. Kubat's language and/or opinions makes for no little difficulty in attempting to criticize and correct them. The tables he presents, for the sake of brevity, are especially elusive. It would appear that the two principal tables, on pp. 136 and 140-141, constitute the real point of his presentation of Brentano's doctrines. He tells us that "the construction of both tables is my imputation of structure into Brentano's writings concerning epistemology and ethics" (p. 140 n). Yet I am totally at a loss to criticize the two tables, for first, I do not find them intelligible either independently or as summaries of what Mr. Kubat has presented elsewhere in his article and, second, although I am familiar with Brentano's writings concerning epistemology and ethics and have devoted some study to them,⁴ I cannot, even by the most vigorous exercise of my imagination, reconstruct the paths which led Mr. Kubat from those writings to his tables. Nor is my attempt in any way aided by his discussion. Because of the first consideration, I can offer no direct confirmation of the

⁴ See my doctoral dissertation at the University of Michigan, *Ethics, Language and Ontology: A Study of the Implications of Franz Brentano's Sprachkritik for Ethical Theory* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1956). Professor J. C. M. Brentano, of Highland Park, Ill., has recently made it possible for me to study some of his father's unpublished manuscripts and correspondence.

second, and in defense of the first I believe that I need only appeal to the reader's own judgment. Enough evidence can be cited, however, to show that Mr. Kubat's account of Brentano's writings is extremely unreliable, and so to create indirectly at least a presumption against the tables by which he imputes (his) structure into them.

I begin with the treatment of the two aspects of Brentano's philosophy which, taken together, form the pillars supporting the theory of value at which he ultimately arrived. They are his account of moral knowledge and his rejection of irreal entities. In saying that one of Brentano's axioms was "that of moral knowledge having the quality of logical evidence" (p. 133), Mr. Kubat has chosen an awkward way of expressing Brentano's doctrine, which was that some emotional attitudes possess a character analogous to the character possessed by evident judgments. *Knowing* of a certain kind of emotional act that it could not but possess this character involves an evident and apodictic judgment. The distinctive feature of Brentano's theory, however, is not the evident character of the judgment which constitutes this knowledge, but the analogous character of the emotional act itself, which is the object of the knowledge. Moral knowledge is given in evident judgments, yes; but this could be said of almost any intuitionist or rationalist theory of ethics. What Brentano contributes is the doctrine that moral knowledge refers to quasi-evident emotional acts.⁵

On the next page of his article (p. 134), Mr. Kubat comments that the result of Brentano's new insights into problems of mind was "his well known epistemological proposition: '*Nur Reales ist vorstellbar*'." This is the other pillar of his final theory of value. One is somewhat surprised to find that this proposition is well known, since it is precisely the lack of awareness of Brentano's later ideas, to which this doctrine is central, of which

⁵ Mr. Kubat suggests that Brentano "simply identified" with "Pascal's *vérité de raison* or *vérité de cœur*" (p. 134n). Pascal distinguished between truths known by reason and truths known by the heart. If there was one doctrine which Brentano repudiated most consistently and most firmly it was the notion that there could be knowledge based on non-rational grounds. What Mr. Kubat has done is to "simply identify" knowledge about emotions or attitudes with knowledge based on them.

Mr. Kubat has been complaining on the preceding page. Surprise turns to dismay when we are offered as a translation (or paraphrase?) of its meaning: "There is always a reference to reality in acts of mind." Dismay turns to despair, when we read on to learn that for Brentano "real" not only means as much as "factual" (*wirkliches*) but can also mean "acts of mind or relation of things (*Bewusstseinsakte, Sachverhalten*)."⁶ One of the primary motives in the development of Brentano's thinking from approximately 1904 on was the elimination of any need for *Sachverhalten*, *Wertverhalten*, etc. The doctrine that we can think of *Sachverhalten*, as we can think of things like tables, chairs, persons, and other individual real entities, he regards as one of the mistakes involved in his earlier point of view. In laying down the new dictum, that we can only think of real entities, he definitely and unquestionably intended to abandon it.⁶

Mr. Kubat offers an account not only of Brentano's final interpretation of value-expressions, based on the theory of moral knowledge and the denial of irreal objects of thought, but of its historical development as well. In a table on p. 135 he gives what are apparently intended to be four stages in the development of Brentano's ascription of meaning to the "category," good. The table is inaccurate and misleading both as history and as interpretation. I shall take up the four sections in order.

The first section is devoted to the theory Brentano held in 1866. Next to last among the theses he defended on the occasion of his habilitation at Würzburg was the definition (hardly surprising in a young Catholic priest-philosopher, as he was then) of the

⁶ "The most striking point in Brentano's latest theories is the claim that we can only have things (Reales) as objects. According to his earlier viewpoint, there are ideas of the non-real as well; the philosophy of his last years admits only real entities When a judgment is correct, many epistemologists speak not only of an immanent content, but of '*Sätzen an sich, Inhalten, Sachverhalten, Objektiven*, which exist in reality Brentano's opinion is that in the case of these expressions we are concerned with fictions." (Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano, Pp. 29f). Incidentally, there is no basis for saying, as Mr. Kubat does in a footnote to the passage I have just criticized, that Brentano "ascribes to the mind the formative faculty of the outside world."

concept, good, by the terms *expectendum*⁷ and *begehrenswert*. (The notion of a "solid quality of objects" is Mr. Kubat's own autonomous contribution.)

It is difficult to understand the relation between the next two sections of the chronological table, which are labelled "until 1889" and "1889" respectively. The dates of publication of the works cited in the footnote to "until 1889" are 1934, 1929, and 1892. Nineteen hundred and thirty-four, however, is the date of the third edition of the *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*, originally published in 1889. *Vom Dasein Gottes* (1929) is based on lectures held at Würzburg and Vienna from 1868 until 1891, and the published text is based for the most part on an 1891 manuscript copy which includes pages from earlier versions also.⁸ One of the passages cited by Mr. Kubat (p. 7) merely repeats the (1886) identification of "gut" and "liebenswert." The other (p. 291) concerns possible limitations on our knowledge of absolute or comparative values, and has nothing to say of the meaning of good, either word or category.

The third work cited, *Das Schlechte als Gegenstand dichterischer Darstellung*, was first published in 1892; it is the text of a lecture presented to a literary society in Vienna the year before, and no doubt includes some of the ideas which Brentano had developed while discussing the problem of evil in one of his courses late in 1891. Even if the page Mr. Kubat refers to (p. 13) included any doctrine about the meaning to be ascribed to *good*, it would afford no evidence as to the views he held until 1889. But in fact, it offers no evidence about his views on that question at any time at all.⁹

The third section of the table (1889) is supported by references located in two works, *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (1889) and *Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik* (1952). The

⁷ Not *expectandum*, M. Kubat's reading. See *Über die Zukunft der Philosophie*, op. cit. 140 f.

⁸ See the editor's preface, p. xvii.

⁹ Mr. Kubat omits any reference to the *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte* (1874) from his table entirely. This is too bad, for what he says about Brentano's views "until 1889" fits better some of the passages in that work than it does any he has cited. (See Chapter vii, Section 9).

latter work is based upon the lectures in Practical Philosophy which Brentano gave at Vienna between 1876 and 1894. Unfortunately, however, the passages to which Mr. Kubat refers all fall within a group of sections to which Mrs. Mayer-Hillebrand (who finished the editorial preparation of the volume after the death of Kastil, who had begun it) has attached a note which tells us that they had been edited by Kastil in the light of Brentano's more fully developed analyses. And in fact, these sections present the viewpoint which Mr. Kubat attempts to describe in his last section, "from 1901 on."

The net result of our examination of the sources which support the different accounts given of Brentano's theory of value in the years "until 1889" and in 1889 is that we are left with one legitimate source of each, the same one, the *Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* of 1889. I shall leave it to the curiosity and ingenuity of the reader to discover the subtle differences which distinguish, on the pages Mr. Kubat cites, the view Brentano held until that year from the view he held in it.

The choice of "from 1901 on" for the final section is a greater mystery. The footnote cites only an article which was composed in 1915.¹⁰ The conception of a linguistic fiction is applied to the problem of universals in a letter to Anton Marty dated March, 1901.¹¹ But the synsemantical interpretation of "good" which Mr. Kubat is attempting to state does not begin to emerge until 1904 (in correspondence with Anton Marty and Oskar Kraus). The publication in 1911 of *Die Klassifikation psychischer Phänomene*, with an appendix intended to "explain, defend, correct and extend" the theories that had originally been presented in 1874, was definitely the first public statement of the new theory.

¹⁰ Once again, the page M. Kubat cites (*Psychologie*, II, p. 215) does not include any specific reference to "good." A more apt choice would have been II, p. 162, in which it is specifically denied that goodness and badness can be objects of thought. The title of the section in which the passage occurs is "*Von den wahren und fiktiven Objekten*." It was first published in 1911.

¹¹ Published in *Wahrheit und Evidenz*, pp. 73 ff., with the title, "*Grammatikalische Abstrakte als sprachliche Fiktionen*."

Whatever the most suitable date might be, Mr. Kubat's account of Brentano's final theory is to be criticized on much more important grounds than that. His version of Brentano's analysis is frightfully inept and misleading. He is correct in saying that according to Brentano's final views, the word "good" does not refer to a property. Nevertheless, the account he gives of the proper interpretation of its use is a mare's nest. The correct account is this: When we say, for example, "pleasure is good," what we mean to express is at least in part an apodictic denial that anyone who has other than a pro-attitude toward pleasure could be right in that attitude, or in other words a denial that any emotional attitude toward pleasure could be both right and other than positive.¹²

So far I have concerned myself mainly with portions of Mr. Kubat's article which have the appearance of factual accounts, with a minimum of interpretation. I shall give a more summary criticism of its plainly interpretive features. One of the reasons for this procedure I have already mentioned—that the two tables in which Mr. Kubat presents his "imputation of structure into Brentano's writings" are beyond my comprehension. The other is that so far as I understand it, Mr. Kubat's interpretation of Brentano rests on one basic mistake. That mistake is an obstinate refusal to take seriously and literally those very features of Brentano's later theory which are described so inaccurately in the final section of the historical table.

Mr. Kubat sees Brentano's thinking as moving from one to the other of two alternatives. They are essentially the classical alternatives of objectivism and subjectivism. Either objects are good in themselves or goodness is bestowed upon them by our valuations of them. Because he sees only these two alternatives, Mr. Kubat, when he finds that Brentano came finally to deny that

¹² There is an exact analogy with judgments of existence which, Brentano holds, express an apodictic denial that anyone whose judgment of the object is other than affirmative could be right in so judging. See Oskar Kraus's introduction to *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*; his *Die Werttheorien* (Brünn, 1937), Chapter xxii; also Georg Katkov: *Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie und Theodizee* (Brünn, 1937), Chapter i, Sections 1-3. My dissertation (see note 4) is mainly devoted to the background and interpretation of this final phase of Brentano's analysis of value judgments.

values exist objectively as such in the objects of our valuations, leaps to the conclusion that Brentano had embraced the other alternative—GOOD (*per se*) is the total result determined by The Actor as CREATOR of values.¹³ It is of secondary importance that Mr. Kubat supposes Brentano to believe that the value bestowed upon the object really inheres in the act itself.

The reasons which led Brentano to abandon his earlier belief in the objectivity of values were linguistic. He came to believe that the word "value" is a synsemantical expression, that it does not have the function of referring to or naming anything. If he means what he says, it makes no more sense to say that values belong to the intentional act itself or are bestowed upon objects by the intentional acts which refer to them than it does to say that they exist in the objects themselves, or eternally in an ideal realm of essences, or anywhere you please. As Mr. Kubat does say, we use 'value' and 'good' as abbreviations. We use them instead of more complex locutions which would be less misleading to philosophers, just as mathematicians use abbreviations for the sake of convenience, although philosophers of mathematics are often misled by them. But, if we do use these abbreviations, we ought to use them correctly, and it is false on any adequate interpretation of Brentano's views to ascribe to him the doctrine that values are created or bestowed by human acts of valuation.

If in saying that values are objective we mean to ascribe to a certain kind of entities, values, a certain status in reality, it is true that his opinion changed from a positive to a negative one. The negative opinion, however, is all too easily misunderstood. To say in the material mode, values are not objective, as if this were merely the denial of the earlier judgment, values *are* objective, misses the point entirely, for it is really a metalinguistic point. The earlier view, values are objective, is later replaced by the doctrine, the word "value" does not possess any independent meaning of its own, does not name any kind of entity to which

¹³ From the table on p. 141. If we were to apply Brentano's parallels between judgment and attitude, value and existence, ('good' and 'true' or 'real'), what then? What REALITY (*per se*) is the Total result determined by the Judging Mind as CREATOR of truths?

a status in reality can be ascribed or denied. Mr. Kubat's failure to see how Brentano's conclusion differs from the ordinary denial of the objectivity of values is mainly responsible for errors in interpretation of which he is guilty.

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REMARKS ON PRICE'S "COMMENTS"

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THE QUESTIONS PROFESSOR PRICE raises in the foregoing *Comment*¹ are very stimulating and thought-provoking, and I am very happy to have this opportunity to reply. I shall make no attempt, however, at this time to answer them in the thorough and complete manner which they deserve. What is really required of course—as Professor Price himself suggests—is a more extensive statement of the inspective or classical theory as I envisage it. I plan to provide such soon.

As an immediate reply, meanwhile, I should like to make a remark or two about what is perhaps the central issue raised in the foregoing *Comment*. This is whether Price's dispositional reduction, or anyone's dispositional reduction can adequately render the act of thinking. Alternatively, the question could, I think, be stated in more presently-favoured language. One could ask whether statements about universals, thoughts, concepts, or ideas can be logically deduced from dispositional statements not containing these "mentalistic" terms. If one is inclined to prefer this more lengthy formulation one may then take this to be my meaning; whenever "dispositional solution" or "dispositional reduction" is mentioned one may translate it into this longer form.

In the original paper I suggested that this dispositional reduction could not render the *necessity* component which is peculiar to rational thinking; and a comparison was briefly suggested with an act of will. In these few pages I should like to enlarge on this somewhat, since I think such further consideration tends to contra-indicate the dispositional approach. Also, it will be noted that Price himself in the *Comment* feels that there may indeed be something wrong with it (*Comment*, p. 482). Further discussion of the matter seems then to be in order.

The dispositional reduction is supposed to get rid of the "mentalistic" entity from the thinking process. It is to allow us to

¹ See this *Review*, XII, No. 3 (March 1959), 481-485.

dispose of the troublesome *universal*, or the thoughts, concepts, or ideas that ordinary usage seems to assume in such expressions as "I have an idea" or "I apprehend the general principle." In its place it allows us to substitute ordinary perceptions, images, words, and perhaps other *occurrents* acceptable to contemporary philosophers. So the whole point of such a maneuver is to eliminate anything that is neither (x), ordinary "occurrences," nor (y), the appropriate hypothetical statements about these. (See Price, *Thinking and Experience*, pp. 320 f.). This is, I think, a species of a more general case which can be expressed as follows: (X) regular sequences of such *occurrences*, (Y) their description in words.

Price's rendering of the thinking process is just such a purely "descriptive" one, an approach perfectly consistent, one might add, with the basic tenets of the strictest empiricism. Thinking or "concept manifestation" is to be defined entirely in terms of certain describable series or sequences of ordinary phenomena. The same can be said, of course, for the familiar and much criticized dispositional reduction of material substance, force, elasticity, and other allegedly non-*occurrent* terms of the physical world. With respect to the physical world, however, Hume long ago pointed out that such an approach meant that we would have to forego any philosophical account of strict causal connection; the events to be connected were preserved all right, but whatever it was that linked them, itself not an *occurrent*, had to be abandoned. Henceforth there could no longer be a philosophical justification for the cause being the *reason* for the effect.

For a long time it has been the fashion to assume that this did not much matter: physical explanation is in no need of the "necessary connection"—particularly with the application of probability theory and the uncertainty principle. But even suppose this is so. One could, it seems, agree with the vast weight of current opinion here and yet still find it impossible to apply the same descriptive atomistic approach to the problem of thinking. The reason is, I think, fairly plain. While a necessary connection between physical events could perhaps be eliminated, the sequence of *occurrences* known as "thought" must have a necessary connection or it is simply not thought. For example, it may be tolerable

enough to lose the sense of its being necessary that the fire melted the wax; but it is not acceptable to omit to see the necessity by which "today is Tuesday" follows from "yesterday was Monday." If you do not "see" that the premise leads to the conclusion then you are not thinking. It is of course possible to come to a correct conclusion without thinking—by "chance", day-dreaming, etc. It is even possible to let one's mind drift through all the correct steps of a complicated proof—from the original premises right through to the conclusion—without thinking. (Presumably this is what happens in the mind of a dull but absorbent student.) Even if we prefer to avoid mentioning "mind," the same kind of argument obtains. For it seems that it is always conceivable that verbal behaviour could be absolutely correct and yet one could spoil everything by one very legitimate remark: "I said exactly the right thing without thinking." Of course your luck would have to be very good to do this very often.

And so whether our acceptable occurrents or "immediates" are confined to words, or whether they are expanded like Price's to include thinking in images or physical actions and things, we are still driven to the same impasse. The mere description of the thinking process is like the mere description of a physical happening. It describes a sequence of empirical realities. In addition, unfortunately there is something else to thinking that such a description misses and that is nonetheless essential. Our attention may be in some way directed to this by such terms as *insight* or *rational necessity*, and other expressions understandably abhorrent to the empiricist. But, whatever it is, if omitted it leaves us with a perfectly good empirical sequence but a sequence which is no longer thinking—an episode which is indeed only a "ghostly twin" of the original. The dispositional solution is such a kind of approach, that is, an approach which reduces thinking to a regularity of empirical occurrents. It seems it must therefore be regarded as untenable.

It is perhaps in conclusion worthwhile to continue the parallel with the *act of will*, and so let us very briefly attempt to indicate the corresponding peculiarity that arises there. Let us assume for the sake of brevity that the empirical approach will also fail with regard to the act of will. Then it would give us—

as in the case of the thinking act—the “ghostly twin” of a real act of will. In this case an example of the ghostly twin would perhaps be movement by post-hypnotic suggestion. Here we would be the passive spectator of our own (normally voluntary) bodily motions. And it is conceivable, it would be argued, that in each such case one could have exactly the same empirical sequence as in the corresponding genuine act of will. Granting the above assumptions the comparison between these two “twins” would prove most interesting. In the one case one would rightly say, “I acted” or “I moved.” In the other it would be more correct to say, “I merely observed myself moving.” In the first case if asked why you moved you could (if at a loss for any other kind of reason) reply, quite justly, “because I so willed.” In the other case you would perhaps say, “I just don’t know.” It is noteworthy here that the *acting* of the first case—as opposed to the passivity of the second—provides a reason or ground for the ensuing bodily movement. You are directly aware of the necessity of these motions; you in your innermost self are the cause and reason for them. There would be a sequence of empirical occurrents; but in this case they would be apprehended as a unity—connected, necessarily and inevitably, by what we call an act (of will). In the second case the sequence would have no more necessary connection than the empiricist’s elasticity or day-dreams.

These latter remarks about the act of will are not, of course, regarded as proving anything; I think, however, that they may provide a useful parallel illuminating to some extent the foregoing problem about the nature of the thinking act. I hope also that they will in some part comply with Professor Price’s suggestion that if one wishes to reinstate the knowing subject one should first say something about mental acts.

Finally, I wish to answer a point in his comment which is concerned more with the knowing subject or ego than with the specific problem of thinking. It is convenient, however, to answer this directly at this time. (Other queries will, as stated at the beginning, be answered indirectly in the next issue.) Professor Price remarks right at the end of his comment that I need not have limited the verification statements about the subject or ego to true statements. False statements, he says, would also have done.

This is, as he himself points out, a paraphrase of Descartes' strategem that I can verify the "I" not only when I am right but even when I am wrong. Professor Price is of course quite correct and I should probably have expanded my remarks to point out that some false statements would be acceptable. Not all, however. It depends on how they are false. When we move away from Descartes' self-referential *tour de force* and change from the first person pronoun into the second or third person we find examples of false statements that would not serve to verify the ego's existence. (Neither would they prove its non-existence.) For it must be true and not false that I act; and this was the truth I was insisting on. For example, if I were dead and someone were to say—over my dead body—"he acts," "he sees," "he wills," "he moves his arm." The term "he" refers, I think, to my ego as animating my observable body, and if I am dead this will by definition be false. It would have to be true before it could be cited as verification for the existence of my ego.

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SINNOTT'S PHILOSOPHY OF ORGANISM

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DAVID L. MILLER'S ARTICLE on "Sinnott's Philosophy of Purpose"¹ is an interesting discussion of this eminent biologist's orientation to problems of mechanism and vitalism as well as to the relation of Aristotle's "efficient causes" and "final causes" to living organisms, and yet it fails to represent adequately the significant aspects of Sinnott's views on a number of points which are enumerated below:

1. In the first place, Miller asserts that "Sinnott refuses classification."² It is not clear from the context whether this is a direct refusal on the part of Sinnott himself or merely a way of expressing Miller's impression that he has found Sinnott's philosophy so complex that it defies classification. Yet, Miller also states: "I agree with Sinnott and with all who advocate some sort of vitalism"³ and this would seem to be an association of Sinnott with vitalists. Towards the end of his article, however, Miller bluntly links Sinnott with the well-known materialist Ernst Haeckel:

Sinnott's philosophy reminds one more of Haeckel's than of any other work. Both use the reductionist's method—neither is able to grant finally the emergence of novelties. Neither avoids reductionism. . . . Although both men belabor the belief in evolution both finally deny it mainly because they do not recognize that emergents are not only new in the sense that they cannot be reduced to their causes but also in the sense that they are not predictable on the basis of a thorough knowledge of these causes in isolation.⁴

But this assertion would make of Sinnott a mechanist and a materialist and this is certainly a serious misinterpretation of his whole position which is not at all obscure but belongs to the general category of philosophies of emergent evolution which

¹ See this *Review*, XI (1958), pp. 637-47.

² *Ibid.*, p. 640 n.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 638.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 645-46.

accentuate the emergence of the new, the formation of wholes which are more than the sum of their parts, the hierarchical order of patterns of organization which possess new regulative properties quite different from the mechanical sum of the properties of their parts. Sinnott occupies a position midway between mechanism and vitalism,⁵ which all elementary books on philosophy describe under various names such as Emergent Evolution, Evolutionary Naturalism, Theory of Levels. This orientation of Sinnott is clear from:

During the past half century there has been a movement in biology and philosophy in a direction which offers promise of finding this middle way and bringing matter, life and mind—concepts which have reality and value but are so difficult to reconcile—into a common system. These new ideas center around the conception of *organization* as fundamental in biology, and of the organism as the great fact in the sciences of life. Aspects of this philosophy of organicism are evident in the work of Driesch, von Bertalanffy, Smuts, J. S. Haldane, Needham, Ritter, E. S. Russell, Ungerer, Schrödinger, Lloyd Morgan, Meyer Abich, Ralph Lillie, Whitehead and others.⁶

Since Sinnott has included so many instances of emergent evolutionists in his summary of a recent trend in philosophical biology, it is a little naive to suggest that he has made "a contribution which he may not suspect" since "he has shown that there is a difference between understanding phenomena in purely physico-chemical terms and understanding them in relation to the ends that actually follow."⁷ The whole point of any philosophy of emergent evolution is the affirmation of phenomena which display directed activities, self-regulation, new properties, which cannot be reduced to merely physico-chemical terms.

2. Confusion as to the meaning of purpose in Sinnott.

Miller asserts:

I believe that a fundamental weakness in Sinnott's philosophy of purpose is his belief that purposes as known by man are identical (except

⁵ Sir Julian Huxley tends to associate Sinnott far more with the vitalists than with any other school. This judgment, obtained in a conversation of the writer with Sir Julian, makes incredible Miller's connection of Sinnott with the materialists.

⁶ E. W. Sinnott, *Matter, Mind, and Man* (New York, 1957), p. 30.

⁷ Miller, pp. 641-42.

in degree) with "purposes" that control the growth and development of living organisms.⁸

Sinnott's philosophy, however, is not merely the reading of human purpose into low forms of life, nor is it motivated by the dualism of "final causes" and "efficient causes" so much emphasized by Miller. What Sinnott stresses is the self-regulative action of organisms in accordance with an immanent form and structure which guides the development of the organism to maturity and sustains the organism beyond maturity. This is a kind of teleology in organisms which resembles purposive action at the human level, and only at the human level. It is not necessary to read purposive action in the strictly self-conscious, human sense down into the lower organisms, but it would appear that self-regulation and patterns of organization are present at all levels in a hierarchical order⁹ in all forms of life. Obviously, the order at which the human mind emerges is immeasurably higher in complexity, direction, self-consciousness and value than the order of self-direction for an amoeba. The higher levels are not to be reduced to the lower levels even though Miller is of the opinion that Sinnott does so. In the words of Sinnott:

This organized system, maintained by the regulatory control of its activities, implies the presence within it of *something to which these activities tend to conform*, a norm, a standard, a goal or end, what the philosopher would call a *telos*, inherent in the whole living mass. Regulation to this norm bears such a close semblance to *purposive* action as to suggest the universal presence of a kind of teleology in organisms The sort of purpose here to be discussed, however, is activity which tends toward the realization of a developmental pattern or goal present in every living thing. Such teleology, far from being unscientific, is implicit in the very nature of organism.¹⁰

It is clear that Sinnott does not make purposive action in the human mind identical with the realization of a pattern of development in sub-human organisms.

⁸ Miller, p. 643.

⁹ See "The Hierarchical Continuity of Biological Order," in Joseph Needham, *Order and Life* (New Haven, 1936), pp. 109-168. See also Lancelot Law Whyte, *Accent on Form* (New York, 1954).

¹⁰ Sinnott, p. 42. See also Errol E. Harris, "Teleology and Teleological Explanation," *Journal of Philosophy*, LVI (1959), 5-25.

3. Agreeing that organisms do manifest "goals" Miller then asks two crucial questions:

- (1) Are these ends or "goals" (of which men are conscious) present in some form in the (sub-cognitive) life process even before they are actualized, so that their presence actually directs these processes, and thereby causes the later actualized form to become what it becomes?
- (2) If these "goals" are present in the living organism before their actualization and serve as causes, can they be understood or known in the first sense of understanding; i.e., will such understanding serve as a means of controlling phenomena and thereby serve as a means of determining the ends produced?¹¹

In dealing with the first question, let us call attention to the ambiguity involved in the idea that men are conscious of goals. Men are obviously conscious that the goal of an infant is to grow into a man, but are they conscious of the multifarious directed activities operating within that remarkable metaphysical structure which men call an "infant" which will assure the elongation of his bones, the enlargement of his organs, the new functions which will emerge at maturity as well as the unfolding of his ethical and religious interests? Neither Needham nor other eminent biologists can explain completely (in either sense of explanation presented by Miller) the embryonic development of an infant from a single cell, though it is a fascinating problem to the highest degree. The goals, in terms of immanent factors which direct the development of any organism from a single cell to maturity, are perceived by men in their outer manifestation, but their understanding in all details is certainly not yet achieved by the biological sciences, nor (it needs to be added) by any school of theology or philosophy. We are indeed dealing with the most complicated phenomena in the universe. However, philosophies of Emergent Evolution, or as they are sometimes called, Process Philosophy,¹² are an approach to such an understanding. It is a sobering thought that the nucleoproteins manufactured so nonchalantly in the chromosomes of his cells by the household cat are still imperfectly understood by the most brilliant chemists!¹³ The fond mother does not have the slightest

¹¹ Miller, p. 640.

¹² See W. H. Sheldon, *God and Polarity* (New Haven, 1954).

¹³ This remarkable behavior of organisms carried on unconsciously is paralleled by (and not reducible to) the wonder of C. F. von Weizsäcker

idea of the complex biochemical organizing agents or principles that are slowly forming the eye of her child, but she hopes that it is through this eye that he will perceive spiritual truth.

To the first question of Miller, then, we presume Sinnott would reply in the affirmative in the sense that the "goals" interpreted as mature organs and functions of the organism are in some way present as "blueprints" in the genetic material of the organism at conception. "Information theory" in biology is attacking this interesting problem.

To the second question of Miller with respect to whether these "goals," present as causes within the living organism, can "serve as a means of controlling phenomena and thereby serve as a means of determining the ends produced," a number of answers are possible. In the first place, our knowledge of the immanent processes of self-direction and maturation is certainly so fragmentary that we would not dream of having the capacity of controlling entirely the growth of the organism. Nor would we want to, had we the knowledge, since Nature does the job so well in most cases. But we can certainly interfere with the growth of the organism by experimenting with its various stages of development and thus modify or destroy the immanent causes working for the goals of mature functions. Aristotle did this when he broke an egg on successive days to ascertain the various stages of the chick embryo, and Driesch made many experiments of this nature.¹⁴ And furthermore, medical science knows to some degree how to control and redirect the development of the human organism whose organs and functions are impaired, or whose growth does not proceed according to the normal pattern of development. Examples of such causes which assist the immanent processes of development have the metaphysical simplicity of the medications recommended in doctors' prescriptions. One need not emphasize the role of

when he considers inanimate objects: "The objects of inanimate nature, too, are able to do their part without knowing it. We know that their motions conform to differential equations that we are able to integrate only in a few simple instances. But these inanimate objects, without hesitation, without error, simply by their existence, are integrating the equations of which they know nothing." *The History of Nature* (Chicago, 1949), p. 20.

¹⁴ See W. H. Werkmeister, *A Philosophy of Science* (New York, 1940), pp. 335-51, for experiments of Driesch and others.

insulin to restore the "goal" of the proper function of the pancreas; iodine to restore the "goal" of the normal function of the thyroid gland; milk to provide calcium for the "goal" of fully developed teeth—and one might add that before the synthesis of vitamin pills, cod liver oil was used to strengthen the "goal" of the optimum development of children.

It would seem that the sharp dichotomy between efficient causes and final causes presented by Miller cannot be sustained. What he calls final causes are dynamic patterns and processes of growth and self-regulation within each species, but these are assisted by such efficient causes as food supply, climatic conditions, competition of other species, environment, etc. A complete separation between efficient and final causes cannot be made any more than it can be made between heredity and environment.

4. Does Sinnott deny novelty? This is asserted by Miller:

Contrary to this belief in novelty, there is the attempt on the part of many biologists (and I believe this includes Sinnott) to reduce what at other times is thought of as new, to the old. Sinnott does not believe there is anything genuinely new in human purpose nor in thinking at the symbolic level.¹⁵

A single quotation from Sinnott will be sufficient to reject this allegation:

We should remember Lloyd Morgan's conception of "emergent evolution" which maintains that as evolution progresses new traits and properties emerge which are radically different from anything that has gone before. Thus life may be an emergent from lifeless matter, and the human attributes of mind, reason and spirit may have appeared successively, as living things reached higher evolutionary levels. These would never be suspected from a knowledge of viruses and protozoa. . . . Life continually aspires to higher goals.¹⁶

5. Sinnott not a reductionist but a spiritualist philosopher.

It is disconcerting to find repeated assertions in Miller's article to the effect that:

Sinnott's philosophy reminds one more of Haeckel's than of any other work. Both use the reductionist's method—neither is able to grant finally the emergence of novelties.¹⁷

¹⁵ Miller, p. 644.

¹⁶ Sinnott, p. 73.

¹⁷ Miller, p. 645.

Perhaps a reason for this misunderstanding is that Miller and Sinnott differ in their approach to a definition of life. Miller states:

... by definition a living organism may be distinguished from inorganic objects by the fact that final causes are operative in its behavior.¹⁸

But one may very well inquire, by what authority does Miller claim this statement as the definition of life? He is so fascinated by the operation of final causes as consciously selected by the human mind that he is impervious to definitions of life in other terms. Sinnott's primary emphasis in this approach to life is directive self-regulation which functions at all levels of the evolutionary ladder in a historical sense, as well as within the various levels—physical, chemical, organic, social, ethical, aesthetic—of the human organism at any one time:

This quality of directive self-regulation, whatever its final relation to chemical and physical processes may prove to be, is a uniquely biological phenomenon, and an understanding of it, I believe, will provide a clue to the character of life itself . . . Neither vitalism nor mechanism by itself gives a complete interpretation of life. Organization—self-regulation—must be accepted as a fundamental scientific reality.¹⁹

Sinnott is so impressed by this principle of self-regulation present in all forms of life that he postulates the directive activity of a Principle of Organization which he associates with an immanent view of God. Whether such a concept be acceptable to traditional theologians, one must pay tribute to Edmund W. Sinnott, Dean Emeritus of the Graduate School, Yale University, and at one time President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, for daring to wrestle with problems of biological order and religious insight and attempting to find an

¹⁸ Sinnott, p. 39. Another definition of life diverging from Miller's is this, given by one of the most eminent biologists of our time: "The necessary and sufficient condition for an object to be recognizable as a living organism, and so to be the subject of biological investigation, is that it be a discrete mass of matter, with a definite boundary, undergoing continual interchange of material with its surroundings without manifest alteration of properties over short periods of time, and, as ascertained either by direct observation or by analogy with other objects of the same class, originating by some process of division or fractionation from one or two pre-existing objects of the same kind." (G. Evelyn Hutchinson, "Biology," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1948).

avenue of reconciliation in the conception of an immanent Creativity active at all levels of reality. This is not the place to examine in detail Sinnott's theology of emergent organization—a type of empirical theism—nor to inquire into its ultimate religious adequacy. We merely wish to emphasize the contributions of Sinnott as one of the few biologist-philosophers who, animated by a genuine metaphysical interest, has seized on a generalizing principle of some significance in philosophies of Emergent Evolution in order to arrive at that unitary concept of Reality which is sought by science, philosophy and religion:

If the highest expression of biological goal-seeking is the human spirit, what relation can there be between this and a greater Spirit in the universe? In evolution life has reached ever higher goals and levels of organization, and has continually opposed the downward and disorganizing tendency of lifeless matter. This suggests that in nature there is a Principle of Organization which, through life, brings order out of chaos, spirit out of matter, and personality out of impersonal stuff. This principle we may identify as an attribute of God.¹⁹

Surely this is not at all what Ernst Haeckel would write, and to confuse Sinnott with Haeckel is an act of "reductivism" on the part of Miller.

Quinnipiac College.

¹⁹ E. W. Sinnott, *The Biology of the Spirit* (New York, 1955), p. 122. See also Sinnott, *Two Roads to Truth* (New York, 1953). Note also the position of Canon Charles E. Raven in which he admits that "he has become increasingly sure of the continuity of biological and historical studies, that the story of evolution is in series with that of humanity, and that, if the whole record down to and including Christ is accepted as covering a single process, it discloses a remarkable coherence and can be interpreted consistently in terms of what St. Paul declared to be its end, "the manifestation of the sons of God." *Natural Religion and Christian Theology* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 16. Pertinent to this discussion are the profound biological studies of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, animated by the vision of an emergent universe: "Si l'Univers nous apparaît sidéralement comme une voie d'expansion spatiale (de l'Infime à l'Immense); de même, et plus clairement encore, il se présente à nous, physico-chimiquement, comme en voie d'enroulement organique sur lui-même (du très simple à l'extrêmement compliqué), — cet enroulement particulier "de complexité" se trouvant expérimentalement lié à une augmentation corrélative d'intériorisation, c'est-à-dire de psyché ou conscience." *Le Phénomène Humain* (Paris, 1955), p. 334.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS *

ROBERT F. TREDWELL AND STAFF

BECKER, O. *Das mathematische Denken der Antike*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1957. 128 pp. 9,50 DM—An anthology, in German translation with brief historical and mathematical notes, of selected theorems and proofs which the author has chosen as perfect specimens of the mode of mathematical thinking reflected in the development of pure mathematics in Greece. Both the scholarship and the selection are excellent. — R. S. B.

BECKNER, M. *The Biological Way of Thought*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. iv, 200 pp. \$6.00—Beckner provides splendid examples of the "distinctively biological" concepts, analyses, and intuitions of the organicistic biologists in this philosophical study. His discussions of the role of models and of functional analysis and teleological explanations are especially interesting. — R. P.

BERGSON, H. *The World of Dreams*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. 58 pp. \$2.75—In this popular essay (which appeared as an eight-page article titled "Le Rêve" in 1901), Bergson presents the view that the indistinct sensations of the *disinterested* dreamer serve to choose those memories which will come from the unconscious (much as does the present situation in the case of the conscious individual). The translation is easy and accurate. — R. P.

CARNAP, R. *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications*. New York: Dover Publications, 1959. xiv, 241 pp. \$1.85—An accelerated introductory text in symbolic logic, this work is a translation and revision of Carnap's 1954 *Einführung*. . . . The latter portion of the book is devoted to semantics and to axiom systems in areas as diverse as geometry and biology. — R. P.

CHRISTIAN, W. A. *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. xii, 419 pp. \$6.00—Christian offers us a clear and detailed analysis of Whitehead's three primary types of entities: actual occasions, eternal objects, and God. He

* Books received will be acknowledged in this section by a brief résumé, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgment does not preclude more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. The Summaries and Comments will be written by the Managing Editor and his staff of assistants, with the occasional help of others. Reports have been contributed to this issue by Richard J. Bernstein, Robert S. Brumbaugh, Donald W. Sherburne, Erling Skorpen, and John T. Wilcox.

endeavours to show how Whitehead's account satisfies his own requirements of categorial explanation and that these three types, together with creativity, require one another. The analysis is focused by a concern for the twin concepts of transcendence and immanence which, while shown to apply to all three types, are seen to be particularly relevant to Whitehead's revision of traditional theology. Christian remains faithful to the text while strenuously probing its inner structure. — L. S. F.

ERDAILY, J. *Philosophy for a New Civilization*. New York: Vantage Press, 1959. vii, 318 pp. \$5.00—The author conceives of his grandiose world view and proposals for biological human selectivity as based on a new scientific philosophy, but the book seems to share little with either organized science or disciplined philosophy. — F. E. B.

FINDLAY, J. N. *Hegel: A Re-Examination*. London & New York: George Allen & Unwin; Macmillan, 1958. 372 pp. \$6.00—Beginning with an attempt to remove what he believes are the most common misconceptions about Hegel, e.g., that he is a "transcendent metaphysician," a "subjectivist," and an "a priorist," Findlay goes on to deal with Hegel's concept of *Geist* and his dialectical method. He argues that Hegel's philosophy does not consist of a body of truths, but rather of an exhaustive and subtle analysis of all possible ways of conceiving experience. Hegel's is, he holds, "one of the most anti-metaphysical of philosophical systems, one that remains most within the pale of ordinary experience, and which accords no place to entities or properties lying beyond that experience, or to facts undiscoverable by ordinary methods of examination" (348). — R. E.

FRANCHINI, R. *Metafisica e Storia*. Napoli: Giannini, 1958. 298 pp. L 2000, \$4.00—In this volume Franchini has collected a number of his articles and book reviews. In them he investigates and rejects the methodology of "existentialism" and "neo-positivism," and defends instead a historicoproblematic method deriving from Croce. — R. D. G.

FRIEDRICH, C. J. *The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. x, 253 pp. \$4.75—An excellent and succinct historical survey of the major philosophies of law as seen in the leading political philosophers, this work explores the connection between views of law and the philosophical outlooks on which they are based. It also includes a short analysis of some current problems, such as the relation of law to justice, and it suggests the feasibility of international constitutional law. — F. E. B.

GEIGER, G. R. *John Dewey in Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. vi, 248 pp. \$5.50—In this comprehensive exposition and defense of Dewey, Geiger uncovers a number of prevailing misinterpretations of Dewey's philosophy. He carefully distinguishes what Dewey believed from the myth which has developed around his name. Geiger also discusses the importance of the esthetic aspect of Dewey's theory of experience. — R. J. B.

GILKEY, L. *Maker of Heaven and Earth*. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959. 311 pp. \$4.50—Gilkey forcefully argues that the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* is required by the Christian view of reality. After determining the meaning and limits of this doctrine, he investigates its implications for the nature of God, the status of the world as created, the purpose of the Incarnation, the problem of evil, and the meaning of time. This is a popularization in the best sense, for the author sketches in enough background to enable him to inform the general reader without falling into oversimplification. — L. S. F.

HALLIE, P. P. *Maine de Biran: Reformer of Empiricism—1766-1824*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. 217 pp. \$4.50—Taking Locke's epistemology as a starting-point, Maine de Biran elaborated the notions of expectation of resistance and kinaesthetic response into a theory which attempted to account for the origin of our ideas of personal identity and causation. In this clear and intelligent study, Hallie compares Maine de Biran to the British empiricists, finding him most in sympathy with Berkeley; he also assesses the importance and limitations of this internal critique of empiricism for both empiricism and later French philosophy. — R. F. T.

HIRSCHBERGER, J. *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2 vols. Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1957. I: xvi, 476 pp. DM 24; II: svi, 641 pp. DM 32. Received also English version: *History of Philosophy*, trans. A. M. Fuerst. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958. 516 pp. \$8.00—Written in the genre of Windleband's histories, this text is designed for use in a course in which the students have little or no access to primary sources, or as a reference work. The translation is rather less ponderous than the original, and its supplementary readings have been altered for American students. — R. F. T.

HEIGEGGER, M. *What is Philosophy?* trans. with intr. by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1958. 97 pp. \$3.00—This edition of one of Heidegger's minor essays—*Was ist das—die Philosophie?*—contains the German text and a translation, (which is generally good), on facing pages. — L. S. F.

HEIDEMANN, I. *Spontaneität und Zeitlichkeit*. Köln: Kölner Universitäts Verlag, 1958. 275 pp. DM 24—Stressing the importance of Kant's revisions in the second edition of the *Critique*, the author advances the thesis that being-in-itself is determinable as a spontaneity which determines the manifold in time. A well-written, stimulating, and highly speculative study of time and spontaneity in Kant's thought. — K. H.

JACOBY, J. E. *Across the Night: Adventures in the Supranormal*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. xii, 110 pp. \$3.75—Jacoby supplements his description of a mystical religious experience with a random survey of favorable interpretations of supranormal experience. — F. E. B.

KLEMMT, A. *Karl Leonhard Reinholds Elementarphilosophie*. Hamburg: Verlag Felix Meiner, 1958. xvi, 596 pp. DM 66—Not only does Klemmt

succeed in showing the importance of Reinhold as a key figure between Kant and Fichte, but he also establishes the originality of his work; especially interesting is his analysis of Reinhold's philosophy of consciousness, which anticipated important tenets of phenomenology. To regard this study as merely historical would be a mistake, for it is an impressive attempt to investigate some of the fundamental principles of theoretical philosophy. — K. H.

LANGER, S. K., ed. *Reflections on Art*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. xviii, 364 pp. \$6.50—All the authors represented in this "source book to serve independent study on the part of scholars and fairly advanced students in philosophy of art" share Miss Langer's predilection for two basic concepts: "expressiveness" and "semblance," which "defines the work of art as a wholly created appearance, the Art Symbol." Thus while it would not serve as a survey text, nevertheless presents many provocative essays which have not been available in English or in other easily obtainable collections. — D. W. S.

LORENZEN, P. *Formale Logik*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958. 165 pp. DM 4.80—After introducing and illustrating the idea of a calculus, this work develops a philosophically interesting but technical theory of the foundation of logic, in connection with propositional calculi and in relation to recent metamathematical research; then quantification theory is introduced, including material on completeness and undecidability and the theory of equality. Not just another logic text, this information-packed little treatise will probably find a place among the classical introductions to the field. — L. K. B.

MEYER, H. *Systematische Philosophie*, II. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1958. ix, 503 pp. DM 28.00—Throughout this eclectic work in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, Meyer displays an amazing breadth of knowledge; but his attempt to do justice to many different views frequently makes it impossible for him to make more than a few general remarks. Besides the traditional questions of metaphysics and philosophical anthropology, he discusses developments in modern physics, cosmology, biology, and psychology. — K. H.

MUNITZ, M. K., ed. *A Modern Introduction to Ethics*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958. viii, 657 pp. \$7.50—Though hardly technical enough for an ethics course, this comprehensive book of readings would be useful in a course on the ideals of civilizations, Eastern and Western. — F. E. B.

ONG, W. J. *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*. Cambridge, Mass., 1958. xix, 408 pp. \$10.00—Three things make Father Ong's work on the sixteenth-century dialectician Peter Ramus an important contribution to the history of logic and letters. First, he has prudently avoided the temptation to make Ramus a hero or villain and to evaluate his work on its logical merits. His treatment is therefore balanced and well-directed, for Ramus was neither a great thinker nor (apparently)

a great man. Ramus's reforms appear here as epiphenomena of the humanistic reform of pedagogy, and the connection between logic and the demands of the university curriculum thus receives much needed attention. Finally, this book marks one of the first important attempts to apply the contrast between the personal communication through dialogue with the objective, impersonal conveying of information by the written word to the history of philosophy and the interpretation of the Renaissance. — R. F. T.

ONG, W. J. *Ramus and Talon Inventory*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. 558 pp. \$10.00—The extent of the diffusion of the works of Ramus and Talon becomes apparent from this short-title inventory: there were over 300 editions of Ramus's *Dialectic* alone, most of them within the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The locations of copies of the various editions are given, and a number of the more important disputes in which Ramus' disciples engaged are followed out. — R. F. T.

POLE, D. *The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein*. Fair Lawn, N. J.: Essential Books, 1958. 132 pp. \$2.40—Pole neatly characterizes Wittgenstein's philosophical method in the *Investigations* and *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, and, in an epilogue, Wisdom's procedure in *Other Minds* and *Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis*. Although he criticizes both for their emphasis on ordinary usage to the exclusion of creative philosophizing, his work is sympathetic and will be useful both to those who know Wittgenstein's works well and to those who do not. — E. S.

RAMIREZ, S. *La Filosofia de Ortega y Gasset*. Barcelona: Herder, 1958. 474 pp. \$4.90—Ortega's philosophy is expounded here in his own words—in 150 pages of carefully selected (and documented) short passages, radically reorganized into just the sort of systematic statement which Ortega never gave. On the basis of a very brief and formal restatement of the position, condensed from the anthology-like version, Ortega's thought is examined minutely, first on philosophical grounds (St. Thomas comes out on top), and then from the standpoint of Roman Catholic dogma and theology. — L. K. B.

ROBERTS, H. C., ed. *The Complete Prophecies of Nostradamus*. New York: Nostradamus, Inc., 1949. vi, 350 pp. \$5.00—This bilingual edition, apparently complete, reveals the prophet's vision of World War II and subsequent events. Apparently prophets too must be interpreted anew with each succeeding generation. — R. P.

SCHELER, M. *Philosophical Perspectives*, trans. Oscar A. Haac. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. viii, 144 pp. \$5.00—This group of essays concerns man, history, and culture—particularly the interdependence of the philosophical vocation and the supporting culture. Scheler's writing is engaging and lively, but unsystematic in presentation. The translation is good. — L. S. F.

SCHWITTERS, K. *Kurt Schwitters in England*, ed. and int. S. Themerson. London: Gaberbocchus Press, 1958. 64 pp. 25s—This expensively produced and well-illustrated little volume contains the unpublished writings in English of the father of Merz. Besides the expected whimsical poems, among them the English version of the famous Ur-Sonata (Lunke trr gll . . .) the reader will find some touching prose sketches in which the poet describes his despair during the war years. — K. H.

SPARSHOTT, F. E. *An Enquiry into Goodness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. 295 pp. \$5.50—From the apparently simple formula "To say that x is good is to say that it is such as to satisfy the wants of the person or persons concerned," Sparshott develops a subtle and self-critical analysis of evaluative language, incorporating much of classical and very recent ethical theory. A stimulating treatise. — J. T. W.

STAVENHAGEN, K. *Person und Persönlichkeit*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1957. 309 pp. 24 DM—The *Wertethik* of Scheler and Hartmann forms the basis of this posthumous essay in philosophical anthropology. — L. S. F.

STEINBACH, A. A. *Faith and Love*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 114 pp. \$3.00—A collection of short, inspirational essays—some new—written to help the reader regain confidence in himself through love (God's voice) and faith (man's answer). — R. D. G.

STERLING, R. W. *Ethics in a World of Power: The Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. xiii, 318 pp. \$6.00—Meinecke sought in the nation-state the means for harmonizing the need for power and the demands of justice. This sensitive and scholarly intellectual biography may serve as a commentary on the important German political philosophers (from whose ideas Meinecke departed) and on German political history over the last 150 years — F. E. B.

SULLIVAN, C. J. *Critical and Historical Reflections on Spinoza's Ethics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958. 45 pp. \$1.00—Through a series of brief but specific internal critiques of Spinoza's system, Sullivan seeks to show that Spinoza tried to be both a supernaturalist and a naturalist, an idealist and a realist. — L. S. F.

TALLET, J. *The Absolute Being*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. 74 pp. \$3.00—"The absolute is the total existence, the last key to existence is existence itself, the fact of existing. That does not say definitely anything. On the contrary it is an imprecise statement," the author tells us. But he does not elaborate. — R. D. G.

TORRANCE, T. F. *When Christ Comes and Comes Again*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1958. 192 pp. \$3.00—The content of the evangelical message of the church should be centered around the

acts of God in Christ, the author holds in these sixteen sermons. — F. E. B.

TUGENDHAT, E. *Ti Kata Tinos: Eine Untersuchung zur Struktur und Ursprung Aristotelischer Grundbegriffe*. Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1958. x, 160 pp. N. P.—This careful and detailed inquiry is an exploration of the inner tension in Aristotle of the "presence" of specific form and the "presentation" of concrete type instance, by way of a study of predication and its ontological ground. — R. S. B.

WEIL, S. *Intimations of Christianity among the Ancient Greeks*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. vii, 208 pp. \$3.95—Miss Weil's perception is acute and refreshing, but also fanciful and undisciplined. Her premonitions of Christianity in the *Iliad*, *Antigone*, the Prometheus myth and Plato's *Timaeus* and *Symposium* are based on allegorical interpretations. — L. S. F.

WHITE, M. *Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning*. Cambridge, Mass., 1959. xi, 140 pp. \$3.50—These ten essays are concerned with the broader aspects of analytic philosophy. White would like to see the tools of logical analysis, developed over the past 50 years, applied to fields other than logic and scientific methodology, in particular, to the philosophy of law, politics, education, religion, and history. In the title essay he argues that religion should be taught as part of our cultural heritage, and not for the purpose of encouraging student commitment. — L. S. F.

WILL, F. *Intelligible Beauty in Aesthetic Thought from Winckelmann to Victor Cousin*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1958. 211 pp. DM 75.80—In this study of aesthetics during the eight decades from 1755 to 1833, Will argues that those thinkers who steered away from the dualistic, neo-classical concern with ideal beauty and turned to a monistic, organic approach to the intelligibility of beauty were pushing the Platonic-Plotinian tradition toward clearer thought concerning beauty, and were also laying the groundwork for Hegel's idealism. He concludes that Hegel's systematization of this strand of thought constitutes "an oblique argument in favor of the major tradition of philosophical idealism." — D. W. S.

WOLF, E. *Recht des Nächsten, ein rechtstheologischer Entwurf*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1957. 75 pp. DM 5.80—Statement of the problem rather than arguments for any conclusion dominates this brief essay on the nature and implications of the Christian commandment to love one's neighbor — L. S. F.

The Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union of the American States. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. cxiv, 409 pp. \$1.75—Madison's Notes of the Convention debates are the central document in this fine series covering the period from the Declaration of Rights of the Stamp Act Congress to the ratification of the Constitution. The editor's excellent introduction and notes sketch the background and influences on American Constitutionalism. — R. J. B.

Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, LXIII. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. 528 pp. \$7.50—Werner Jaeger's seventieth birthday is marked by this well-deserved *Festschrift* containing some thirty articles by colleagues and students as well as a list of Jaeger's publications (1911-1959). Of special interest are Leonard Woodbury's "Parmenides on Names," Friedrich Solmsen's "Aristotle and pre-Socratic Cosmogony," and Joshua Whatmough's reading of νόητος νοήσεως as a superlative. — R. P.

JEVONS, W. S. *The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method.* New York: Dover Publications, 1958. liii, 786. \$2.98 (Photographic reprint).

JOHNSON, A. B. *A Treatise on Language.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959. vii, 312 pp. \$1.50. (Introduction rewritten; text retains the original pagination.)

LAMONT, W. DÈ *The Value Judgement.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1955. xv, 335 pp. 25s.

MUNITZ, M. K. *Moral Philosophy of Santayana.* New York: The Humanities Press, 1958. vii, 116 pp. \$3.50. (Photographic reprint.)

PARKE, N. G. III. *Guide to the Literature of Mathematics and Physics including related works on engineering science.* New York: Dover Publications, 1958. xviii, 436 pp. \$2.49.

POINCARÉ, H. *The Value of Science.* New York: Dover Publications, 1959. 147 pp. \$1.35. (Photographic reprint.)

v. WEIZSACKER, C. F. *The History of Nature.* Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1959. vi, 191 pp. \$1.25.


ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Metaphysical Society of America, at its meetings at Brooklyn College March 20-21, 1959, installed the following new officers: President: Professor Richard McKeon, the University of Chicago; Secretary-Treasurer: Professor Francis H. Parker, Haverford College. The 1960 meetings of the Society will be held at Notre Dame University next March; the program will be announced at a later date. The Society welcomes application for membership from all philosophers with interest and competence in metaphysical problems regardless of personal philosophical position. Dues are \$3.00 a year. Applications for membership and dues may be sent to the secretary-treasurer: Francis H. Parker, Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania.

A colloquium will be held in London from September 8th-18th, 1959, under the general title of "Contemporary British Philosophy—its Scope and Relations." Professor H. B. Acton, University of London, will act as Director of Studies. Interested persons may obtain further information by writing The British Council, 65 Davies Street, London W1.

The Sixth Inter-American Congress of Philosophy will take place at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, from August 31 to September 5, 1959.

The Philosophical Library is sponsoring an essay contest which closes two weeks before Christmas. The competing essays should be from 25,000 to 75,000 words long, and deal with the general topic *Philosophy and Religion in a Time of Stress*. The grand prize of \$500 will be a down payment toward usual royalties at time of publication of the winning essay in book form.



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